What to do about Chechnya?

The Chechen Conflict offers a glimpse on a small scale, what the Global War on Terror is likely to resemble in a few years time, if the US insists on countering its terrorism problem as Russia has. Russia has adopted a no-negotiation policy with regards to the Chechen separatists. Russia regards the Chechens they are fighting as terrorist who need to be eradicated. However, Russia’s policy has been largely unsuccessful, even given that the Russian army has killed virtually all the indigenous Chechen leaders identified at the start of the conflict. More leaders have sprung up, and foreign Islamists have thrown in with the local Chechen resistance. The Russians have not shown the ability to destroy the Chechen forces, and the Chechens have shown no ability to do anything but strike back with terrorism against civilians, and small scale harassment attacks against the Russian forces on the ground. There is no sense of impending resolution on the battlefield, or any where else in this conflict.

The Mediator in the Chechen simulation succinctly distilled the conflict down to its essence; 1) the Russians have a veto in the UN, which forestalls that organization from serving as mediator. 2) The Russians and the Chechen cannot agree even on the type of conflict they are having, with the Russians seeing the war as a battle to prevent secession, and the Chechens fighting to prevent genocide. 3) Neither side can muster the power to defeat the other. And finally 4) neither side has a reason to end the conflict. The Mediator suggests that all this perhaps adds up to an impasse that the sides must address.

The Chechen conflict certainly looks like an impasse. Since 1994 Russia has attempted to quell the uprising in Chechnya but the justification for that action has changed. “If Yeltsin's war was purportedly about preserving the union, Putin's has now become about defending it -- against bandits, terrorists, and radical Islam.” (King) The conflict has mutated over the years but neither side has been able to establish control. The status quo is one of kidnappings on both sides, press censorship and reprisal killings. The conflict is now between a pro-Russia ruling clique against an Islamist resistance made up mostly of foreign fighters. After consulting the most recent stories about Chechnya of the pro-Russian Itar-TASS.com and the pro Chechen kavkazcenter.com, there are stories of military victories by their respective sides, but very little about gaining control. The Mediator’s assessment that Chechnya is at impasse seems prescient.

Mayer has a benign view of impasses, arguing that there are often good reasons for the parties to be in impasse, often because an impasse can serve the objective of one or both parties. Mayer calls these impasses which serve the needs of one or the other in a conflict “tactical impasses” and characterizes them in this way: “when disputants refuse to proceed with a resolution effort in an attempt to increase their negotiating power, to put pressure on others to make concessions, or to enhance their negotiating position in some way.” Mayer goes on to note that “tactical impasses usually result from a short-term calculation of costs and benefits and usually do not last very long.” (Mayer, pg 169) Given that the Chechen conflict is entering its 12th year, this impasse seems to have moved past the tactical into what Mayer calls the “genuine.”

“Genuine impasse occurs when people feel unable to move forward with a resolution process without sacrificing something important to them…Usually, disputants experience this kind of impasse as beyond their control, and feel they have no acceptable choice but to try to remain there.” (Mayer, pg 171) This quotation accurately describes what is happening in Chechnya. Charles King, in the September 24, 2004 issue of foreignaffairs.org calls the conflict “Russia's unwinnable war against Chechen secessionism.” The war may well be unwinnable, but it is also one that the Russian government, for reasons related to the oil trade, but largely for psychological reasons, cannot avoid. Boris Yeltsin, on a fishing trip to Norway, gave some insight into the Russian point of view: “Russia must not allow Chechnya to break away, nor can Russian authorities ‘negotiate with bandits.’” (Washington Times) Yeltsin asserts that Russia cannot allow secession of Chechnya, as if that is a self-evident proposition. Now, after 12 years of fighting, and a quarter of the Chechen population dead or having fled, Russia has too much invested, in terms of lives lost, and the Chechens have perpetrated too many atrocities to allow any negotiations, much less concessions. But on a deeper level than this strictly pragmatic consideration, Russian people are predisposed to resist the breakup or loss of any part of their territory they consider as part of Mother Russia. Chechnya is such a part. The Russian government cannot relinquish their hold on Chechnya.

The situation in Chechnya is a genuine impasse, and not a benign one. Sensing the intractability of this conflict, the participants in the recent simulation offered various means of breaking the stalemate, the majority of which revolved around calling in some external international body to mediate, intercede, or create some kind of buffer between the forces which would allow a cooling off period. After some time had passed, most participants advocated convening some kind of Truth and Reconciliation Commission to allow the airing of grievances with the hope that exposing the truth about atrocities on both sides would prevent reprisal violence.

This recommendation of truce, followed by peacekeeping, mediation and a TRC is much more likely to be successful in an environment without an active low intensity conflict (like South Africa) or where the dominant power in the conflict is willing to acquiesce to the process (like East Timor). Russia has shown zero willingness to “negotiate with bandits” as Yeltsin put it, or open the conflict to international news media, much less mediation groups. Further, Russia has the diplomatic power to prevent any international organization from imposing a settle, and Russia has the military means to resist any power from crossing its borders to force a truce.

The other disputant, Chechnya, has been infiltrated and radicalized by the presence of Islamic fundamentalists who are ideologically motivated to fight. These fundamentalists see the battle in Chechnya as one to defend their faith. They have no desire to negotiate because there is nothing that Russia can offer them that tops the heavenly rewards their faith offers them should they die in the battle. So, one disputant cannot concede land because to do so is a psychological impossibility while the other cannot concede because to do so would be a blasphemy.
One additional solution not mentioned in the simulation but suggested by the intractability on both sides is that one side or the other will give up through exhaustion. Both sides are apparently trying this solution. The Chechens have brought the war into Russian urban centers in the hope that the population of Russia will tire of the losses and demand Russian forces withdrawal from Chechnya. Russia has apparently embarked on a “scorched earth” policy of their own in Chechnya, outside the watch of the media. These tactics worked in the US Civil War and World War II, the theory goes, they may work in Chechnya. However, this hope for victory though exhaustion is illusory. The Chechens have access to unlimited capital through petrodollars controlled by sympathetic Islamic regimes, and virtually unlimited fanatical recruits who will flock to their banner. Russia has massive material advantage, and enough authoritarianism extant in their government to ignore popular discontent over the pursuit of the war. Exhaustion no longer has a place. “Wars are limited with exacting refinement to achieve very specific political objectives. In such a world, the strategy of exhaustion—a strategy that helped bring decisive victory in some of the most horrific conflicts mankind has ever seen—no longer has a place. Its provocative nature, the greater perceived benefits of peace, and the scaled-down nature of modern conflicts have all combined to bring about its obsolescence.” (Smith)

The critical factors in this conflict are the attitudes of those in the conflict. Negotiation, military defeat, and attrition are not effective weapons against ideologies. The only effective weapon against intractable ideologies is utter, unconditional surrender like in the US Civil War and World War II, or by having the more irrational elements of the ideology collapse in the face of moral suasion over time as happened to the anarchists at the turn of the century. As Smith pointed out, the era where one combatant can force an opponent into unconditional surrender has probably past. So, we are left with the idea that one or the other side in the Chechen conflict will experience an evolution in their ideology so that they are less confrontational, and more willing to reach past the impasse to craft a solution. Unfortunately, as the Islamists move toward the acquisition of nuclear weapons, combined with their enthusiasm for suicide missions, time is not something in abundance. The world may be compelled by necessity to return to a concept though to be passé: forcing surrender conditions onto an abjectly defeated enemy.
Sources cited

King, Charles. “Crisis in the Caucasus: A New Look at Russia's
Chechen Impasse.” Foreign Affairs Magazine; March/April 2003.

Mayer, Bernard. Dynamics of Conflict Resolution. Jossey Bass
(San Francisco); 2000.

Smith, Lawrence M. “Rise and Fall of the Strategy of
Exhaustion”. Army Logistician Magazine; November/December
2004.

Washington Times. “UPI Hears…” 19 August 2004.

15th Century Japanese Martial Philosophy

It is necessary to be careful in examining Miyamoto Musashi’s philosophy, not to be too ethnocentric. A society in which some individuals, by virtue of their birth, are allowed to carry weapons and terrorize the productive members of society without due process is anathema now. However, Musashi grew up in those surroundings and flourished in them. As an old man, he wrote a treatise that sought to justify the hereditary caste system by essentially saying that his success in the martial arts meant the samurai system was right.

Examine the “philosophy” in the Five Rings. Even given the limitations inherent in translations, Musashi’s pronouncements are vague and always end with the exhortation such as: it must be “investigated carefully,” “it takes work,” “requires thorough practice.” He concludes with a question that is quite revealing: “Who in the world can attain the direct penetration of military science? Training and refining day and night with the derermination to eventually consummate it, after having perfected it, one gains a unique freedom, spontaneously attains wonders, and is endowed with inconceivable powers of penetration. This is how cosmic law is carried out through martial arts.” (pg 49)

Musashi recognizes that what he is teaching requires a lifetime of dedicated study to master. Therefore, those who would master “cosmic law” must have the absolute freedom to pursue these studies, which meant these “scholars” had to be free from mundane considerations like feeding and clothing themselves to focus on the “cosmic.” The samurai system was perfectly constructed to provide the time and the means for this study. Samurai had the weapons and the will to oppress and exploit the other sectors of society. “Philosophies” like those of Musashi provide the theoretical framework for exploitation that allowed those with weapons to oppress everyone else, seemingly with the sanction of the heavens.

It is not easy to determine what the average Japanese thought of these strutting strongmen, because this system survived for generations. Even today, you see the great respect give to order in the Japanese society, and outlook that was carried into their society on the edge of the samurai’s sword. Or as Hane says: “Thus it might be said that the courtesy, politeness, humility and subservience of the common people were instilled in them at the edge of the sword.” (pg 32) In Shogun, Blackthorne and the Western men are disgusted and fearful of the arbitrary and absolute power of the samurai. Clavell may be attempting to communicate a universal disgust which was shared by the Western men and the Japanese alike, upon which he will expound later in the readings. It is clear the samurai, the warrior scholars, were very impressed with their power and their seeming sanction from God. It will be very interesting to discern whether the oppressed classes were as enthusiastic about their lot as the samurai were with theirs.

Pre 13th Century Chinese Navy

The entire pre-historical travels of the aboriginal people has been the source of much speculation and wonder. Levathes devotes a page or so to this great movement from the Chinese mainland out into the Pacific, but that feat ranks as one of the most impressive maritime accomplishments in human history. The idea of pushing off from the southern tip of Taiwan, thinking that there is some land relatively close by, based on the flotsam and the movement of clouds far in the offing, is nonetheless quite daunting. It is undeniable that it too great courage to shove off from land, into the unknown, but it may have been the courage born of necessity. By 7000BC, there is a likelihood that the Taiwan’s arable land and wildlife had been exploited to the breaking point which gave men looking to raise families little choice but to fight for what was available or take their chances on the sea. For many, obviously, they took their chances.

The author does point out the many linguistic and cultural similarities that exist around the Pacific Rim. These similarities are compelling and indicate, at least to me, that people descended from those who lived in what is now southeastern China populated the Pacific. The implication is that these people displayed great courage, and great seamanship. It is not surprising that their descendents would build great navies in the next few thousand years.

In this line of courageous characters is Xu Fu. Sent by the Qin emperor to find some magic elixir in 219BC, Xu Fu would disappear for years before re-appearing to request youth for colonization or for more supplies. Given that Xu Fu traveled east from the Bohai Gulf, his most likely landfall was somewhere in Japan. With the youths and supplies the Emperor granted, it is likely that Xu Fu was able to establish some kind of colony. Ancient Japanese traditions, with the names slightly modified, lend credence to this theory.

For the next thousand years, oceangoing sailing was largely left to the merchant fleet. China had no sea-borne threat, and instead welcomed and found ways to accommodate traders from Asia and Africa. The only difficulties that could be linked to sea travel occurred as a result of ethnic tensions resulting from the interactions of large numbers of foreigners who had come to live amongst the Chinese, in the 8th and 9th centuries. Also during this period, Chinese monks went exploring on the seas and are said to have reached the Americas. The evidence for this proposition is at least as compelling as for earlier travels linking Taiwan to Polynesia, so such evidence cannot be discounted.

In the 12th Century, the Song navy rose to prominence, as the Song were forced to consolidate power in the southeast. As such, the Song recognized that their best defense lie in powerful Naval forces. Over time, this strong Navy was able to assert its dominance out into the Indian Ocean, where the superior Chinese Navy dominated trade and suppressed piracy. The Song dynasty’s naval power remained supreme until the Song themselves lost interest in maintaining the Fleet so that the manpower could be directed to other uses on land. The Fleet fell into disrepair and was unable to resist the powerful Mongol invasion that swept down from the North.

Chinese Riverine and Naval Technology

The short answer to why China developed a navy is to facilitate land warfare. There are numerous rivers running from west to east in China which must be crossed if a king would unify China. Since these rivers were not permanently bridged, a commander of land forces required either sufficient boat transport or pontoon bridging material to allow his forces to cross rivers in order to continue prosecuting his attack. Innovations in Chinese naval warfare seem most pronounced in the areas of shallow draft transport, riverine warfare and bridging because it was in these fields where there was an internal Chinese arms race to produce better vessels.

Two particular battles highlight the emphasis on riverine forces. The first battle, the Battle of Red Cliff occurred in the spring of 208. Forces of the Wei dynasty chained their boats together in an offensive line, using skills perfected in bridging. Rather that lash their own boats to the Wei line, the Wu-Shu fleet drifted fire boats toward the Wei fleet, then nimbly destroyed individual vessels once they broke the formation.

Another instructive example was the battle between the Jin riverine force of small vessels arrayed against the large oceangoing vessels of the Song in the Yangtze river in 1127. Although the Song ships were powerful they required strong winds to maneuver while in the current of the Yangtze. These Song ships were no match for the Jin boats on a windless day. These engagements pointed up the fact that the necessities of transporting troops across rivers and defending these transports significantly advanced Chinese riverine warfare technology which remained at a high level throughout the dynastic period. Oceangoing Chinese naval technology was less impressive.

Naval technology (vice riverine technology) did advance at times in China, but these advances seem to be more related to the urge to thwart pirates and individual initiative. This halting advance of technology can be explained by the lack of a maritime threat to China. The Mongols to the West and North were a constant, overland threat to all of China, while southern and northern Chinese power centers were frequently at odds, requiring the riverine forces discussed above. Korean and Japan were not real threats to China until the 16th Century, and given that those two powers were in a naval arms race, they had to be wary of each other, which left China relatively unmolested. The Ming dynasty raised a huge ground army for defense, and relied on the Korean navy to interdict the Japanese supply lines, further lessening the need for Chinese naval technological advancement. Once again, the threat, or lack of it, dictated the direction of Chinese naval technology.

While it is undeniable that at times Chinese naval technology rivaled that of the European oceangoing powers, the lack of necessity for naval advancement would later severely hurt China. Once European powers began appearing off the Chinese coast in large numbers in the 19th century. China’s centuries-long lack of necessity in maintaining a naval force would result in the painful assaults on its sovereignty culminating in the Opium Wars and the Unequal Treaties.

Is China going to start something anytime soon?

I think China is hoping to keep a lid on things until 2008. In April 2008, Taiwan will elect a new president, and China is hoping that Taiwan will elect someone less confrontational. China does not want anyone rocking the boat until after the Summer Olympics in 2008.

Chen Shui Bian, the current president of Taiwan, knows that China is desperately hoping to maintain the status quo, so President Chen has been subtly and not so subtly provoking China by disbanding the "Reunification Council" and talking about Taiwan being a nation that governs itself. Chen thinks now is the time to carve out as much space for itself internationally because China is unwilling to do anything rash that might jeopardize their chance to hold the olympics.

So the wild card is Chen. Will he push China too far? Is China willing to put up with just about anything, hoping that Chen will be gone in 2008. Will something unforseen occur (spy scandal, plane wreck, natural disaster) that could completely overturn all assumptions up to now? Unknowable.

I would say that after 2008, the Chinese government will think that it has "arrived" as a superpower, and that it will feel much more unconstrained to act. I would say Winter 2008-2009 will be very dangerous for Taiwan.

That is, unless China collapses on its own accord, which is entirely possible, given their precarious financial situation, and massive unemployment. We will just have to wait and see

Chinese Dynastic Theory

The Dynastic Theory of Chinese History is the idea that Chinese History is part of a grand pattern of national unity fostered by a strong, dynastic central government, followed by periods of disunity and chaos, out of which a strong unifying agent emerges. Traditional Chinese scholarship attributed this cycle to the morality of the leaders of China through history. In other words, virtuous leaders found favor with Heaven, and so their descendents were rewarded with the opportunity to lead a unified Greater China. This classical view posits that human nature being as it is, later generations in the dynastic succession will falter when called to maintain the high standards set by the dynastic founder. Faltering angers Heaven, which will visit disaster on China which augers a period of chaos from which a new, virtuous leader will arise.

Contemporary scholarship dismisses the view that the morals of the leaders determines the fate of dynastic succession. Instead, current scholars point to other more mundane factors effecting dynasties, including large socio-economic factors, bad decision making, or plain old bad luck. Focusing on the socio-economic reasons for the rise of new dynasties, the period of chaos from which these new dynasties arise gives the victorious new leader pretense to wipe the slate clean, and to establish new laws which allow him to codify and solidify his power. Since the new leader has the power to reward his followers and supporters with land, these supporters have reason to help him maintain and extend his rule because his power is, by extension, their power. This is the “economic” part of the dynastic succession. The “socio” part of this theory involves the extent to which royal advisors who had internalized the “classical theory” of dynastic succession thought that they divined the signs of Heaven’s disfavor which in their view would inevitably lead to a period of chaos. So, to protect themselves, these powerful families would begin to position themselves as if the period of chaos had already arrived, thereby weakening the dynasty, and making the prediction self-fulfilling.

The bad decision making/bad luck explanation for dynastic succession posits that dynasties rose up for various reasons in response to contemporary events and continue on, barring some catastrophe. But the catastrophes are the key. A recurring scenario in China is a large natural event (drought, flooding, locusts) causing widespread famine. In response to the famine, families, clans or villages band together to protect their resources or to plunder the resources of clans or villages. These roving bands often became more than the central government could handle, which precipitated the breakdown of governmental authority.
Many times, this breakdown of authority was aided by the poor decisions of the dynasty in attempting to consolidate power. Dynasties would appoint leaders of distant districts based on loyalty or family relation, without regard to any particular competence. This policy would contribute to the dissolution of the dynasties, as these patronage appointments found themselves unable to cope with crises, and lost the power on the local level that had been acquired by the larger dynasty. Once the pieces began to crumble, the dynasty itself was unable to maintain control, and it too crumbled into chaos. And once the central power was lost, regional powers based on local clans and families, mentioned earlier. Out of the competition among these clans, arose the successor dynasty.

FAIR to middlin'

I am no lawyer and I don't have much experience reading Supreme Court decisions, but I do have some experience with academic debate. I took the time to read the entire opinion of Rumsfeld v FAIR that is linked on NRO because my interest in the subject. This opinion seemed like an complete demolition of poorly reasoned and factually unsupported arguments presented by an inferior debate team. The law professors (!) who drafted this suit and the Appeals Court which overturned the District Court should be embarassed to have their collective hat handed to them by the Chief Justice.

My question is: are Supreme Court opinions always so clearly written, and so decisive? If not, you may have the reason we are seeing decisions handed down without dissent. The dissenting judges are so overmatched, that they would seem ridiculuous when their arguments are held up to those of Chief Justice Roberts.

Given that, Roe v Wade is not looking like such a super duper precedent, if the quality of the scholarship out of FAIR is the best that side can muster for a case so near to their hearts, and with "Sleepy" Ginsburg, "Dopey" Souter and Great-granpappy Stevens matching wits with Chief Justice Roberts in the Supreme Court Conference Room.

Taiwan got their alphas kicked in Japan in the World Baseball Classic

They lost Thursday 2-0 to Korea in what was a really good game, with Korea playing out of their mind defense, and Taiwan's bats just going cold at the worst time. Last night, Taiwan got beat up 13-3 by Japan in seven innings because of the mercy rule. Japan is a strong team, and one of the 4 favorites in this tournament, along with the US, the Dominican Republic and Venezuela.

Tonight, Taiwan plays China, but both teams are only playing for pride, as only the top two teams from this pool advance to the next round in the States. Korea is guaranteed to advance since they are 2-0 after beating Taiwan and China, and Japan has the same record after beating Taiwan and China as well. Tonight's game between Japan and Korea will probably not be as good as the one between Korean and Taiwan since the field has already been set, Korea is an inferior team, and both are set to advance.

An armed Darfur is a peaceful Darfur

The step by step guide is an interesting best case course of action for Darfur, but I think that it lacks applicability to this conflict as we find it on the ground. Regarding the points in order:

1- Enlarge Peacekeeping force, carry on with humanitarian efforts, continue until law and order is restored

Enlarging the peacekeeping force, especially from the pool of peacekeepers being considered (AU and Arab League) absent strong controls and a commitment to military justice and discipline will certainly not restore law and order, instead will tend to break down law and order. A recent report about refugees in Africa by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees points to widespread and systemic exploitation of women and girls by aid workers and peacekeeping forces among three different peacekeeping operations in Africa. (UNHCR) The Independent newspaper in London asserted, based on their own investigation, that these findings do not go far enough to describe the problem: “There is a very serious problem with sexual exploitation of particularly young teenage girls, in this case in vulnerable communities, by a range of people in positions of power." (Independent) Refugees International echoes these sentiments: “Nevertheless, there does appear to be a relationship between the number of international peacekeepers and aid workers and sexual trafficking and prostitution. Furthermore, no matter the actual extent of the problem, the perception of the problem has serious implications for the overall credibility of the UN.” (Refugees International) In this region, at this time, peacekeepers do not seem to be a reasonable solution.

2- Investigate. Send members of all parties who are guilty of violating international law to the ICC. If the government refuses, take them by force. This shows that the international community is not messing around anymore.

Taking the government of a sovereign country is an act of war and is especially problematic if they are being “taken” only to try them in court. The ICC operates on the premise that suspects are innocent until proven guilty, but declaring war would be a de facto declaration that the leaders of the government, against whom war is declared, are guilty. Declaring war to determine whether someone is guilty is illogical on its face, and would never be approved by the UN or any member state.

3- Begin disarmament process, and at the same time, start to bring back some of the refugees. This would also be a good time to hold negotiations.

There is no evidence that disarming the parties solves the problem or refugees, village burning or leads to negotiation. In fact, assuming disarmament does these things is counter-intuitive. Recent history shows that peace comes not when the parties are disarmed, but when the parties are armed equally. The Soviet Union was fought to a stalemate in Afghanistan when the US begin sending arms to the mujahadeen. The Kurds in Northern Iraq were free of fear from Saddam when the no-fly zone and infusion of arms prevented the Baathist forces from entering the region to kill as they had previously. India and Pakistan’s first instinct is to negotiate, now that both openly possess nuclear weapons. China and Taiwan have enjoyed 60+ years of peace, North and South Korea, 50+ years and the Pacific has been free of Japanese aggression because all are armed in rough balance. When we see an imbalance, or when one side has no arms to defend itself, that is when we see atrocities as we have seen in the German ghettos of the 30’s, and recently in Rwanda, towards the Kurds in Turkey and Iraq and anyplace there are defenseless people arrayed against brutal men with guns such as in Darfur.

A much surer path to negotiations than more peacekeepers or disarmament would be to arm those people without a means to defend themselves so they can fight to a stalemate. This would lead to the opportunity for #4 - #6.

4- Hold numerous meetings throughout the region, inviting all members of all parties. Why?
a- “The development of safe forums for communication and interaction that allow people to get to know each other as human beings.
b- Reconciliation- All sides can express their pain and anguish.
c- Educational purposes. This enables the international community to hold training seminars on such important issues as combating desertification and harvesting. But as important as this is, “it is often secondary to the personal rapport that can be built and the understanding of different perspectives that can develop as a result of bringing people together in an educational forum.” (pg. 227).
5- Over time, pull back forces step by step. Continue negotiations. Leave the various NGOs, Humanitarian aid, and trainers to keep working.
6- Eventually pull back all UN peacekeepers leaving only AU. Keep watchful eye on government and get daily reports from NGOs.

I am definitely in favor of peace instead of war, but I think the prescription of peacekeepers, international trials and negotiations is only workable to safeguard a peace AFTER the people who are oppressed have a means to enter into negotiation with roughly equal levels of power. Once a stalemate has been reached on the groud, negotiations can begin and Mayer’s principles of negotiation can find some purchase.

Works cited:

The Independent. “The Dark Side of Peacekeeping.” 10 July 2003

Refugees International. “Conflict, Sexual Trafficking, and Peacekeeping.”
(http://www.refugeesinternational.org/content/article/detail/4146?PHPSESSID=8cd9d5b0df1ae0bbae8d3ddf647ec715). 10/08/2004

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Note for
Implementing and Operational Partners by UNHCR and Save the Children-UK
on Sexual Violence & Exploitation: The Experience of Refugee Children in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone based on Initial Findings and Recommendations from Assessment Mission 22 October - 30 November 2001. United Nations: (New York) February 2002

An armed Darfu is a peaceful Darfur

The step by step guide is an interesting best case course of action for Darfur, but I think that it lacks applicability to this conflict as we find it on the ground. Regarding the points in order:

1- Enlarge Peacekeeping force, carry on with humanitarian efforts, continue until law and order is restored

Enlarging the peacekeeping force, especially from the pool of peacekeepers being considered (AU and Arab League) absent strong controls and a commitment to military justice and discipline will certainly not restore law and order, instead will tend to break down law and order. A recent report about refugees in Africa by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees points to widespread and systemic exploitation of women and girls by aid workers and peacekeeping forces among three different peacekeeping operations in Africa. (UNHCR) The Independent newspaper in London asserted, based on their own investigation, that these findings do not go far enough to describe the problem: “There is a very serious problem with sexual exploitation of particularly young teenage girls, in this case in vulnerable communities, by a range of people in positions of power." (Independent) Refugees International echoes these sentiments: “Nevertheless, there does appear to be a relationship between the number of international peacekeepers and aid workers and sexual trafficking and prostitution. Furthermore, no matter the actual extent of the problem, the perception of the problem has serious implications for the overall credibility of the UN.” (Refugees International) In this region, at this time, peacekeepers do not seem to be a reasonable solution.

2- Investigate. Send members of all parties who are guilty of violating international law to the ICC. If the government refuses, take them by force. This shows that the international community is not messing around anymore.

Taking the government of a sovereign country is an act of war and is especially problematic if they are being “taken” only to try them in court. The ICC operates on the premise that suspects are innocent until proven guilty, but declaring war would be a de facto declaration that the leaders of the government, against whom war is declared, are guilty. Declaring war to determine whether someone is guilty is illogical on its face, and would never be approved by the UN or any member state.

3- Begin disarmament process, and at the same time, start to bring back some of the refugees. This would also be a good time to hold negotiations.

There is no evidence that disarming the parties solves the problem or refugees, village burning or leads to negotiation. In fact, assuming disarmament does these things is counter-intuitive. Recent history shows that peace comes not when the parties are disarmed, but when the parties are armed equally. The Soviet Union was fought to a stalemate in Afghanistan when the US begin sending arms to the mujahadeen. The Kurds in Northern Iraq were free of fear from Saddam when the no-fly zone and infusion of arms prevented the Baathist forces from entering the region to kill as they had previously. India and Pakistan’s first instinct is to negotiate, now that both openly possess nuclear weapons. China and Taiwan have enjoyed 60+ years of peace, North and South Korea, 50+ years and the Pacific has been free of Japanese aggression because all are armed in rough balance. When we see an imbalance, or when one side has no arms to defend itself, that is when we see atrocities as we have seen in the German ghettos of the 30’s, and recently in Rwanda, towards the Kurds in Turkey and Iraq and anyplace there are defenseless people arrayed against brutal men with guns such as in Darfur.

A much surer path to negotiations than more peacekeepers or disarmament would be to arm those people without a means to defend themselves so they can fight to a stalemate. This would lead to the opportunity for #4 - #6.

4- Hold numerous meetings throughout the region, inviting all members of all parties. Why?
a- “The development of safe forums for communication and interaction that allow people to get to know each other as human beings.
b- Reconciliation- All sides can express their pain and anguish.
c- Educational purposes. This enables the international community to hold training seminars on such important issues as combating desertification and harvesting. But as important as this is, “it is often secondary to the personal rapport that can be built and the understanding of different perspectives that can develop as a result of bringing people together in an educational forum.” (pg. 227).
5- Over time, pull back forces step by step. Continue negotiations. Leave the various NGOs, Humanitarian aid, and trainers to keep working.
6- Eventually pull back all UN peacekeepers leaving only AU. Keep watchful eye on government and get daily reports from NGOs.

I am definitely in favor of peace instead of war, but I think the prescription of peacekeepers, international trials and negotiations is only workable to safeguard a peace AFTER the people who are oppressed have a means to enter into negotiation with roughly equal levels of power. Once a stalemate has been reached on the groud, negotiations can begin and Mayer’s principles of negotiation can find some purchase.

Works cited:

The Independent. “The Dark Side of Peacekeeping.” 10 July 2003

Refugees International. “Conflict, Sexual Trafficking, and Peacekeeping.”
(http://www.refugeesinternational.org/content/article/detail/4146?PHPSESSID=8cd9d5b0df1ae0bbae8d3ddf647ec715). 10/08/2004

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Note for
Implementing and Operational Partners by UNHCR and Save the Children-UK
on Sexual Violence & Exploitation: The Experience of Refugee Children in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone based on Initial Findings and Recommendations from Assessment Mission 22 October - 30 November 2001. United Nations: (New York) February 2002

Darfur

Darfur is an area about which much is said, mostly by people who seem to have no real knowledge about what is going on. Darfur has entered our lexicon as a synonym for “genocide” but most who talk about Darfur would be hard-pressed to describe who is being exterminated by whom. Both presidential candidates in the last US presidential election “agreed that was was happening Darfur was genocide.” (Wikipedia) If Darfur is “genocide,” this would certainly fit into the “clash of civilizations” thesis, but this would imply that the conflict is something more than an “impasse” that is amenable to negotiation techniques. On the other hand, if Darfur is genuinely a conflict that has reached impasse, this would make the killings and village destructions that have occurred extreme manifestations of negotiating tactics. The sides are saying “we are serious about our position, and are willing to kill to show it.” It is necessary to define the conflict in order to analyze whether Mayer’s impasse resolution tactics would be successful.

The United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide defines “genocide” as: Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. (Jacobson) The amount of killing is irrelevant but rather, the motivation of the killers: “The specificity of genocide does not arise from the extent of their killings nor their savagery nor resulting infamy, but solely from their intention: the destruction of a group.” (Destexhe pg4)

In Darfur, it is not clear that any of the actions or the motivations of the actors meet Destexhe’s definition of genocide. The UN itself looked at the very question of whether the situation in Darfur is genocide and concluded that what is going on there is not genocide. In the words of the Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the Secretary-General of the UN: “Generally speaking the policy of attacking, killing and forcibly displacing members of some tribes does not evince a specific intent to annihilate, in whole or in part, a group distinguished on racial, ethnic, national or religious grounds. Rather, it would seem that those who planned and organized attacks on villages pursued the intent to drive the victims from their homes, primarily for purposes of counter-insurgency warfare.” (Report of the International Commission, pg2) Leave aside for a moment the thorny question of the UN’s objectivity, after all, if the UN declares the situation to be genocide, they will be on the hook to do something about it. Or, in the words of Mark Steyn:

“After months of expressing deep, grave concern over whether the graves were deep enough, Kofi Annan managed to persuade the UN to set up a committee to look into what’s going on in Darfur. Eventually, they reported back that it’s not genocide.

That’s great news, isn’t it? Because if it had been genocide, that would have been very, very serious. As yet another Kofi Annan-appointed UN committee boldly declared a year ago: “Genocide anywhere is a threat to the security of all and should never be tolerated.” So thank goodness what’s going on in Sudan isn’t genocide. Instead, it’s just 100,000 corpses who all happen to be from the same ethnic group—which means the UN can go on tolerating it until everyone’s dead, and none of the multilateral compassion types have to worry their pretty heads about it.” (Steyn)

Given the accuracy of the UN’s assessment, that the situation in Darfur is a “counter-insurgency” and that the sides are at an impasse, it is necessary to get to the issues in contention. A UN study published in 2002 identified clashes over transhumance (the transfer of livestock from one grazing ground to another, as from lowlands to highlands, with the changing of seasons) as the root of the conflict. Further, the report identified 9 “causes of route conflicts” which included:

1. DROUGHT AND ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION.
2. DEGRADATION OF WATER RESOURCES.
3. THE TIMING OF TALIG (GRAZING OF FARM RESIDUES).
4. POPULATION GROWTH.
5. POOR LOCAL CAPACITIES. Official understanding of the pastoral production system and its complexities and requirements is limited
6. COMMERCIALIATION (sic) OF AGRICULTURE.
7. GREIVENCY (sic): Lack of representation of pastoralists in crop damage estimation committees and the exaggeration of the value of that damage by the farmers is usually a cause of serious tension and confrontations between the farmers and the pastoralists.
8. LACK OF CONSULTATION: Farmers in Abu Zeraiga in El Fashir province claim that they were not consulted when the routes were marked. As a result, some villages and agricultural lands were included in the route area.
9. ESTABLISHMENT OF PASTORAL ENCLOSURES. (United Nations Development Programme)

Some of these points of contention are clearly outside the limits of what can be effected by negotiation. Drought and environmental degradation can certainly introduce stress into relations between groups of people but cannot be changed by negotiation. However, the other seven causes certainly seem amenable to negotiation. Several attempts at negotiation over a 13 year period were pursued, but ultimately failed for four reasons identified in the report:

1. Decisions & recommendations were not followed up and thus remained unattended in the offices of the senior officials and, therefore, rarely reached the grass roots levels who are the main stakeholders. This was partly due to the weaknesses of the state media and the poor and distorted representation of the communities.

2. The third party to conflict (those working behind the scene and fueling conflict) has its own interests (armed robbery, weapons trading..etc.). Such party is rarel considered.

3. Apparent weaknesses of the native administration system in the area in terms of effective representation, acceptance, legitimacy, legal recognition, authority and economic and financial capacities.

4. Poor and weak supervision and implementation mechanisms at the state level. (United Nations Development Programme)

Perhaps the most crucial one of these reasons for failure was the interest of third parties. The local contestants in the Darfur are largely indistinguishable from one another. In the words of an academic from Darfur:

The labels “African” and “Arab” weren’t always as pronounced as they are today. The problem started as a competition over resources—land and water. But then people started revising their world views according to their ethnic identities. Visually, Africans and Arabs in Darfur look the same. It’s only when somebody tells you, “I’m Arab,” or from another tribe, that you know how a person identifies himself. During this conflict, identity has become a label that people use to pursue their claims for land or water. (Renwick)

Given that the contesting parties are largely indistinguishable outside their own self identification, it is hard to conclude that the conflict in the Darfur is about anything other than economic competition. However, the factions squabbling over transhumance and water appealed to outside groups in what Mayer has called association power. These larger groups, Pan Arabist organizations, al Qeida, the Sudanese government, the Chadian governments and others have all weighed in on one side or the other. During the Cold War, the term for this types of conflicts was war by proxy. Douglas Johnson has identified a similar phenomenon at work in Darfur:

Often times, appeals to Islam and Pan Arabism have been used by Khartoum Government to overcome the discontent of marginality elsewhere in the North. These appeals are not only to home grown support but increasingly about access to external powerful allies. The power of Pan Arabist ideology, however fictitious its actual base, can connect local groups to a wider international community and offers them opportunity to mobilize support for internal conflicts. We have noted: the alliance of Arab tribes in Darfur appealing to Libya outside Sudan and the UMMA and NIF parties inside Sudan; Sadiq rallying Arab North to retake Kurmuk from SPLA forces, the successive governments were appealing to wealthy Muslim States for military hardware in the face of Anti-Arab insurgency in the South. (Johnson, pg 141)

The upshot of this appeal to outside power is that the local groups lose their autonomy to make deals of mutual, local benefit because these local groups are beholden to murky, larger forces with more expansive agendas. So, attempting to negotiate at a local level will prove ineffective so long as the larger powers continue to use the Darfur as a battle by proxy. Connell believes that Darfur can only be solved as part of a larger, regional peace: “The only two possible solutions under these circumstances are to fold Darfur and other regional conflicts (including that in the northeast) into the north-south peace talks taking place in Naivasha, Kenya, and deal with the nation as a whole, or to give up on the notion of a unified Sudanese state.” (Connell)

Given that the UN does not consider refugees to be victims of genocide, and with the realities of the violent impasse in the Sudan, the facts on the ground may present negotiators with only one realistic choice. Negotiate new, international boundaries along a defensible frontier for the aggrieved Darfurians, and appeal to the international community to respect and defend those borders. Absent this type of regional negotiated break in the impasse, there is a much larger chance Darfur will turn into the genocide all fear.

BBC. “Analysis: Defining genocide”
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3853157.stm) 1 Feb 2005.
Connell, Dan. “Sudan: The Politics of Slaughter.” Grassroots
Online. (http://www.grassrootsonline.org/weblog/sudanconnell.html) 14 October 2004.

Destexhe, Alan. Rwanda and Genocide in the Twentieth Century.
Pluto Press: (London) 1995.
International Commission of Inquiry. Report of the International
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the Secretary-General:
Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1564 (2004) of 18 September 2004. United Nations: (New York) 1 Feb 05

Jacobson, Mary. “Balkan Glossary of Terms.” FACSNET:
(http://www.facsnet.org/issues/specials/kosovo/glossary.php3) 18 Jan 2000.

Johnson, Douglas H. The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars.
Indiana University Press: (Bloomington, Indiana) 2003.

Renwick, Lucille. “Darfur: Roots of Conflict.” Ford Foundation
Report. Spring-Summer 2005.

Steyn, Mark. “America and the United Nations” Imprimis Magazine.
February, 2006.

United Nations Development Programme. Research on Roots of Conflict and Traditional: Conflict Transformation Mechanisms. TRANSHUMANCE ROUTES IN NORTH DARFUR. (http://www.sd.undp.org/Publications/pub2/Transhumance%20routes%20report2.htm) September 2002.

Venezuela, Cuba, North Korea and whatnot

Mr Lamb argues that “One very basic fact exists within conflict resolution; to be resolved a conflict requires an interest by either one of the engaged parties or an outside party for it to be resolved.”

I am not sure that I completely agree with that statement, since often times the entire world would like to see a conflict resolved that one or the other player in the conflict is content to keep going, and the conflict keeps going. If an outside observer wants a conflict to end, that outside observer has to be prepared to “put its money where its mouth is” so to speak. There have been times in the recent past when the US has been willing to intervene in conflicts in which it does not have a direct interest, such as in Bosnia. Venezuela is a little different. The side with the biggest problem with Chavez and his rule in Venezuela is not the US but a substantial portion of the Venezuelan people themselves. However, it is not in the Chavez’ interest to endlessly berate and castigate these opponents to his regime (although they do come in for a certain amount of his opprobrium) so instead, Chavez has picked a proxy for his complaints. That proxy is the United States. The problem for mediating this conflict is that the US government has been studiously unwilling to clash with him in return.

Part of the reason is that overt engagement of the United States in Central and South America has a negative connotation for many in the region. Many immediately think of gunboat diplomacy, the overthrow of Allende or as Chavez himself likes to mention, the “terrorism” of sanctions imposed on Cuba. Having these examples thrown up into the face of US diplomacy makes the US understandably reticent to come down strongly on one side or the other on a dispute. Should the US be seen as anything other that neutral with regard to Chavez, it plays into his criticisms and strengthens his stand.

The other reason for the United States’ seeming indifference to provocations from Chavez is that experience shows that Central and South American dictatorships do not have a long lifespan. Time and again we see fiery anti-American rhetoric from dictatorships that spring up from both right and left in South America, but some years later, after failing to deliver on promises to the people, those dictatorships are gone. Sometimes the go peacefully, other times, more violently (and sometimes, with a push from the US, as recently with Panama), but always, they go. Cuba may seem to be an argument against this policy, but Cuba has not really been a threat to US interests since the fall of the Soviet Union. Castro is more a threat to his own people that he will ever be again to the US. Benignly waiting them out, until they do something truly against American interest, like directly running drugs, seems like a much better policy than responding to every provocation or being dragged into negotiations for the purpose of embarrassing the US.

This policy perhaps explains the patience that the US has shown to North Korea. Evidence has shown us that sclerotic Communist regimes are unlikely to start wars, directly. Survival within the bureaucracies attendant to these governments is predicated on one’s survival instinct and ability to forge consensus around the status quo, not taking big chances going off into a new direction. Second and beyond generations of communist dictatorships have shown no interest in directly challenging their enemies. These aging dictatorships are willing to fight by proxy, to sell arms to lunatic regimes, to work actively to undermine their enemies secretly or to engage is bellicose threats because these are status quo behaviors. Actually starting a war, however, is risky and risk is something that no communist bureaucrat is willing to countenance. The best way to handle conflict with these types of regimes is to watch them warily, stay strong in the face of their threats, and wait them out. Negotiating with these types of regimes, as Mayer points out, is assigning them the “perception of power” that they otherwise do not possess. The US has rightly gauged that North Korea won’t attack, so there is no need to negotiate, and actually reward them for power they don’t possess. They have no power, nothing to offer in negotiations, so they can’t give anything up to get anything in return.

Jimmy Carter, and by extension, the Carter Center, have miscalculated the nature of the North Korean’s power. The Carter Center looks at the claims of North Korea having nuclear weapons and sees the array of arms pointed at the South and assumes this equals power. Given this assumption, it is understandable why they would attempt negotiations with the North Korea but these negotiations have failed, primarily because they have nothing to give up, as I mentioned above, but also because they have acted in bad faith. Mayer points out that “although some people may feel that lying to people, misleading them, and intimidating them are acceptable behaviors in negotiation, these behaviors to do not promote mutual problem solving, effective communications or rapport.” (Mayer, pg153.) Unfortunately, these behaviors pretty much sum up the North Korean approach to negotiation.

The counter argument to continuing to negotiate with a partner who acts in bad faith, and has no real power to begin with, is that there is a certain transformative power in the peace process itself. Coates argues that “the means of change will create new community, and this is why we must focus on the process as much as (if not more than) the outcome.” This sentiment is not uniquely held, in fact, many ascribe to the belief that by talking and talking, eventually attitudes will change and thereby actions will change as well. So far, in the case of Central American dictatorships, North Korea, and recently, in Iran, we have not seen any proof of this assertion.

Coates, Susan. “Peace Feminism in International Relations.” University of Denver: (http://www.du.edu/~suscoate/) Date unknown.

Estonia

Estonia is the northernmost one of the small republics on the Baltic Sea, on Russia’s northwest, just south of Finland. It has a population a 1.5 million, split between ethnic Estonian speakers who represent about 65% of the population and ethnic Russian speakers who represent 29%. The remaining 6 percent’s ancestors emigrated to Estonia from all over the Soviet Union, starting during Stalin’s rule.

The roots of the conflict between Estonia and Russia stretch back only to the Russian revolution. Prior to 1917, Estonian had been nominally ruled from afar by Sweden, Poland, Germany and Russia. The real power lay with the descendents of German knights who first invaded Estonia in the 13th century to convert the pagans there to Christianity. These landowners formed the Baltic “Ritterschaften,” or “corporations of the nobility” and controlled the economy of Estonia This arrangement lasted until Emperor Alexander I of Russia released the serfs from bondage to the land in 1816. Following this limited emancipation, Estonian nationalism began to come into being. (Kasekamp, pg4)

A group of idealistic German scholars came together to establish a “Learned Society” and to further the goal of secondary education in the indigenous Estonian language. Other Estonian societies sprang up to promote local interests. It was not until a national Estonian language newspaper began publication in the 1860’s calling for greater freedoms for Estonia from Russia. Eventually Russia became alarmed by these expressions, and moved to impose Russification on Estonia to remove the lingering influence of the German aristocracy in the 1880’s. This movement had the ironic effect of removing the larger German influence without completely replacing it with Russian influence, a development which allowed the local Estonian identity to flower. (Kasekamp, pg5)

Although the Russian Czar remained in control of Estonia through 1917 when Germany began to advance on the capital Tallinn. Estonia declared its independence, and fought off, in turn the Kaiser’s forces then the Red Army until 1920, when the Soviet Union signed a peace treaty with Estonia, establishing the Republic of Estonia, which oriented itself away from Russia and toward Great Britain, Germany and the Nordic Countries. However, in 1939, Germany and the Soviet Union make a pact which resulted in the subjugation of the Estonian people. Stalin deported thousands of Estonian elite to Siberia, and relocated many Russians and Ukrainians to Estonia. This upheaval sowed the seeds of resentment. The authoritarian rule of the Soviets suppressed the rage of the Estonian people, but with the crumbling of the Soviet Union in 1991, Estonia began to assert itself and eventually won its “reindependence” in the bloodless “Singing Revolution.” (Carter Center, pg42)

Since “reindependence,” there has been internal conflict in Estonia, at the “Confrontation” stage of the “life cycle of conflict.” This conflict is essentially ethnic with the Estonians lined up against the Russians. There exist large parts of Estonia, especially near the border, with virtually no Estonians. Some towns are 95%+ Russian speaking. Nonetheless, the newly installed Estonian parliament enacted citizenship rules requiring fluency in Estonian and restrictive voting requirements and restrictions on officeholders that essentially disenfranchised all the ethnic Russians. The Estonian government considered these late arriving Russian a security risk, a risk exacerbated by the presence of thousands of Russian troops who continued to be garrisoned in Estonia.

Out of concerns for the “human rights” of ethnic Russians in Estonia, the new Russian government offered citizenship to any ethnic Russian in Estonia without requiring those individuals to return to Russia. This ethnic struggle could be framed as one between human rights and security. (Birckenbach) The Estonians saw the unassimilated population of Russians living in their midst, and the large garrisoned Russian Army forces as a direct and overt threat to their newly won independence while the Russian Estonians perceived a loss of rights in place that for many had been their only home. This disenfranchised group look for a benefactor and found one in the neighboring country, Russia. Tensions were present both internal to Estonia and between Estonia and Russia. Officials from the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), one of the regional actors mentioned in the packet, recognized that this conflict had real potential to lead to ethnic bloodshed or a cross-border war. In an attempt to forestall these outcomes, the OSCE appealed to the Carter Center for Conflict Resolution Program to devise a program to reduce tensions. (Neu, pg11)

The Carter Center decided to convene workshops of 40 participants and smaller groups of 12, equally weighted between ethnic Estonians, ethnic Russians from Estonia and Russian Russians. These groups met over the course of three years, from 1994 to 1997, to discuss their perceptions about the problems in Estonia and between Estonia and Russia. The groups consisted of people from all walks of life, interested in facing the challenges of Estonia. (Neu, pg21)

The participants identified certain key areas for resolution:

-The need for Russia to acknowledge its 1940 annexation (occupation) of Estonia.
-The importance of having a shared understanding of Russia’s and Estonia’s histories.
-The need to treat elderly Russians fairly in gaining citizenship.
-The importance of Russians making good-faith efforts to learn Estonian language and culture.
-The value for the Estonian government to make good-faith efforts to provide Estonian language classes at a reasonable cost.
-The need to allow the Russian speaking community access to the media and politics.

Given the different perceptions harbored by the ethnic Russians and the ethnic Estonians, it was soon apparent that different groups were going to require different approaches to resolve the conflicts. The Estonians felt that the Russians, given the history, were evil and considered Estonians as lower class. Any resolution for the Estonians would have to address their emotional revulsion towards the Russians.

The Russians could not understand the animosity of the Estonians. From the Russian perspective, the Estonians were ungrateful and whiny for not leaving Estonia if they were so unhappy. The Russians required cognitive resolution because they did not learn the history of Soviet occupation of Estonia and they had no idea the Estonians resented the presence of to Russians so much. Over the course of the years of workshops in Estonia and the United States, the participants were able to address the needs of all sides and begin moving towards resolution of difference that could be applied to the wider population of Estonia.

The conflict boiled down to this: “the Russian speakers wanted to return to pre-1991 Estonia, and the Estonians wanted the Russian speakers to leave.” (Neu pg32) Clearly, this problem required reframing of the problem, something that the conflict resolution specialists from the Carter Center were able to provide. The solution hinged on the Estonians being willing to accept Russian presence, provided Russians made some effort to integrate, and the Russians being willing to learn the Estonian language and to integrate into society.






Birckenbach, Hanne-Margaret, “The Role of Fact-Finding in
Preventative Diplomacy.” International Journal of Peace Studies, July 1997.

Kasekamp, Andres, The Radical Right in Interwar Estonia. (St
Martin’s Press; New York) 2000.

Neu, Joyce and Volkan, Vamik, Developing A Methodology For
Conflict Prevention: The Case Of Estonia. (Carter Center; Atlanta) 1999.

The birdshot that broke the mountain's back

Michael, Could you comment on why Gonzaga students chanting "Brokeback Mountain" at a gay opponent is bad and worthy of censure, but Jill Sobule baiting Dick Cheney in the same way is "funny?"

I imagine that if somehow the Sobule meme got picked up and Gonzaga students took to sing-song chants of “Brokeback Mountain” at a Dick Cheney appearance, there would be no outrage.

What interests me is the larger, cultural implication. It seems that even liberals recognize the depravity inherent in homosexual behavior that still shames those who engage in it. Hence, the effort by college administrators (read: liberals) to shield the homosexual student from the shame that comes when his actions are mocked by the “Brokeback Mountain” chant.

Conversely, the laughter that accompanies portrayal of Cheney and Whittington as the leads in “Brokeback Mountain” stems from its absurdity. It is like when John Wayne would pretend to be a “swish” for a moment on the “Dean Martin” show. Laughter comes from the unimaginable juxtaposition of someone like Cheney behaving in so depraved a manner.

It seems to me that we should not let liberals have it all ways. They can’t at once laud homosexuality as a natural expression of love, while trying to shield those who practice it from being called out AND yet at the same time be willing to use homosexuality to ridicule someone with whom they disagree.

Letter to Michelle Malkin

When you are on the same side of an issue as Maureen Dowd, Chuck Schumer and Hillary and against the WSJ and President Bush, it should cause you to pause and rethink a little.

The UAE company will be operating terminal space, and only a portion of it, in the ports. The wild, ignorant speculation that you quote is full of specious logic "Gaffney: Past experience suggests the job may have fallen to lower-level career bureaucrats who give priority to maintaining good relations with their foreign 'clients,' like the UAE." Say what? How does that follow? I am a lower level bureaucrat, and I would be happy to spear a foreign 'client' in a
heartbeat. How does Gaffney's unsubstantiated guess about the approval process advance your point?

Yes, there is a lot of conventional wisdom that is "gob-smackingly obvious," but there are also a lot of mistaken assumptions that seems pretty gob-smackingly
obvious to the uninformed and willfully obtuse. I can usually count on the knuckleheads on the left to wave the flag of ignorance as if it were truth(Koran
flushing, withholding armor, torture in Gitmo), it sorrows me to see someone for whom I had a lot of respect line up with them on something like this.

And I thought that the disrespectful, dismissive tone you directed towards the WSJ was beneath you as well. Your stuff routinely gets treated that way on leftist websites, you would do well to rise above such pettiness. It needlessly sullies your work.

Say it ain't so, James

I read that James Webb is running for the Senate in Virginia as a Democrat. Reagan's Secretary of the Navy, running as a Democrat. Why?

Mac Owens of the Naval War College in Newport says that it is because the civilians at the Defense Department are not sufficiently deferential to the views of veterans regarding the conduct of the war in Iraq. So, oor James Webb feels slighted by the bully Rumsfeld. Oh, and Republicans said mean things about some veterans, like Paul Hackett in Ohio, Murtha, and Kerry, all of whom opposed the President's policy in Iraq. I sense a trend. Some ego-tripping politician, who happens also to be a veteran, calls the White House with a great idea for winning the war, but does not see the idea immediately put into action, and turns into a strident anti-war critic. So, a fit of pique causes these great statesmen to turn from hawks to doves.

Now, I am on active duty, and I have to tell you, that while I might respect an officer for having the fortitude to step into the uniform and serve, that doesn't mean I think that person has all the answers regarding Iraq or any other matter of public policy. Some of the dumbest ideas for ending the war, or for reducing our presence in Iraq, or about political matters in general come from people who have been in combat. Should their lame-brain ideas have special currency by virtue of having been to war? OR should those ideas be weighed against all other ideas before a decision is made. I trust Rumsfeld and the President to take as much input as the can, and make the best possible decisions. Will this result in some ideas, even those submitted by intellectual luminaries like Webb, Murtha and Kerry being ignored? Yes. Does that mean they should take their ball and go home? A mature adult would say no, but an inside the beltway egotist would say, "because Rummy won't listen to me, I am now against the war that I was for previously."

I used to have a lot of respect for James Webb, respect that he earned through his service in Vietnam and for his obvious literary gifts on display in Fields of Fire and Something to Die For, among other books. I began to lose some of my respect for him in my two encounters with him during book signings. If both cases, I saw him make plenty of time for Generals and retired Generals who came to glad-hand him all the while ignoring young Marines who were introduced to Fields of Fire through the Commandant's Reading Program and wanted to express to him how much his book meant to them. He perfunctorily signed their copies, and turned back to the Generals who, I guess now looking back in retrospect, he thought were going to back his Senatorial candidacy through donations or assistance. I was not impressed.

I am even less impressed now. For all his professed concern for the troops and for the welfare of the military, it looks like Webb is just another of those inside the beltway egotistical prima donnas who doesn't get his way, so in a tiff, changes parties to "send a message to the President" or something else equally banal. To him I say, George Allen is a good enough Republican senator for Virginia who upports the troops and the war effort, and would never side with the likes of Ted Kennedy, Joe Biden and Harry Reid against this President and against the United States. Webb has become a Murtha-style phony. Vote for Allen, vote against Webb.

You have a grievance?

For an article written in 1993, Huntington’s words in “The Clash of Civilizations?” are remarkably prescient. His thesis: “The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural,” might have seemed radical during an era informed by the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the “End of History,” but we see now how on the mark this observation is.

The current round of attacks on embassies has as its proximate cause outrage over the publication of images of Mohammed. The images of the conflict are startling, children in London holding signs demanding that cartoonists be beheaded, chanters in France calling for Allah to bring a “9-11” to Europe, statues of Ronald McDonald aflame in Pakistan, Danish Embassies burning in Syria and Lebanon, and claims that nuclear weapons will give Moslem countries “respect.” Clearly, there is rage among Moslems, regardless of their nationality, directed toward the West in general and Denmark in particular. But the interesting question is whether the cartoons caused the rioting that would not have occurred but for the images or whether the cartoons are a catalyst that precipitated a conflict which was otherwise inevitable?

The argument that cartoons are somehow uniquely offensive in a way that makes otherwise docile believers in Islam to become violent is belied by the fact that books and statues have depicted the image of Mohammed’s face for more than a 1000 years. Illustrations of Dante’s Inferno have featured Mohammed in hell since the poem’s initial publication. Other works of art throughout history have show his face, and even now, cigarette vendors in Iran have pictures of Mohammed’s face to prove their piety. There is a frieze featuring Mohammed on the north face of the Supreme Court. So, since it does not appear that the images themselves are particularly horrific, some have speculated that the outrage of Muslims is because publishing the pictures shows that infidels have insufficient reverence and respect for the prophet and by extension, all Moslems. While holding the West to a higher standard regarding images of Mohammed than they hold their own, Huntington makes that point that “People apply one standard to their kin-countries and a different standard to others.”

This explanation comes closer to Huntington’s observation that the sharpest differentiation between civilizations is by religion. When one civilization feels that its religion is not respected by another, the situation could result in “the most prolonged and the most violent conflicts.” Whether the images in question are particularly egregious manifestation of a lack of respect is immaterial to the perception among many Moslems that they images represent a general lack of respect for Moslems by the West, a lack of respect that many Moslems feel they must counter by force.

Many Westerners are bewildered by the anger and hatred they see in the faces of the Moslems protesting the cartoons, because most in the West, think of Islam not at all and would prefer to be left alone to live their lives in peace, completely unconcerned about the Moslems and their perceived grievances. For Mayer, this kind of neglect and ignorance by the stronger power for the interests and needs of the weaker power is a recipe for conflict. And because there is such a huge imbalance between the power of the Moslem states and the West, the Moslems have resorted to nuisance attacks on the West that “irritate, bother, interfere or harass but…fall short of the ability to impose significant consequences or penalties.” Since the early 70’s the Moslem world has made nuisance attacks on the West through terrorism, kidnappings, oil price shocks, embassy seizures and bombings, and small scale attacks in individual targets, like the first World Trade Center bombing and the attack on the USS Cole. The West had responded in a similarly limited fashion with small scale bombings, arrests and targeted killings.

One of the “nuisance” attacks was somewhat more successful than the others, namely the attacks of 9-11. Initially, this “victory” over the United States and the West was met with jubilation throughout Moslem countries and the perpetrator of the attack, Osama bin Laden was lauded. However, this pride was soon dashed into humiliations as Moslems watched the United States and Britain respond disproportionately to the loss of 3000 people by toppling two Moslem governments, occupying the cradle of Moslem civilization in Iraq, and establishing bases throughout the region. And this humiliation breeds anger and fosters the perception that the West is at war with Islam.

Individual Moslems have certainly not been shy about claiming that Islam is at war with the West. At least since the first Gulf War, many prominent Moslem voices have made this claim, as detailed by Huntington. Current leaders, like the President of Iran are making similar claims, and the perception on the street, not only in Moslem countries, but also among Moslems who live in the West is that Islam is at war with the West. Given that perception, even relatively innocuous provocations like cartoons can seem as huge affronts to the already aggrieved. Mayer argues that this type of affront can be attributed to cultural obliviousness which when combined with the huge power disparity can drive the offended party to seek ever larger expressions of their outrage. Hence, the Iran pursues nuclear weapons.

The cultural obliviousness of the West can result is serious miscalculations. Mayer says that by failing to understand the needs of the smaller power, the larger power is prone to gestures which will seem patronizing and controlling. This reliance on gesture and posture is where the real threat to press freedom reside. Because many in the West fail to understand the grievances of the Moslems and to realize that many in the Moslem world are actively at war with the West, leads the more feckless Western countries to call for self-regulation of the press or tolerance to Moslem sensibilities that would amount to censorship. Yet failing to grasp the underlying grievance of Moslems; the fact that they have been routinely defeated by Infidels, and that their economies and modern cultures are dependent on Western technology and money. These things are deeply humiliating and represent an affront to Moslems very essence.

Offering to be more solicitous of the feeling of Moslems, trying to assuage the offense Moslems feel by pixilating the face of Mohammed when the cartoons are shown on CNN or firing an editor of some newspaper plays into the patronization against which Moslems are rioting. The offense is not cartoons, but is the West itself, and the West’s failure to submit to Islam. Currently, the lines between Islam and the West are not sharp but they are real. Once the balance of power begins to tilt more toward Islam, with the acquisition of a nuclear bomb, the lines will become much sharper. Nuisance power of Islam will transform to more formal power, and become a lot harder to confront.

The two best cheerleading movies

My all-time favorite cheerleading movie is “Bring It On.” You can’t beat the acting, the cheering or great lines. “We’re a cheerocracy!” But I saw one last night that is a close second. “Man of the House” with Tommy Lee Jones and the mega-hottie, Anne Archer. This movie has laughs, R Lee Ermey, the Drill Instructor from “Full Metal Jacket,” references to “Full Metal Jacket” in the script, and a take down of a college mascot. The best line comes when Cedric the Entertainer tries to a break dance floor spin, stalls out in mid revolution and as he is lying in the middle of the floor, Tommy Lee Jones says, “That is REAL old school.”

This is a good flick, I give it 6 out of 8 stars.

Commentary of the State of Educational Administration in the US

All right, I told an Irish joke to a friend of mine, Education PhD, smart guy, Irish Catholic. Nothing dirty, nothing particularly offensive, but he didn’t get it. I may have thrown him off initially by telling the joke in my flawless Irish brogue, so I retold it in my flat, yet still melodious Midwestern Accent. He still didn’t get it. Now, mind you, I have told this joke in numerous other situations, in bars, during physical therapy, and it always gets a laugh, so I look at his inability to understand it as a massive personal failure on his part.

Finally, after 15 minutes of retelling the joke, analyzing each segment, with him enacting parts of it, then going away to his cubicle still puzzled, I hear a guffaw from his desk. “I get it now!” he yelled. And people wonder why the US Education system is broken, it is because we have dumb-ass Irishmen who are even more incapable of comprehending simple narratives while sober than they are when drunk. Although we all have to admit, you are more likely to encounter them drunk than sober, even at work.

Oh, here is the joke.

Walking into the bar, Mike said to Charlie the bartender, "Pour me a stiff
one - just had another fight with the little woman."

Oh yeah?"said Charlie "And how did this one end?"

"When it was over," Mike replied, "she came to me on her hands and knees.

"Really," said Charles, "now that's a switch! What did she say?"

She said, "Come out from under the bed, you little chicken shit"

I am all about Conflict Resolution, Baby!

Bernard Mayer, in his book, The Dynamic of Conflict Resolution offers four factors to explain how individuals approach conflict: values and beliefs about conflict, approaches to avoiding and engaging in conflict, styles of conflict, and the roles people are drawn to play in conflict.

How can this framework for understanding the behavior of an individual be applied to the behavior of states?

I think the way the question for this discussion is phrased: “How can this framework (Mayer’s four factors for how individuals approach conflict) for understanding the behavior of individuals be applied to the behavior of states?” implies that the answer is not whether or not the framework is appropriate. To answer this question, we have to assume that the framework IS appropriate, so that we can respond to “how” it is appropriate.

To answer “how,” we must look at our possible responses. Is Mayer’s framework a useful descriptive tool to give observers the language to contemporaneously communicate the underpinnings of state to state conflict? Is the framework a useful historical tool into which the actions of main players in a past conflict can be readily slotted to provide lessons learned to illuminate current conflicts? Or is the framework a predictive tool upon which intelligence analysts can rely to give policy makers an indication of what course of action an potential adversary is likely to take? Given the first two chapters of Mayer’s book, the examples contained within and the realities of state to state conflict, the framework seems to be a tool more likely to be of value in retrospect.

Take the four parts of the framework: values and beliefs about conflict, approaches to avoiding and engaging in conflict, styles of conflict, and the roles people are drawn to play in conflict. “Values and beliefs” do not seem to be particularly useful, even in the historical context: as Mayer himself says on pg28: “Some people have set and unvarying beliefs about conflict. Others tend to values that can vary according to the conflict and its context.” States are the same way, sometimes they seem to act according to stated principles, sometimes they don’t. When will individuals or states stick to their values and beliefs, and when are these values and beliefs merely situational? According to Mayer, that depends on the context.

The “context” is shaped by the various players in the conflict, and by their approaches to avoiding or engaging in conflict. For individuals in conflict, their approach to engaging or avoiding can be gauged by tone of voice, tone of writing, body language, volume or first-hand reports from associates. Individuals can get a gut feeling about the frame of mind of their adversary based on actual sensations, and respond intuitively. Mayer emphasizes the personal component of conflict in the numerous examples he sites. In state to state conflict, these sensations are often lacking. Absent first hand impression, an action can be interpreted as passive avoidance, or as capitulation or as a manipulative trap. The enemy’s actions could be aggressive avoidance, or actual power-based aggression. Assigning a “conflict approach” to the actions of an adversary without actual intelligence is little better than a guess, and could in fact be worse than a guess. Once a leader of a country thinks he has divined his adversary’s approach, the leader’s course of action is laid out. But if he has guessed wrong, disaster awaits.

So, given the variables within variables inherent in using the Mayer framework to analyze the styles of conflict of states, is it nonetheless a useful tool? I would answer yes, with the caveat that it is useful when we are considering conflict between rational actors. If we are in conflict with a madman, or someone on drugs, the framework is not so good. The framework does servesto remind us that argument and conflict is not something that occurs in a vacuum, but in fact is the end result of the psychology, the stimuli and the pressures on individuals and states. The framework is a valuable basis to continue studies in state to state conflict, but I would not assign it much value beyond that

Hugh demands answers!

Hugh Hewitt asks that those who opine on the cartoon
intifada to answer two questions up front: Are we at
war with Islam? Do you want a war with Islam? Hewitt
says sensible people answer no to both, but that is a
false choice. We ARE at war with Islam, because they
are at war with us. Unless we (the US, the West,
Christians) fight back, we are guaranteed to lose.
Mohammedans say they want to kill us, so we should
give them the respect to take them at their word, and
kill them first.

As to the second question, do I want a war with Islam,
the answer is “of course not.” But reference my first
point, since they are fighting us, only a lunatic or a
suicide would refuse to fight back. Since they are
spoiling for a fight, I say, give it to them. We are
at a numeric and material advantage on our home turf,
so we can crush them here (or at worst, expel them),
and since we have small footprints among the Arabs,
they surround us in mass to fight, so we have a target
rich environment. Since they want to fight, and we
have the advantage, we should fight. As any clear
military thinker from Clauewitz to Hanson will tell
you, a decisive victory far from home solves a lot of
problems.

Finally, Hewitt should face up to the fact that the
Moslems are engaged in the ultimate in ethnic
cleansing. A Moslem who wrote to Instapundit put it
best:

Coming from an all Muslim family, I'm forced to listen
to the sense of perceived injustice of Muslims
concerning the depiction of their revered prophet.
It's quite sickening.

I tell my family that that's just how things work in a
free society: while I don't agree that the newspaper
should have done something so culturally insensitive,
they do have the right to do that, and attempting to
make Danish society pay as a whole for it is utterly
ridiculous.

It doesn't matter, I'm told. It literally means
nothing to them, because in their world, everything
should revolve around them and their culture, and God
made the world for Muslim Arabs to control.
And this is the kind of mindset the Danish people are
contending with.

“God made the world for the Muslim Arabs to control.”
Pretty chilling. But our God tells us to go forth
teach every nation, the truth of Jesus Christ. These
world views are not compatible. Better to wake up and
fight for this now, than kick the can so that our
children must fight for what we ourselves did not hold
dear.

Goat Glands and Coretta Scott King

Does anyone think that it is puzzling that Coretta Scott King died in a Tijuana Goat Gland Clinic? I mean, the woman had a stroke and heart disease, was half paralyzed, yet was so desperate to cling to this life that she threw in with a bunch of quacks in Mexico. It would seem that someone with a modicum of faith, even smaller than that of a mustard seed, would accept and rejoice at her impending appointment with God, instead of dashing around, leaving family and familiar environments, to get some "mysterious" cure. She is an example to me, I pray that when my time is nearing, I accept it gracefully, prepared, joyously to head home; not in some Mexican sweatshop, clinging to some false hope of another few days of paralyzed misery.

Let's Roll

So our friends, the Muslims, with outrage sensors tuned so exquisitely, decry the caricature of Mohammed by burning the Danish flag, which is otherwise known as the Scandinavian Cross. So the Moslems think that the best way to respond to some cartoon caricatures of Mohammed is to desecrate the symbol of Christianity? Oh the humanity! Where is the jihadi’s sense of propriety and respect for other religions?

I know, I am laughing too, I always laugh at my own absurdities.

And when it comes down to a clash of civilizations, in the midst of a war in which Muslims are justifying their war on the United States as fulfillment of their sacred duty, where does the State Department of the United States stand? (This one is a no brainer!) With the terrorists, of course!

Well, the anticipated European civil war, the one that actually started in the Fall in France with all the riots and the burning cars, is about to pick up pace. Good to know that the State Department has thrown in with the enemy.

Here are the cartoons that caused the Arab Street to erupt. If they want this to spark a latter day Battle of Tours, I say "bring it on."

Michelle Malkin is doing yeoman's work in this story with her 'MUHAMMAD CARTOONS BLOGBURST'. Semper fidelis.

Career news

I did not get promoted. Look for me in the civilian world in a few months.

Yellow flags

There are 65 countries with yellow in their flag. I know, I counted them at mailorderflags.com. I went to Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_flags_with_yellow) which has a page ostensibly listing all the colors that appear on flags and the flags which have each color. However, that page is woefully inadequate. For yellow, Wikipedia lists 21 flags, but one flag is of Niue which is more or less a commonwealth of New Zealand, one is the Soviet Union, which doesn’t exist anymore, and there is one listing for the Gay Pride flag. Last I checked, Gay Pride is not a country, although they do have a motto: “Allow me to push in your stool.”

In a related story, the 82nd Airborne says only 7 of its soldiers are performers in gay pornography. I figured, them being Army and all, the number would be a lot higher.

Gregg Easterbrook responds

Thanks for your note. Am just leaving on a trip and want to reply in more detail later. But let me say this. I derive my faith from the Gospels, as opposed to from religion, if you get my point. Jesus said we should not worry about our food or clothing, or about the lengths of our lives, that these are matters for God. By this I take him to mean that the natural world had already been completed by divine power and we need not concern ourselves with it (though of course could study it). Human society, by contrast, is far from complete nor did Jesus view it as complete -- he constantly advocated reform of human society.

So to be a Marine and be willing to fight evil is not a failure of faith, there are times when evil must be fought. Fighting must be only a last resort; it was was the Nazi darkness was spreading, and we are all glad Christians of that era took up the sword. Whether Jesus himself would have been capable of doing so, I don't know.

Warm regards,

Gregg

Email to Gregg Easterbrook

I listened with great interest to your presentation last night on CS Lewis and the Moral Imagination. As I understand your argument, you think Aslan fails as an allegory for Christ because Aslan never attempts to love his enemies, preferring instead to attack and kill them. Later, in your response to the question from the woman in the back, you asserted that we are nonetheless correct to confront and defeat the evil of Hitler and al Qaeda without recourse to negotiation.

It seems to me that a faith in Christ that is larger than a mustard seed would compel someone to love his enemies, even in the face of seemingly implacable hostility and even in the face of certain death. Given your view of the primacy of the Gospels, is the recourse to arms a failure of faith?

I wrestle with the question daily, especially given my profession as an officer in the Marine Corps. I see my service to the Corps as a troubling lack of faith since I trust not in Christ to deliver us from evil but instead take up arms myself. Daily, I pray for forgiveness. I would be interested in hearing your view of this.

Baseball conundrum

Consider the contradictions in the forced runner rule: Rule 7.01 A runner acquires the right to an unoccupied base when he touches it before he is out. He is then entitled to it until he is put out, or forced to vacate it for another runner legally entitled to that base. This seems pretty clear to anyone who has ever watched a baseball game and seen a runner on first base forced out at second base following a ground ball.

But read Rule 7.03: Two runners may not occupy a base, but if, while the ball is alive, two runners are touching a base, the following runner shall be out when tagged. The preceding runner is entitled to the base.

So, according to 7.01, a runner must vacate a base for a runner behind him who is entitled to that base. But, according to rule 7.03, if the runner on first base obstinately insists on staying there after the batter hits a ground ball, and they both end up on first base, then the batter is out if a fielder comes up and tags them both. Turns out, the runner is not actually forced to run at all!

Of course, I hear you saying, “But Ken, what kind of nitwit infielder would attempt to tag out the runner on first instead of just throwing the ball to second base to force him out.” Answer: it is hard to imagine this circumstance, except for the fact that I saw it happen. In a game I was playing, we had a runner on first, and a bouncing ground ball was hit to the second baseman who was playing in. He ran up on the ball and fielded it directly in front of the runner and tried to tag him. The runner, to avoid being tagged, turned and ran back to first base. The second baseman, realizing he would not be able to make the tag and get a double play, tossed the ball to the first baseman to force out the batter. The batter foiled this attempt by beating out the throw with a slide into first base. Meanwhile, the runner also slid into first base from the baseline. So, for an instant, both batter and runner were standing on first base. It was the perfect instance to show the inherent contradiction between 7.01 and 7.03!

Alas, the runner, not appreciating the deliciousness of the moment, bolted from the base and was tagged out by the first baseman. If he had stayed, and if the first baseman had tagged both runners, he could have forced the umpire to determine whether the batter is “entitled” to first base according to 7.01 or whether the preceding runner is “entitled” to the base according to 7.03. An opportunity to interpret and clarify the rule was lost.

Personally, I think that given how the game is played, a forced runner is not permitted to the preceding base since the act of touching the following base before he arrived means he is out. The preceding/following runner rule only applies to runners not forced. However, since the rule book is poorly written, this conundrum is open to interpretation. The rule should be rewritten for clarity.

White made its appearance this morning

FYI

We should take them at their word

Someone asked me if I was worried about going to Baghdad because of all the improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and I said, "No, I have my insurance all paid up and frankly, IEDs are down near the bottom of the list in terms of threat to Baghdad." My interlocutor asked what I meant by that and I said "In the next year, it is much more likely that Iran will get a nuke and use it on Baghdad, because when they do, they will get a two-fer. Destroying the capital of the hated Iraqis and killing 100,000 of the hated Great Satans at the same time."

Iran is developing a nuclear weapon for one reason, to use it. Nowadays, sane countries develop nuclear weapons as a deterrent. The most recent example are the weapons developed by Pakistan and India. Both these countries saw the other as a real threat and worked assiduously to develop nuclear weapons to deter the other from an attack. Each having the weapons was enough to force the other side to peace negotiations, a peace that is holding. Rational countries recognize and welcome peace, even if it is the peace of détente or of mutually assured destruction. Irrational countries, namely Iran, are unmoored from these concerns. These bad actors look at the destruction they can visit on their enemy, and discount the destruction they themselves will experience in return. In the words of Rachel Neuwirth; "Iran, with 70 million people, could absorb and survive any response from Israel while Israel, with only 5.5 million Jews, is vulnerable to devastating losses if only a few of Iran's missiles got through." This is the essence of the problem, Iran can effect the Final Solution at an acceptable cost, so we can be assured they will.

How is it that we know that? We listen to their own words. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran in October call for Israel to be "wiped off the map." The President of the country, a supposedly democratically elected official, is calling for another country to be wiped off the map. I hate to make the extermination of Jews sound like a pedestrian electoral concern, but when an elected president makes a widely reported promise, he will be under pressure to fulfill it or face humiliation and defeat if he backs down. President Ahmadinejad promises to wipe Israel off the map. Once he gets the bomb, his constituents (the equally crazy Mullahs of Iran) will expect him to do what he says. We should give him the courtesy of taking him at his word.

This isn't a question of faulty intelligence or competing analyses. We have the president of Iran threatening one of the closest allies of the United States with nuclear annihilation. Intelligence analysts must resist the temptation to look beneath the plain words to discern what President Ahmadinejad "really" means. He says Israel should be wiped off the map and he is working to build a bomb. These are three really big dots you can use a crayon to connect.

Now to be fair, there are other reasons that Iran might want to build a bomb, other than to just exterminate Israel. Iran sees that they have three enemies in the world, the US (Great Satan), Israel (Little Satan) and Iraq. Building a bomb arguably can deter the US from conventional attack, and can menace and intimidate Iraq, in addition to wiping Israel off the map. These considerations hearken back to my earlier observation that Iran is unmoored from concerns about mutually assured destruction that restrain every other nation that possesses nuclear weapons.Israel is too small to worry about proportionate response, Iraq does not have nuclear weapons and the Iran does not have a delivery system capable of menacing the Continental US.

Assuming that Iran is full of rational actors, (something I certainly DON'T assume), and given "balance of power" theory, a nuclear armed Iraq can operate with impunity. And since balance of power theory (and practice) shows that countries will accumulate power until they are checked, Iran will not willingly forgo acquiring weapons. So whether you judge Iran as a rational or irrational actor, the rest of the world is faced with a situation where Iran's acquisition and use of nuclear weapons are in their own national interest.

So we are faced with a race against time. More on this later

Daily Kos: "Marines are cowards!"

Markos Moulitsas, current star of the Democrat party, argues that I am a scaredy cat because I happen to think that it is a good idea for the NSA to intercept phone calls to and from telephones being used by al Qeida. He opines that I am so afraid of terrorists that I would willingly give up the rights fought for by the Founding Fathers. That allowing the President to hunt terrorists by listening to their phone calls means I means I support the man who “now resembles the very despot we fought in our war of independence.”

Give me a freaking break. Truly, the Founding Fathers possessed a lot more personal courage than I do. They willingly pledged their lives, their fortunes and their sacred honor to secure the blessings of liberty. But to argue that the Founding Fathers would disapprove of the NSA’s program of intercepting communications of terrorists as a sell-out of the freedoms they fought for is, (how shall I put this?) STUPID.

Would George Washington have refused on principle to open a letter from the King to Cornwallis detailing the King’s plan because Cornwallis happened to be on American soil and therefore had “rights?” Preposterous.

Were the Hessians like al Qeida; nihilistic, sadistic murderers of non-combatants? Did they use a passenger ferry full of innocent civilians as a weapon in New York in an attempt to kill indiscriminately? Did the Redcoats march into schools in Boston and systematically murder children as al Qeida did in Beslan, Russia? I don’t recall the King’s troops behaving that way. Al Qeida, as an enemy, is altogether different from the enemy our forefathers fought. The Islamic Fascists are worthless in the face of force of arms, but are lethal to their targets of choice, children and other innocents.

So back to the NSA intercepts. Is it a cowardly delegation of my rights to exchange my freedom to converse with al Qeida in privacy for the chance that the US government might uncover and stop a plan to attack the elementary school when my children and the children of many other Marines are being taught? The Bush-hating minds of Kos and the Democrat party think it is. If the definition of cowardice is wanting the government to use passive means to reveal a Beslan-like attack on some elementary school outside Camp Lejeune or Ft Benning, then I am wear my yellow strip with pride.

But for me and my fellow Marines, who enthusiastically take up arms to exterminate those terrorists who cower from a fair fight yet who nonetheless plot to bayonet children, the real cowards are in the press and democrat party. Kos revels in the phony machismo that he is the courageous “Champion of Constitutional Rights” when the reality is: if he truly had to choose between his life and the sacred honor of defending “privacy,” he would dispose of the constitution faster than a guard at Guantanamo could flush the Koran. I will take courage lessons from Kos when his children face the knives of the killers of Beslan and yet he still opines that their lives are well spent if it means Osama in Karachi can plot in privacy via cell phone to Mohammed in Raleigh.

The climb rate of my underwear

I washed all clothes in the house on New Year’s eve, and realized that when I put my boxers in the drawer, my white one was on the very bottom of the pile. Hence, I have the perfect opportunity to determine the velocity at which my underwear rises to the top of the pile. I will keep you informed…