Latest on China

Stratfor mentioned the crucial aspect of Chinese industrial success, massive
subsidy of energy prices. It is not just wage differentials keeping
consumer products cheap, it is all the money that the central government is
paying not to have a fuel cost shock like the American economy is enduring.
If individual Chinese people and companies had to pay market prices for
gasoline and fuel oil, industries would shut down, people would park their
cars and the country's economy would collapse. On the other hand, if China
continues paying these subsidies, there will not be any money left to loan
to companies to modernize to keep up with consumer demand. This too will
doom their economy as countries and factories with cheap labor, access to
Western capital markets and oil of their own (Mexico) are able to once again
be competitive with the Chinese.

Colonialism's Effect on Southeast Asia

Southeast Asian history features the stories of indigenous cultures that had arisen without much intermingling with outside influences, save for the occasional raids by the remote neighbors, being forced to contend with the arrival of Chinese and Western sailors and adventurers. In some cases, especially in the first years of the scramble for colonial holdings, the interaction was benign and even beneficial on both sides. “European visitors to Southeast Asia in the seventeenth century approached Asians as equals, displaying an openness and readiness to learn that was often lacking in the nineteenth century, when scientific and industrial developments had produced a technological gulf between Europe and the rest of the world.” 1 In other cases, the interaction was more indifferent, such as the West’s interaction with Siam. Often, the relations were much more negative and wrenching, as it was in Vietnam and every other country with which it came into contact. The Chinese went to Southeast Asia for tribute. Chinese Emperors believed that since China was the Middle Kingdom, all other peoples were compelled to literally pay respects to Chinese power. “[The tribute system] showed that China was the superior centre and its rules had duties toward all other rulers as his inferiors.” 2

Colonialism in Southeast Asia brought modern Western ideas and concepts to Southeast Asia. Some of these new ideas included the nation-state and its concomitant bureaucratic structure, education for ambitious youth in political theory and human rights, new economic opportunities and travails and new perspectives on religion. Each of these innovations served to change the nature of life in Southeast Asia countries. Prior to the arrival of colonial powers, Southeast Asia had a small population that was probably a result of a number of factors including high female work load, rampant gonorrhea, prevalent abortion and instability of residence. 3 This dynamic changed as the colonial powers brought colonial governmental structure and the will to organize the economy to produce salable goods. With more order and with economic incentives for the people in the region to remain in place to produce raw materials, populations began to increase. As more wealth was produced, more outsiders were drawn to Southeast Asia, bringing their own cultures and religion into contact with the locals, and engendering change, and unfortunately, prejudice. “Throughout the region, the many different ethnic groups live side by side with their diverse languages religions customs, occupations, and education and social statuses. As in much of the rest of the world, these differences give rise to prejudices and stereotypes.” 4 The differences also gave rise to nationalism.

Nationalism, as it was expressed throughout Southeast Asia, looked different in each country. The various religions and cultures found in the countries in the region were so unique that some observers coined a term for the unique Southeastern Asian expression of nationalism. “We shall use the term ‘indigenism’ to describe the structure of policies and institutions created to transform the racial dimensions of the colonial type economies inherited by Southeastern Asian societies.” 5 While these scholars further broke down “indigenisms” into the individual country “ism” for each unique county in Southeast Asia, the scholars noted that all countries did share one characteristic. Even though each country had different colonial experiences, all people shared a similar, negative perception of colonialism. “Contrasting sharply with the diversity in colonial policies and practices is the uniformity of images held by Southeast Asians of their colonial experiences. Nationalism is seen as the movement to liberate the national society from the constraints…which prevented the fulfillment of individual and collective capacities for economic and political development.” 6

Kratoska hinted at what might be the actual root for these negative colonial images in the minds of indigenous Southeast Asians: the usurpation of traditional ruling prerogatives by the efficient colonial bureaucracies. The colonial bureaucracies allowed the state to reach into areas previously untouchable by any central authority. The colonial powers’ influence and authority touched all people within a large geographic region. Because colonial policies were so pervasive in a way previously in a way that had not previously been experienced, all people in the colony shared the same antipathy to the big, foreign authority in their presence. 7 The shared loathing of the colonial power resulted in “indigenism.”
It should be noted that most nationalists and revolutionaries in Southeast Asia did not object to structure and bureaucracy per se. Revolutionary leaders, most of whom had been educated in the West, understood that an efficient bureaucracy was intrinsic to the functioning of the state. Further, most Southeast Asian revolutionaries did not object to the usurpation of power from the local chieftains (unless, of course, the displaced chieftain returned as a revolutionary). Instead, the indigenous leaders objected to the foreigners being in power, not to the governmental structure necessary to projecting the power. These local leaders were content to displace the colonial rulers while maintaining the trappings of power. 8

An example of this phenomenon is Indonesia. Prior to the arrival of the Dutch, the people of the islands that eventually came to be known as Indonesia saw themselves as subjects of a this or that kingdom or as members of a particular ethnic group. After the Dutch set up political boundaries and asserted authority throughout the islands did the people on those islands have something towards which to direct their resentment and around which to unite. Ambitious, Western educated revolutionaries recognized the power of the resentment that could be leveraged to expel the Dutch while at the same time admiring to political infrastructure that the Europeans had created. After finally forcing the Dutch out, the revolutionaries grabbed power but soon realized that the temporary unity displayed by the Indonesians in ridding themselves of their colonial overseers would not persist. Indonesia has found that replacing a foreign hegemon with a local authoritarian has not instantly improved the lives of the people. 9

Indonesia has striven to create itself as a nation-state, but has been largely unsuccessful since the people have reverted to their natural affiliations to local leaders, ethnic groups, and now increasingly, religious preferences. These sub-allegiances work to subvert the foundation of a nation state in general, and in Indonesia in particular, making the idea of a nation state in Southeast Asia a chimera. “In some way the state's sovereignty is inherent within the people, expressive of its historic identity. In it, ideally, there is a basic equivalence between the borders and character of the political unit upon the one hand and a self-conscious cultural community on the other. In most cases this is a dream as much as a reality. Most nation-states in fact include groups of people who do not belong to its core culture or feel themselves to be part of a nation so defined.” 10

The fact that many Southeast Asian revolutionaries only recognized their desire to overthrow and supplant their colonial masters after availing themselves of Western educations is another common theme to the post-colonial period. There is some evidence that many of these highly educated individuals would have been content to return to a position of power in their own countries even only to serve the colonial administration. However, Western powers were not willing to provide much opportunity to these returning scholars. So, instead of working within the colonial structure to buttress the status quo, these revolutionaries worked to undermine it. Colonialism thus “contained the seeds of its own destruction.” 11 Young people with good educations could recognize the strengths and weaknesses of the colonial system, and therefore could attack the weaknesses and preserve the strengths. Additionally, these young, intelligent leaders could to some extent rally the people who as we have seen, shared with these returning intellectuals an antipathy towards foreigners, although the antipathy grew out of different causes such a lack of respect for religion or blame for wild, disconcerting economic swings. “The colonial powers inadvertently nurtured Asian nationalism by combining political repression with opportunities for Western (or Japanese) education. The most talented and capable indigenous leaders were offered the benefits of colonial education but denied profession opportunities to use it. Strain rapidly increased between traditional values and new ones, between efforts to adapt modern Western material techniques and the need to maintain a distinctly non-Western cultural identity, and between the impulse to assimilate the intruder and to expel him completely.” 12

Another by product of colonialism was introducing new religious beliefs that supplanted indigenous, traditional ones. These new beliefs became a way to set populations apart from one another. “Southeast Asia is a crossroads of many religious influences, which have always been treated syncretically. One precondition for this basically peaceful syncretism is the fact that the different religious communities largely eschew orthodoxy and content themselves with their followers' commitment to a particular ritual practice (orthopractice).” 13 This syncreticism has begun to erode however, as the religions brought into the region by the colonial powers begin to insist on a rigid orthodoxy enforced through worldwide communications and hardened in reaction to one another.

Colonialism’s effects in Southeast Asia continue to this day. The region has a large, dense population brought about by the economic effects of colonialism. The density of population and the wealth in the region has brought many different cultures into contact, and altered the religions and culture. Colonial education policies introduced ideas about nationalism and human rights that encouraged and inspired revolutionaries who ultimately overthrew the colonial order. The revolutionaries co-opted the colonial bureaucratic structure to administer the governments they now controlled. The results have been mixed, but the legacy of colonialism and the nationalism it engendered remain to the present.

Notes
1 Paul Kratoska, “Nationalism and Modernist Reform” in Nicholas Tarling, ed., The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia Volume Two, Part One From c. 1800 to the 1930s (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 1999, pg 250.
2 Denis Twitchett and John K. Fairbank, The Cambridge History of China Volume 10 Late Ch’ing, 1800-1911, Part 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 1978, pg 30.
3 Nicholas Tarling, “The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia Volume One, Part Two From c. 1500 to c. 1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 1999, pg 117.
4 Clark D. Neher, Southeast Asia Crossroads of the World (DeKalb, IL: Southeast Asia Publications) 2004, pg 16.
5 Frank Golay, Ralph Anspach, M. Ruth Pfanner, Eliezer B. Ayal, Underdevelopment and Economic Nationalism is Southeast Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press) 1969, pg 9.
6 Ibid, 17.
7 Kratoska, ibid, pg 248.
8 Ibid.
9 Leo Suryadinata, Nationalism and Globalism, East and West (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asia Studies) 2000, pg 38.
10 Hastings, Adrian. The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism. (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press) 1999 , pp. 2-5.
11 Michael Brecher, The New States of Asia: A Political Analysis (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 1963, pg 22.
12 Mark Borthwick. Pacific Century: The Emergence of Modern Pacific Asia (Boulder: CO: Westview Press) 2007, pg 153.

Bibliography
Borthwick, Mark, Pacific Century: The Emergence of Modern Pacific Asia (Boulder: CO:
Westview Press) 2007.

Brecher , Michael, The New States of Asia: A Political Analysis (Oxford: Oxford
University Press) 1963.

Golay, Frank, Ralph Anspach, M. Ruth Pfanner, Eliezer B. Ayal, Underdevelopment and
Economic Nationalism is Southeast Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press) 1969.

Hastings, Adrian, The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism.
(Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press) 1999.

Horstmann, Alexander, “Reflexive transformation and religious revitalisation:
perspectives from Southeast Asia” EASA Biennial Conference 2006 website, 21st September, 2006 at http://www.nomadit.co.uk/easa/easa06/easa06_panels.php5?PanelID=54 accessed 27 May 08.

Kratoska, Paul, “Nationalism and Modernist Reform” in Nicholas Tarling, ed., The
Cambridge History of Southeast Asia Volume Two, Part One From c. 1800 to the
1930s (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 1999.

Neher, Clark D., Southeast Asia Crossroads of the World (DeKalb, IL: Southeast Asia
Publications) 2004.

Suryadinata, Leo, Nationalism and Globalism, East and West (Singapore: Institute of
Southeast Asia Studies) 2000.

Tarling, Nicholas, “The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia Volume One, Part Two
From c. 1500 to c. 1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 1999.

Review of Austronesian Taiwan: Linguistics, History, Ethnology, Prehistory

Austronesian Taiwan: Linguistics, History, Ethnology, Prehistory, (Berkeley, CA: Phoebe A. Hearst Museum, University of California 2000) edited by David Blundell is an excellent introduction to the study of the origin and spread of the indigenous people of Taiwan into the Pacific. Any scholar interested in studying a competing theory to the popular idea that Polynesian people moved directly from mainland China to the Philippine Islands and beyond would find Dr Blundell’s book to be the natural place to start. The book itself is made up of contributions by scholars from various fields in the study of indigenous Taiwan peoples. There are chapters from anthropologists, professors of linguistics, archaeologists, ethnologists, musicologists and historians, among others. While there is a great deal of information and some provocative theories contained within this book, some readers may find themselves distracted by passages of inelegant prose written by authors for whom English is not their first language.

Dr Blundell is from California and received his PhD from UCLA in Anthropology after extensive undergraduate and masters’ level studies of Asian languages and cultures. He took a teaching position at National Taiwan University in 1984 and soon after began conducting research in Formosan groups, prehistory, and socio-linguistic mapping. The contributors to Austronesian Taiwan provided papers to the “Austronesian Studies in Taiwan: Retrospect and Prospect” conference that took place in Berkley in late October 1997. Dr Blundell then edited these submissions, some of which were in their original languages, and compiled them into this volume.
The central thesis of this book is that Taiwan is the historical home for all Austronesian people who speak Formosan and Malayo-Polynesian (MP) languages. Dr Blundell gathers evidence from many academic disciplines to support this thesis, but the most compelling arguments are linguistic and archeological. For example, the MP languages in evidence from Madagascar to Easter Island share sentence structures, accents and words with the many Formosan languages indigenous to Taiwan. However, the Formosan languages of Taiwan have larger and more varied vocabularies and display more distinctive features from one another than do the MP languages from the Formosans. The implication is that the MP languages are much younger and are descended from the languages in Taiwan.

The second compelling argument for Taiwan being the locus of the Austronesian peoples is the archaeological record of “red slipped” pottery in Oceania. The pottery suddenly appears on these islands with no archeological precursor around 2000 BC. In contrast, there is a voluminous archaeological record with regional variation on the island of Taiwan for more that 2000 years previous to the appearance of this Oceania pottery. When the pottery evidence is viewed in tandem with the linguistic evidence, it would appear that some people who working with pottery and speaking an Austronesian language departed from southern Taiwan to the next nearest islands of the northern coast of Luzon in the Philippines. The descendants of those people then migrated further out into the Pacific and to Southeast Asia.

Dr Blundell and his contributors had to deal with the alternative theory that Austronesian peoples launched directly from the Southeastern coast of China towards Luzon then curled back up at some later date into Taiwan. The counter to this theory is the Penghu Islands archaeological record. These small islands in the Taiwan Straits have an archaeological record that predates that of both Taiwan and of Oceania but is more recent than that on mainland China. This timeline comports with the theory that these proto-Austronesian people hopped from the mainland to the next nearest islands, the Penghu, as a response to ecological or demographic pressure. From there, the descendants of these people hopped to Taiwan, stayed a few thousand years, then moved onto the Philippines.

The information and arguments presented in the book are compelling, as far as they go. However, advances in DNA analysis of rat bones found throughout Southeast Asia and Oceania as well as further Y-chromosome and mitochondrial analysis of the indigenous peoples of the Pacific and southeastern Asia will answer many of the questions left by the conjecture-based linguistic and archaeological evidence in this volume. Determining the actual pattern of migrations in southeastern Asia and Oceania will allow for more informed assessments of the historical and pre-historical evidence. Austronesian Taiwan is a valuable contribution for students of southeastern Asian history.

Curse you Steve Czaban!

He has been advertising this new beer, Leinenkugels, on his radio show in the mornings.  I decided to give it a try.
I bought some Honey Weiss at the 7 Day store and was shocked to find that it is as expensive at Guinness!  So, I was half hoping that it would be bitter, or metalic or would give me a hangover, but unfortunately, it is a really good beer.  So, instead of sticking with the tried and true Silver Bullet at 5 for 6, I am now going to have to shell out for this $8 stuff.  Woe is me, and curses on your moustache, Czaban!

New Obama Poster

Courtesy Tennyson and Malkin

The real cause of civil wars

A reader asks: "Do you think it is possible that these characteristics are more inherent to instability and ineffective government and those the real cause of civil war? Most of the countries we looked at were African nations which have been riddled with unstable conditions for many years now. To me the relatively young and uneducated populations in these countries seem more the result of the chaos stemming from civil war rather than a cause of it. Is this different than an observer noting that an ice cream shop sold more sundaes on a hot day, therefore ice cream sales affect warmer weather?"

If I read your question correctly, you are asking if it is possible that civil war is symptom of dysfunctional governance, just as are the youth bulge and illiteracy. I think there are two responses to this: 1) Civil war is exacerbated by surplus manpower. To illustrate this point requires an examination of the youth bulge.

The youth bulge is caused when medical advances allow more people to live longer lives and also decrease infant mortality. When these medical advances occur before a society transitions from a preference for large family sizes, there develops a sizeable cohort of youth for whom there is little to do and little upward mobility. Longer life spans for older men allows older men to stay in their professions or retain their wealth longer before passing it on to their children. In polygamous societies, older men with more wealth make better marriage partners for younger women who might otherwise be available to men nearer their own age. As a consequence, these types of societies must deal with populations of young men who do not have women, and who do not have any viable means for getting ahead in society except through glory in battle. Opportunistic leaders eager to assert power and/or seize resources or wealth find it easy to recruit armies from these young men. Opportunistic leaders with armies will inevitably clash for supremacy. (Cincotta)

I think the causation looks like this: A developing nation in any economic condition experiences an increase in lifespan at the same time experiencing a decrease in infant mortality. The society begins to destabilize as young, rootless men compete violently for dwindling supplies of available wealth and wives. Opportunistic leaders recruit armies from these men. Civil war results.

An alternate answer to your question is: 2) It just doesn’t matter which came first, the chicken or the egg or, if you prefer, the hot day or the sundae. Collier has identified the ingredients that, when present, indicate a country is in or will shortly be in civil war. How those ingredients came to be present is not particularly important. The fact that these characteristics are present means that the same prescription applies; free trade, energetic peacekeeping and tutorials on government. As Collier puts it: “Our utter neglect of trade, security and governance policies for the bottom billion is a scandal -- and an opportunity. Properly used, these policies have real power, which is why they were employed for the recovery of Europe.” (Collier)

Sources:

Cincotta, Richard. “State of the World 2005 Global Security Brief #2: Youth Bulge, Underemployment Raise Risks of Civil Conflict” Worldwatch Institute website March 1, 2005 at http://www.worldwatch.org/node/76 accessed 28 March 2008.

Collier, Paul. “Will the Bottom Billion Ever Catch Up?” Washington Post online 21 Oct 07 at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/19/AR2007101901543.html accessed 28 MAr 08.

Argument against Sri Lanka as a counter-insurgency

It may be splitting hairs, but it seems that what is going on in Sri Lanka does not really qualify as a civil war. Consider the Correlates of War (COW) definition for Civil Wars: “To be recognized as a civil war, a conflict had to (1) occur within a generally recognized state (2) produce at least 1000 deaths per year (3) involve the national government as an active participant and (4) experience effective resistance from both the rebels and the government.” (Walter, pg 48) Combine that definition of civil war with Colliers’ construct of civil war: “a relatively high proportion of young uneducated men; an imbalance between ethnic groups, with one tending to outnumber the rest; and, a supply of natural resources like diamonds or oil which simultaneously encourages and helps to finance rebellion.” (Collier, Bottom) Then, consider that statistics for Sri Lanka in Table 1. Sri Lanka stands out from the rest of the countries in the table in literacy, average age and in the lack of a “resource curse.”

The sides in Sri Lanka appear to be two combatants contesting an international border rather than a rebel group against a sovereign country. The north and east of the island has been identified internationally as a Tamil homeland since at least 1873 when the frontier was demarcated by Britain. (Manogaran) The LTTE, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, collect taxes in the areas they control, run schools and even have a navy and an air force. (Shtender-Auerbach) The latest assessments by observers of the conflict see the war headed for stalemate. “However, since mid-2007, the Sri Lankan ground forces have not been able to show any notable successes, giving rise to fears among military observers that there could be a prolonged stalemate, leading to public disillusionment.”

The combat between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government may share some of the characteristics of civil wars seen around the world, but this conflict should fit into another category. This new category should include wars between states and quasi-states. Wars between states and quasi-states, such the one between Israel and Palestine and between China and Taiwan, feature capable combatants across a clearly demarcated frontier. Further, the sides have fought to a stalemate although considerable animosity exists on both sides and can flare into combat quickly. Removing these “state vs quasi state” conflicts from the discussion about civil wars makes the causation for civil war more clearly defined and more readily apparent from the Table 1 data.

Sources:

Balachandra, P.K. “Sri Lanka may be heading for military stalemate” India eNews Feb 6 2008 at http://www.indiaenews.com/srilanka/20080206/95922.htm accessed 29 Mar 08.

Collier, Paul. The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 2007.

Manogaran, Dr. Chelvadurai. “Sinhalese - Tamil Relations & the Politics of Space” Tamil National Forum 29 June 1997 at http://www.tamilnation.org/forum/manogaran/970629space.htm accessed 29 Mar 08.

Shtender-Auerbach, “What Happens When a "Poor Man's Air Force" Goes Airborne?” The Century Foundation, 5/3/2007 at http://www.tcf.org/list.asp?type=TN&pubid=1569 accessed 29 Mar 08.

Walter, Barbara F. Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press) 2002.

Predicting civil war with the Collier Construct

“The construct by Paul Collier states that: Civil war has nothing much to do with the legacy of colonialism, or income inequality, or the political repression of minorities. Three thing turn out to increase the risk of conflict: a relatively high proportion of young uneducated men; an imbalance between ethnic groups, with one tending to outnumber the rest; and, a supply of natural resources like diamonds or oil which simultaneously encourages and helps to finance rebellion.”

Paul Collier accepts the University of Michigan Correlates of War (COW) definition for Civil Wars. “To be recognized as a civil war, a conflict had to (1) occur within a generally recognized state (2) produce at least 1000 deaths per year (3) involve the national government as an active participant and (4) experience effective resistance from both the rebels and the government.” (Walter, pg 48) Given these assumptions, the Correlations of War Project has identified 213 conflicts since 1816 that meet these definitions. (Sarkees, pg 123-144) Going down the COW list, it is apparent that many of the COW’s civil wars feature Collier’s three increased risks. However, Collier himself points out that his observations are not able to predict which countries will have a civil war. “More fundamentally, our model cannot be used for prediction. It can tell you what structurally are the factors underlying proneness to civil war and what is sometimes more interesting, what seems to not be very important. From that, it can tell you the sort of countries that are most at risk. But it cannot tell you if Sierra Leone will have another civil war next year. That depends on a myriad of short-term events.” (Collier, Bottom, pg 19) Similarly, Collier’s observations do not hold true for every civil war. Take for instance his observation about an imbalance between ethnic groups. “One of the few low-income countries that is completely ethnically pure, Somalia, had a bloody civil war followed by complete and persistent government melt down.” (Collier, Bottom, pg 25)

The table constructed from the UN data seems to bear out Collier’s three factors. The table compared 10 states at-risk for civil war and 2 controls (United States and Great Britain), each measured in four variables: median age, percent of uneducated young men, ethnic balance and presence of natural resources, the “resource curse.” More or less arbitrarily, I grouped those countries with a median age less than 21, a school life expectancy in single digits and/or literacy of less than 51%, a dominant ethnic group that is less than 75% of the population, and the presence of a resource curse. The Sudan and the Ivory Coast meet all those criteria. One observer sees the Ivory Coast as heading towards disaster. “The Ivory Coast, therefore, is not just another little tribal war in the making — but potentially a major catastrophe.” Sudan is mired in a number of conflicts that may have had distinct beginnings, and a North-South orientation, but have devolved into something more general. “…the prospects of ending Sudan's armed conflict seem gloomy, stating that Sudan ‘entered the twenty-first century mired in not one but many civil wars.’” (Ronen)

Collier carefully notes that his factors do not predict when a country will experience civil war. For example, Bhutan, impoverished, land-locked, adjacent to two countries experiencing civil war (Nepal and Tibet), with low literacy could be a potential cite for civil war, but is instead on the verge of elections to replace a benevolent monarch. (CIA) Since Collier has identified broad variables in his construct and because Collier himself has identified the construct’s limitation, the Collier civil war construct is probably correct but required additional refinement to become more of a predictive tool than a descriptive one.

Sources:

Chirot, Daniel. “Chaos in Ivory Coast: Roots and Consequences” Globalist: Power of Global Ideas website at http://www.theglobalist.com/DBWeb/StoryId.aspx?StoryId=4264 accessed 25 Mar 08.

CIA. “Bhutan” World Factbook website at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bt.html accessed 28 Mar 08.

Collier, Paul. The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 2007.

Ronen, Yehudit. “Review of The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars by Douglas H. Johnson” Middle East Quarterly Spring 2004 at http://www.meforum.org/article/1528 accessed 28 March 08.

Sarkees, Meredith Reid (2000). "The Correlates of War Data on War: An Update to 1997," Conflict Management and Peace Science, 18/1: 123-144.

Walter, Barbara F. Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press) 2002.

Lessons from the First Afghan War

Given the United States then-recent retreat from Vietnam, scholars have questioned why the Soviet Union would have invaded a small country on the periphery of its empire thereby risking getting bogged down in an foreign adventure. Michael MccGwire saw the Soviet Union’s invasion as a reasonable response to concerns about its own security on its southern frontier. “The Soviets saw Afghanistan as part of their national security zone, and their intervention was directly comparable to those in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 and not some new departure.” 1 Raymond Garthoff argued that the Politburo believed the security situation in Afghanstan was so dire and such a threat to their interests that they had no choice but to intervene. Garthoff analogized that Afghanistan is to Russia as Mexico is to the United States. “…No one in the American leadership sought to understand the Soviet position by imagining a comparable parallel situation on the southern border of the United States (moreover with a hostile China and an adversarial alliance in place of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans). In such a case, it would not have been difficult to imagine an American intervention to save American lives and strategic assets and to preemptively preclude hostile presence.” 2 An Afghani observer rejected the rational geopolitical calculus as an explanation for the Soviet intervention, and instead identified the cause as the Soviet Communists’ lust for power and empire. “The concern that the Soviet leaders showed about their ‘insecurity’ of their southern borders was a mere rationalization for their drive for expansion, a drive reminiscent of nineteenth-century colonialism.” 3

The fact that Afghanistan actually bordered the Soviet Union supports Garthoff’s argument that political instability and other nations’ mischief in Afghanistan were strategic justifications for Soviet intervention. The Soviet Union had never let political challenges go unanswered on its frontiers, as MccGwire pointed out, so it was no surprise that the Soviet Union would intervene aggressively and in force as it had previously. The Soviet Union would use proxies like the Cubans or Nicaraguans in more remote insurgent battles like Angola or Latin America without injecting their own forces in those places in anything more than limited “advisor” role. Proxy wars were expensive drains on the Politburo’s treasury, but less so than would be an actual overseas deployment of an expeditionary army. Overseas proxy battles were certainly less likely than an actual Red Army deployment of provoking a response by the United States Army, and thereby actually destroying détente. 4 The proof of Afghanistan’s strategic importance can be seen in the fact that a few years after the Soviet Union’s defeat there, the Soviet Union empire had broken up. While the withdrawal from Afghanistan can not be seen as a direct causal link to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the psychological damage done by the defeat there, coupled with the drain on capital that the anemic Soviet economy could not sustain, doomed the empire.

By contrast, Vietnam’s strategic importance to the United States was a more tenuous case. Many American leaders in that era ascribed to the “domino theory” when countering Communist expansionism. The domino theory explained the fear that allowing one small country on the periphery to fall to the communists would discourage neighboring states and embolden expansionist communists. According to the theory, many states would fall if one fell. Eventually, the falling states would imperil the United States. “Domino theorists held that the capture of one Third World state would allow the capture of the next, and the next. In other words, they believed Third World states were highly cumulative assets. 5 President Kennedy was a believer in this theory and made an impassioned argument in support of the theory on the Huntley Brinkley Show: “I believe it. I believe it. I think that the struggle is close enough. China is so large, looms so high just beyond the frontiers, that if South Viet-Nam went, it would not only give them an improved geographic position for a guerrilla assault on Malaya but would also give the impression that the wave of the future in Southeast Asia was China and the Communists. So I believe it.” 6

While it is clear that there was a deep belief in the wisdom of intervention in Vietnam, history has shown that America’s defeat there did not result in “dominoes” falling in Asia in any way that could be considered a threat to American power. The United States emerged in the years following defeat in Vietnam as the world’s superpower. The lack of repercussions for America’s geopolitical position following the defeat is evidence of the lack of strategic importance of the war there.

Operationally, both the US and the Soviet Union ran out of time in prosecuting their particular operational approaches to the counter-insurgency. The US eventually adopted a Philippine War -style approach that attempted to protect villagers and destroy insurgents in an attempt to allow civilian rule to take hold. The Soviets attempted to ethnically cleanse recalcitrant populations and relocate those more amenable populations into recently cleansed areas to forestall disturbances. Both of these counter-insurgency strategies, the benign and the repugnant, require time to in order to achieve the goals. As noted by Sarah Sewall, the key to a successful counter-insurgency is time. “Since a national COIN strategy is a long-term proposition, building a unified and bipartisan approach is critical for the Nation.” 7 Both the United States and the Soviet Union ran out of time and as a consequence, had to leave the battlefield in defeat.

Tactically, US forces remained effective throughout the war. Colonel Summers argued that American forces performed superbly throughout the war. American forces never lost a major engagement on the ground or in the air. 8 On the contrary, the Soviet forces performed in a desultory fashion, often committing atrocities against civilians. Observers noted that many Red Army units and their Afghani counter-parts had no interest in performing basic patrolling or rudimentary attacks that could have been devastating to the Afghan insurgency. The Red Army was poorly trained, poorly led, rife with alcoholism and engaged in systematic, sadistic hazing of conscripts. Morale was very bad. 9 The Afghan Mujahadeen were not note to have any particular tactical skill, but the Soviet Army was unable or unwilling to exploit the obvious weaknesses of the insurgency. 10

Afghanistan held more strategic significance for the Soviets than was Vietnam for the United States. Afghanistan was a restive province on the southern periphery of the Soviet empire, and to the Russian autocrats in the Politburo, Afghanistan appeared indistinguishable from neighboring countries already in the Soviet orbit. The Soviet leadership could not afford to have such a country on its southern frontier as an example of liberty and to provide manpower and materiel for insurgencies inside the Soviet Union proper. Even though the political leadership defined Afghanistan as strategically vital, the Red Army did not perform well enough to prevail in its counter-insurgency fight. In contrast, Vietnam did not represent a real strategic concern for the US, but the US military nonetheless performed admirably against the insurgency. What was common in the two counter-insurgencies, that of the US and the Soviet Union, was a lack of time to follow through to victory. Consequently, both were defeated.

Sources:

1 MccGwire , Michael. Perestroika and Soviet National Security (Washington: Brookings Institution Press) 1991. Pg 94.

2 Garthoff, Raymond L. Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington: Brookings Institution Press) 1994. Pg 1074, Notes

3. Kakar, M. Hassan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 (Berkeley: University of California Press) 1995. Pg 49.

4. Bialer, Seweryn. The Soviet Paradox: External Expansion, Internal Decline (New York: Knopf) 1986 . Pg 312.

5. Van Evera, Stephen. Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press) 1999. Pg 113.

6. US General Services Administration. Public Papers of the President: John F. Kennedy, 1963 (Washington: Government Printing Office) 1964 in James N. Giglio Debating the Kennedy Presidency (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield) 2002. Pg 88.


7. Sewall, Sarah. “Modernizing U.S. counterinsurgency practice: rethinking risk and developing a national strategy” Military Review, Sept-Oct, 2006 at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PBZ/is_5_86/ai_n17093153/pg_11 accessed 17 March 2008.

8. Summers Jr, Harry. On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War (New York: Dell Books) 1992. Pg 47.

9. Reese, Roger R. The Soviet Military Experience: A History of the Soviet Army, 1917-1991 (London: Routledge) 2000. Pg 172.

10. Jalali, Ali Ahmad and Lester W. Grau. The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War (Quantico: Marine Corps Studies and Analysis Division) 1995. Pg 404.

Thailand's First Counter-insurgency Fight

The most striking characteristic of the Thai counter-insurgency is the time it took to finally get it right. From 1965 to 1983, the Thai government groped for the strategy that would work to effectively counter the insurgency. The early Thai counter-insurgency effort looked somewhat like the early American counter-insurgency effort in Vietnam, heavy on the conventional war with little effort to redress the economic and political grievances that motivated the Maoists. Many Thais recognized that the Maoist complaints about the political system had resonance, but instead of joining the insurgency, many disaffected Thais turned their dissatisfaction to more traditionally Thai outlets like Buddhism, Thai nationalism and love of the monarchy. These outlets were more attractive to most Thais that what the Maoist in the Communist Party of Thailand were offering. The insurgency failed to grow and thrive even though the Thai military adopted many of the heavy-handed tactics of the seen in other counter-insurgency fights that generally backfired.

The unique character of the Thai people offered the counter-insurgency additional time to find the right strategy. As we have seen in the other case studies, the key variable to counter-insurgency is having the time to allow the right strategy to work. Seventeen years is a long time to fight any kind of campaign, but that kind of time is generally what is needed to be successful. The time allowed the Thai military to put into practice a counter-insurgency strategy the broad outlines of which are now familiar. The conventional military provided real security in the villages to allow grass-roots political reform to take place. Special units hunted and destroyed the military capability of the insurgents. At the national level, general political reform addressed the systemic problems that might have compelled the ideologically inclined to side with the insurgents and tip the balance away from the government.

As Jon pointed out, CPT strategic mistakes also contributed to the Thai government victory. Most of those mistakes can be attributed to the nature of communism. Communists are atheists, anti-religious, controlled by outsiders and anti-monarchical. Thus, the CPT had a hard time swimming in the sea of the Thai people who were Buddhist and traditional monarchists. The Maoists just could not change or hide their nature, and were thus always at a disadvantage in their organizing and concealment in the countryside. There is a Zen Buddhist story that goes something like this: A Buddhist master reached into a stream to save a scorpion that was drowning while a soldier stood nearby. As the master lifted the scorpion on the bank to save it from drowning, the insect stung the master, then the soldier immediately stomped the scorpion to death. The student asked why the master would save a scorpion knowing it would sting and that the soldier would kill it. “It has its nature, I have mine, he has his.”

The extent to which the CPT insurgency was wedded to Maoist ideology probably was a lucky thing for the Thai counter-insurgency as Robert mentioned. By the time the Thai counter-insurgency was heading to victory, Maoism had been discredited everywhere, including in China. Whatever political problems existed in Thailand seemed trivial compared to the prospect of foreign domination, concentration camps and bankruptcy that communism had to offer. The Thai people could see what communism wrought for their neighbors in Laos and Vietnam. Those examples had no appeal for the average Thai and that perception contributed to the defeat of the CPT.

What is up with Syria? or Never attribute to malice or conspiracy that which can be explained by stupidity or incompetence

Stratfor doesn't know: The events in Syria of September 2007 make no sense and have never made any sense. The events we have seen since February make no sense either. That is noteworthy, and we bring it to your attention. We are not saying that the events are meaningless. We are saying that we do not know their meaning. But we can't help but regard them as ominous.

This is my take: I think one point Stratfor did not make is that the Syrians have never shown 
themselves to be particularly adept at long term strategic thinking. Maybe things seem disjointed and illogical because that is the nature of Assad's thought process. Aligning themselves with North Korea, trying to build nuke plants, continuing to test the patience of the US and Israel, blatantly interfering in Lebanon without much strategic purpose...Syria does not have much of a plan except trying to punch above their weight. They are like the 5'2" tough guy who swaggers around hurling insults and threats and occasionally bullying someone even smaller...eventually someone bigger and tougher will tire of the act and crush him. Just a matter of time.

Killing People for Safety

Iain Murray wrote in the National Review Online "Not all those whose flights have been canceled will cancel their trips. Some will find slots on other airlines, but some will choose to go by car (there being no appreciable competition from rail in most markets). Automobile travel is more dangerous than commerical plane travel for long distance trips. With the number of cancellations in the thousands, we can expect very many people to have gone long distances by road who wouldn't have otherwise. There is a chance that some of these people will be involved in a fatal accident. It is plausible, therefore, that grounding the flights will have fatal consequences."

Well, duh.  Family of 4 dies in a rental car on the highway, not news.  Plane slides off the runway because some wiring was crossed, BIG NEWS.  Bureaucrats might feel some heat (that is about it, can't be fired, after all) so they shut down the air traffic grid.  The FAA would rather people die than have to answer some questions at a press conference.  But, that is the Federal Gov't for you, in a nutshell

So what is going on in Taiwan

Taiwan just held an election in which the more or less pro Independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and their standard bearer Chen Shui Bien who had been elected president in 2000 was defeated by the Kuomintang (KMT) or “Chinese Nationalist Party.” The Chinese Communists hate Chen because of his pro-independence beliefs. The Communists were happy to see the Ma Ying Jeou and CMT take Chen’s place. The CMT were defeated by the Communists back during the Chinese Civil War but they never lost their affinity for relations with China. China has always seen the CMT as more conciliatory and more likely to bring Taiwan “back” to China.

Given the poor state of the Taiwan economy and Chen’s lack of diplomatic success, Ma was heavily favored to win the election. However, even though Ma won a landside, the size of his victory did not match polling predictions. In the immediate run up to the election, China cracked down on Tibet, and many Taiwanese voters saw what was playing out in Tibet as a glimpse into their own future if Taiwan were ruled by China. Many independent voters who might otherwise sided with Ma to send out the DPP changed their minds at the last minute, wary of what China intends for Taiwan.

This is actually a very dangerous time in China. Tibet chose this moment to assert their nationalism since if ever the Red Army would be restrained it is in Tibet, immediately before the Olympics. If other restive provinces decide to press their dissatisfaction with the 300 million unemployed, vast income disparity, heavy handed and incompetent regulation of the economy, China will be faced with a dilemma. Crack down violently to maintain their control or risk being seen to lose the Mandate of Heaven. If China does crack down on these protestors with a substantial loss of life, there is a good chance that many countries will pull out of the Olympics, causing a loss of face that might in itself hasten the end of the dynasty. Then, the cycle will only worsen. Chinese communists will be all the more angry and fearful at what losing face and power would mean to them personally (thing Ceausescu and Mussolini) and all the more likely to take brutal reprisal. No one holds a civil war like the Chinese and the potential loss of life there could be staggering. A minor uprising prior to the Boxer Rebellion in western China killed 800,000. A minor rebellion. Something major like an uprising to depose the Communists would get very ugly. Do not expect them to fade away the Gorby and the boys in the Soviet Union.

Test driving a new slogan for Barack Hussein Obama rallies

Hey, hey, hey Barack
Stab another ally in the back

He is going to go over great with the military.  He will have to fire a dozen Generals before he finds one disloyal enough to the US to enact his policies.  In fact, he is probably going to have to bring back that grasping Gen McPeak to surrender to the Moslems.

Losing is for Losers, Loser!

Lance Lawson Theme Song

La – ance Lawson
La – ance Law – aw – son!
He monitors all police scanner channels
But he only needs four panels
To solve cri – ime, ime, ime – imes.....
That BAFFLE! (Big blast of trumpets here)

This is the theme song that goes through my head on Thursday afternoons. I am more of a librettist than composer as you might be able to tell. I think the melody for the first couple of lines is the opening bars of the Dragnet theme, then it becomes kind of brassy jazz tune.

Lessons from Tet

Bergerud argues that the tactical or operational success of the American military was irrelevant to winning or losing the war in Vietnam. He closes his book with the sweeping statement that the United States lost because the generals “underestimated dealing with enemy forces,” and because civilian leadership underestimated the enemy, and overestimated American’s stomach for the fight. Bergerud’s message is that America lost because there was no way for America to win the Vietnam War: “In short, American leaders, both civilian and military, committed a strategic blunder that has brought many a general to grief: They chose the wrong battlefield.” 1 Bergerud describes the ordinary US soldier and Marine infantryman who carried the fight as proficient, able and deadly. The author’s example was the25th Division. “Yet the evidence indicates that most combat units of the 25th Division retained a high degree of skill and cohesion until the end.” 2 To the extent that there were units that lacked skill and cohesion, the blame lay not with race relations, or drugs or officer and NCO leadership, but with the strategic: politics back home. “The biggest problem facing combat morale dealt not with pathologies but with politics…Every soldier knew that Nixon was withdrawing the troops. Most American combat soldiers assumed that this meant that the United States was selling out South Vietnam.” 3 Bergerud makes the case that defeat was inevitable because of strategic errors but this case is based to faulty assumptions.

Bergerud’s analysis is akin to drawing a straight line back from the ultimate defeat in 1975 to the entry of the United States in the early 60s, and interpreting every victory or good decision and every set-back or bad decision in relation to that downward trajectory towards ultimate defeat. The NLF was ruthlessly violent: this ensured discipline and solidarity in the villages and undermined US resolve. The US and GVN were ruthlessly violent attacking the popular front: however, this policy was alienating and off-putting in the villages, and steeled the hearts of the NLF. Communist instuted land reform was well implemented and convinced the peasants to support the NLF. The government of South Vietnam instituted land reform that failed to convince the peasants to support the Government. Smashing defeats of the VC in Cambodia and during the Tet Offensive were actually not that bad for the North Vietnamese, while the victories won by the US forces and the ARVN where chimerical. This analysis is hard to refute because the author starts with the premise the defeat of America was inevitable and uses the defeat as evidence of the validity of his premise. He explains away the tactical successes of US troops as being in spite of the strategic blunders, poor quality rear-area soldiers and an antagonistic civilian populace. Any strategy, development or action that would refute his premise can be waved aside as “doomed” or “not enough.”

Interestingly, Bergerud may well be correct in his analysis. Perhaps the United States would have lost Vietnam even with inspired intuitive generalship and even if the South Vietnamese government had proven to be a stalwart and respected ally. However, it seems that the author’s assessment that defeat was inevitable rests on two shaky pillars. One shaky pillar is that had the US launched a conventional attack into North Vietnam, this would have provoked the Chinese or the Russians into some kind of response that would have led to a wider war. It is telling that “not even the most ambitious contingency plans advocated an all out invasion of the DRV” but Beregud never answers the question, “why not?” 4 The author sees no reason to answer this question since the answer is an article of faith.

Not every observer saw the Communists this way. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, although in retrospect, thought the Soviets were not interested in directly confronting the US. “I offer what follows somewhat as conjecture, but with a measure of conviction. The Soviet Union never intended to invade Western Europe, or generally speaking, engage in a third World War with the West. The leaders in Moscow were, for a while there at least, Marxist-Leninists. That doctrine decreed that class revolution would come regardless.” 5 In a similar analysis, it seems unlikely that in the mid-Sixties, the Chinese would have be willing to, or much able to reinforce North Vietnam had the US launched a conventional invasion of North Vietnam. China was reeling from the effects of the disastrous “Great Leap Forward” and suffered from internal political maneuvering that threatened a civil war or coup. Further, Mao had a history of provoking the US with bluster for his own internal political reasons, without being willing to act on the bluster. One example to illustrate this point occurred during the shelling of Quemoy and Matsu. Rather than launch an attack across the Taiwan Strait that would have provoked the US, Mao preferred to play games by shelling islands near-by the coast of China that were in the hands of the Chinese nationalists: “the islands are two batons that keep Khrushchev and Eisenhower dancing, scurrying this way and that. Don’t you see how wonderful they are!” 6

Western intelligence analysis of Communist intentions, “Kremlinology,” was little better than guesswork piled on faulty assumptions. The feckless nonsense that passed for insight into Communist intentions that was proffered by Western “Kremlinologists” would have been humorous had not leaders in the West made such important decisions based on this “intelligence.” The West essentially had no clue what the Soviets or the Chinese would do in response to any particular stimulus. This was a “fundamental failure at the intelligence level. For instance, a commentator noted that it ‘beggars incredulity’ that the CIA “had no idea that that the Soviet Union was on the verge of radical change after spending 50 percent of its budget on Soviet analysis.” 7 Based on CIA guesstimates, the civilian leadership in the US assumed that attacking the NVA center of gravity in the North would have lead to a counter-attack by China, and this was not something anyone in the US was willing to consider. Hence, the US focused on the doomed counter-insurgency fight that contemporary observers could tell was not effective. The US strategy of fighting the war in the South even though their real enemy was in the North is reminiscent of the joke about the drunk who insists on looking under the streetlight for the wallet he lost in the alley “because the light is better out here.”

That being said, a successful counter-insurgency does not necessarily need the “correct strategy” at the highest levels. Therein lies Bergerud’s second shaky pillar. The Philippine Army conducted a successful counter-insurgency roughly as the same time as the Vietnam War, even though the Philippine’s civilian leadership and the Army was every bit as corrupt and incompetent as their South Vietnamese counterparts. Thomas Marks notes “as the efficiency and legitimacy of the Marcos regime declined, there was a commensurate increase in the extent to which armed force, as represented by the 70-odd, individual military battalions, became the crucial foundation upon which the government survival depended. This proved significant, because in the absence of any other viable government presence, it was the battalions which became, like so many warlords, the rulers of their domains.” 8 Bergerud makes the case that the military remained effective in Vietnam at the Battalion level and below, so it can then be asserted that a hands-off policy with regards to Battalion operations in Vietnam may well have succeeded to the same extent that such a policy worked in Vietnam. No two historical analogies are perfect, and there are many differences between the Vietnam War and the Philippine Counter-insurgency. Most notable of the differences relates to what may be the immutable law of the counter-insurgency fight. A successful counter-insurgency need time to fight onto victory once they discover what works. In the Philippines, the government forces had the luxury of time, since they had no place else to go. In Vietnam, the clock had been ticking since the first combat deaths and by the Tet Offensive, the time had run out. No victory, no matter how definitive or apparent at the time would have mattered unless it was clear to the American public that troops were literally on the march to total victory. In Vietnam, the American public certainly did not have this perception.

So, perhaps the defeat in Vietnam was not as inevitable as Bergerud describes it. However, American Intelligence did not have ability to discern Communist intentions, the American Military did strike at the real center of gravity in a conventional sense, nor did they hit upon the right counter-insurgency strategy with enough time left on the clock of American public opinion: therein lie the dynamics of defeat.

Sources:

1. Bergerud, Eric M. The Dynamics of Defeat (Boulder: Westview Press) 1991. Pg 335.
2. Ibid., pg 290.
3. Ibid., pg 291.
4. Ibid., pg 331.
5. Moynihan, Daniel Patrick. Congressional Record, Senate - 1 May 1997. Page: S3891.
6. Zubok, Vladislav Martinovich and Konstantin Pleshakov. Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press) 1996. Pg 226.
7. Perry, Mark. Last Days of the CIA (New York: William Morrow) 1992, pg 308 quoted in Ofira Seliktar; Politics, Paradigms, And Intelligence Failures: Why So Few Predicted the Collapse of the Soviet Union (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharp) pg 4.
8. Marks, Thomas. Maoist Insurgency Since Vietnam (London: Frank Cass) 2003, pg 125.

Protecting the oldest tree in the world -OR- Buddhists v. Monkeys

The oldest documented tree, and the most sacred tree in Buddhism is under guard in Anuradhapura, Sri Lanka. The tree is thought to be 2300 years old, and grew up from a shoot taken from the Bohdi tree that sheltered the Buddha as he attained enlightenment. The shoot was replanted in the spot where it now grows by a Sri Lankan princess. (Fraser) Twenty-three years ago, in 1985, Islamic LTTE guerrillas attacked the monastery where the tree is located, and killed three monks, 25 worshippers and 117 pilgrims. The goal of the attack was to destroy the tree seen as a symbol of both the Sri Lanka government and of Buddhism itself. Now, the threat to the tree is not from terrorists, but from monkeys that are raiding the tree for fruit and leaves. (AFP)

The raids by the monkeys put the monks at the temple into a quandary. The monks, because of their vows, are forbidden to hurt the monkeys who are destroying the tree, but non-injurious attempts to drive away the monkeys have been completely unsuccessful. However, if the monks continue to be unsuccessful, the tree will die. The monks have tried clanging bells, bursting firecrackers and flashing lights at the monkeys, but are not looking for some kind of technological solution to non-violently drive away the monkeys and protect their sacred tree.

The tree itself has been featured in English literature for more that 120 years. Even HG Wells published an account of the tree in 1922. His description is remarkably close to the condition of the tree in the present day. “It has been carefully tended and watered; its great branches are supported by pillars and the earth has been terraced up about it so that it has been able to put out fresh roots continually.” (Wells, pg 434) Another earlier observer, James Ricalton in 1891, also described the tree in terms that are very familiar today. “The several divisions of this tree are feeble, gnarled, and bent; the leaves lack the fresh verdancy of a vigorous growth, and plainly show the yellowish pallor of decrepitude.” (Ricalton, quoted in Fraser) Nowadays, the tree is surrounded by gold plated fencing, and is guarded around the clock by an army of well wishers, monks and Sri Lankan soldiers. “The tree already arguably has the tightest security in Sri Lanka.” (AFP) People continue to scramble for leaves, just as they have done for thousands of years. The monks want to keep the tradition alive, whether in the face of terrorists or monkeys.

This tree is significant because it highlights the Buddhist commitment to non-violence, but it is similar to the Afghanistan buddhas in that the Muslim terrorists would be happy to destroy the tree, absent the extraordinary security precautions.

Sources

AFP. “Monks battle monkeys to save Buddhism's holiest tree” 26 February 2008 at http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5j12FKz3DWqsfmADUQ7DH7NwkiO9w accessed 27 February 2008.

Fraser, Anna. “Buddha and the Bodhi tree” The Tree.org.uk (no date) at http://www.the-tree.org.uk/Sacred%20Grove/Buddhism/bodhi4.htm accessed 27 February 2008.

Well, H.G. The Outline of History: Being a Plain History of Life and Mankind (New York: Review of Reviews Company) 1922.

Similarities among insurgencies

What is remarkable about various insurgencies is how similar they all sound. A weak central government loses the ability to effectively assert its authority in rural areas. Long pent up grievances held by farmers are exploited by insurgents who have moved into the power vacuum left by the receding power of the central government. In Vietnam, the South Vietnamese government never addressed perceived and real agrarian inequalities, and the North effectively exploited those grievances. Other countries that have faced a discontent by rural peasants found that real land reform effectively forestalled insurgency. Taiwan, Bolivia and parts of India have instituted land reform that has done much to undermine insurgencies. However, successful land reform is difficult since landowners who must give up their land also provide the capital and taxes that any government needs to stay in power. Consequently, governments facing a crisis that has sprung from agrarian inequalities must negotiate carefully. There is a real tension between the need to distribute land equitably to aggrieved peasants and the interests of entrenched landowners loathe to surrender their title to lands. Skilled, successful and relatively uncorrupt governments can do it, Diem was none of these things. Not surprisingly, he failed.

Mao and his disciples have sought to exploit rural discontent. Communist ideology appeals to landless, disenfranchised peasants because it seems to offer a chance to retain their claim to the land. Skilled Maoist propagandists exploit these desires to gain a foothold among villagers. These insurgents can swim among the “fishes” of the local people, always present, enforcing discipline, but relatively invisible to government forces. Then, these Maoist true believers use ruthless tactics to maintain discipline, and to thwart attempts by the government to counter their influence.

The North shrewdly recognized the dynamics of the government of the South that replaced the French colonialists. The political and economic environment had not changed, so it was likely that the tactics that prevailed against the French would work against the Diem government. This assessment was correct.

Devotion to Buddhist Enlightenment?

One day, while the Buddha was meditating, a monk, Malunkyaputta, came to the Buddha to ask what might be called “eternal questions.” Among the questions the monk asked were: Is the cosmos eternal or not? What is the nature of the soul? What is the nature of the Buddha? The Buddha dismissed these questions as questions upon which he had not commented. Buddha then gave his reasons for his silence: "And why are they [the answers to your questions] undisclosed by me? Because they are not connected with the goal, are not fundamental to the holy life. They do not lead to disenchantment, dispassion, cessation, calming, direct knowledge, self-awakening, Unbinding. That's why they are undisclosed by me.” 1 Buddha also related a parable about a man who was struck by a poison arrow, and spent his last moments asking for information about who had shot him. What was the man’s profession? What clan did he come from? What were his physical characteristics? What was the arrow made of? What were the feathers on the arrow made of? Even as the man was asking his questions, he died without ever getting the answers he sought. 2

I will examine why Buddha remained silent to Malunkyaputta’s questions, and the Buddha’s belief in the foolishness inherent in irrelevant spiritual pursuits. Then, the paper will examine some similarities in the Buddha’s focus on the Way that can be found in other religious traditions. Later, I will examine Buddha’s goal for his followers, then a look at how the current human condition, given the similarities in religious traditions, can benefit from Buddha’s goal.

Why no answers?

Why the Buddha would have not have answered Malunkyaputta’s questions, the total number of which is given as ten 3 or fourteen 4 depending on the translation and whether longer questions are actually broken into more shorter questions, is a popular question among students of Buddhism. These questioners look for a deeper reason than the one that the Buddha himself gave. There are four general theories to explain the silence of the Buddha in the face of these universally pondered inquiries from Malunkyaputta. One theory is that the Buddha was silent because he was only interested in practical matters, and had no time to ponder imponderables. Another theory is that Buddha simply did not know the answers. Malunkyaputta, the monk of the parable, seemed to think this was the reason for the Buddha’s silence. 5 Malunkyaputta, exasperated, said to the Buddha: “But if he doesn't know or see whether the cosmos is eternal or not eternal, then, in one who is unknowing & unseeing, the straightforward thing is to admit, 'I don't know. I don't see.'” 6 The monk then repeated this accusation. He seemed clearly perturbed that the Buddha would not answer, although, in fairness, Malunkyaputta eventually went away satisfied. The final words of the parable are: “That is what the Blessed One said. Gratified, Ven. Malunkyaputta delighted in the Blessed One's words.” 7

Still another theory for the Buddha’s silence is that the Buddha did know the answers to the questions asked, but his listeners did not possess the vocabulary and comprehension to understand the explanation should he give one. Therefore, the Buddha never bothered to speak the things that he knew. A final theory is that the Buddha would not answer the question because the monk’s act of asking such a question was evidence that the questioner was still striving and grasping, and the Buddha would not be a party to such actions. 8

Ultimately, the most compelling justification for the Buddha’s silence is the one given by the Buddha himself. The Buddha would only speak if he had something of import to pass to his listeners. There was nothing hidden in the silence, because there was nothing in the silence worth knowing. The Buddha only said exactly what he meant, and he meant everything that he said. Nothing else was of any importance. “And why are they disclosed by me? Because they are connected with the goal, are fundamental to the holy life. They lead to disenchantment, dispassion, cessation, calming, direct knowledge, self-awakening, Unbinding. That's why they are disclosed by me.” 9

Foolishness of irrelevant spiritual pursuits

The questions asked by the poisoned man in the parable were entirely irrelevant to finding a cure for his poison, or finding a cessation of the suffering the man was feeling, but he persisted in the questions, nonetheless. Asking these questions was the embodiment of foolishness. Squandering one’s last moments in the quest for answers to unanswerable and in fact pointless questions is the opposite of wisdom. Speculating about the “eternal questions” is a fool’s errand because there are no definitive answers offered to mortals although there is plenty of conjecture. As one commentator remarked, “in the final analysis, such speculation remains a matter of belief or opinion, for in this life these questions cannot be settled with any certainty. Furthermore, seeking answers to unanswerable questions diverts precious time and energy away from the real of heart of spirituality: the quest of wisdom and compassion. To be wise and compassionate does not require that we settle the many metaphysical questions we might pose.” 10

Similarities of the Buddha’s Way found in other religious traditions

Other religious traditions share the Buddha’s disdain for seeking answers to these large questions. Paul Tillich, a Christian theologian made the point that spirituality requires that a man must put aside that which he considers wisdom, and seek holiness as does a child. Tillich’s idea is that man will be unsuccessful in trying to discern the answers to large questions but must ask those questions in order to be prepared to recognize that the path to fulfillment is paradoxically in not finding the answers. The path is one in which the mind accepts that reason will not provide the answers that the brain can craft. Tillich called this paradox the “divine foolishness.” “This certainly is ecstatic and paradoxical, and it should not be brought down to the level of a divine-human chemistry. But it should be understood and experienced as an expression of the divine foolishness that is the source of wisdom and the power of maturity. “ 11 Tillich here was recapitulating an idea first offered by Paul in his First Letter to the Corinthians: " Let no man deceive himself. If any man among you seemeth to be wise in this world, let him become a fool, that he may be wise.” 12

Another religious tradition expresses sentiments similar to those of the Buddha. Taoism, based on the Tao Te Ching by Lao Tzu includes many verses that make it seem like the writer was not interested in delving into the nature of that which cannot be observed or commenting too explicitly on these matters. Instead, the Tao, which literally means, “the Way,” was designed to provide guidance to those who would live the right way in this world. At the earliest period of Taoism, the practitioners were primarily interested in living the right way to the exclusion of other considerations. “If the essential defining characteristic in the diachronic analysis of an early Taoist tradition is that its members all practiced the ‘techniques of the Way’ – a term that encompasses apophatic inner cultivation aimed at a mystical realization of the Way and its integration into everyday life.” 13

The Tao offers practical advice to help keep those who seek the way on the right path. The Tao contains guidance that those who know the answers need not speak them. In chapter 34 it says: There is something mysterious and whole which existed before heaven and earth, silent, formless, complete, and never changing. Living eternally everywhere in perfection, it is the mother of all things. I do not know its name; I call it the Way. If forced to define it, I shall call it supreme.” 14 Later, in chapter 56, Lao Tzu offers the observation that “Those who know, do not speak. Those who speak, do not know. Close the mouth; shut the doors. Smooth the sharpness; untie the tangles. Dim the glare; calm the turmoil. This is mystical unity.” 15 The Tao advises silence when one knows, much as Buddha remained silent regarding the questions that were asked. Just as Buddha remained silent to focus on the more important work of finding the right path to enlightenment, so to do the believers in the Tao focus mainly on the path rather than a higher philosophy. The final stanza of the Tao sounds very familiar to the ear of students of Buddhism: “The Way of heaven sharpens but does no harm. The Way of the wise accomplishes without striving.” 16

The Buddha’s goal

Rather than answering the questions that did not have answers, the Buddha was more interested in the practical. He was interested, as was Lao Tzu, in leading those who would listen along the Way to enlightenment. The Buddha knew that the way to the cessation of suffering is difficult. Another giver of Truth, Jesus, described the quest along the way with these words: “For the gate is narrow and the way is hard that leads to life, and those who find it are few.” 17 However, since the way was hard, and the showing others the path to the cessation of suffering, the Buddha knew that his followers had to husband their reservoirs of power. There was literally nothing that the Buddha could do for his followers except give them a roadmap along the “hard way,” whether those followers would make it to Nirvana was up to those who would follow the Way. “The Buddha has clearly stated that no one can do any thing for another for salvation except show the way. Therefore we must not depend on god and not even depend on the Buddha. We must know what are the qualities, duties, and responsibilities of being a human being. He said that if we have committed certain bad karma, we should nor waste precious energy by being frustrated or disappointed in our effort to put it right. 18

Mark Muess argues that Buddhism’s emphasis on finding relief from suffering, indifference to eternal questions and practical advice for living in a world full of strife and discord make Buddhism particularly relevant for modern society. It also allows one to find a way to put into practice beliefs one might hold from other religious traditions. Buddhism also allows one to find accommodation with whom one does not share political beliefs. “Buddhist spirituality is imminently practical. It provides discipline for the mind and the body, for treating others and oneself. It does not merely say, "Love others"; it shows us how to love others. It does not merely say, "Be wise"; it shows us how we may become wise. Because it is practical rather than theoretical, it may be compatible with other religious perspectives. It does not seek the repudiation of other spiritual and philosophical viewpoints.” 19

Relevance to current human condition

Conserving one’s energy to continue the quest for Enlightenment remains extremely relevant in the current time. The earth’s population is higher than it has ever been, while the proportion of those living in poverty and hunger seems to have stabilized. Nonetheless, in absolute terms, there are more miserable people now living than there have ever been. 20 There are more people with AIDS, there are more people without clean drinking water and there are more people displaced by war than ever previously. In absolute terms, there has never been are more urgent need for guidance in finding a way to relieve the suffering in the world.

Buddhism has particular relevance in this regard. Buddhism offers an escape from suffering, whatever the cause, and whatever beliefs the seeker has prior to following the Eightfold Path. Even though the Buddha revealed what he revealed thousands of years ago, what he revealed still has value for us today. “From the Buddhist perspective I think the analysis that the Buddha offered in his Four Noble Truths still remains perfectly valid. Not only does it need not the least revision or reinterpretation, but the course of twenty-five centuries of world history and the present-day human situation only underscores its astuteness and relevance.” 21

Clearly, Buddhism retains its relevance because human suffering has not changed even as the Four Noble Truths have not changed. Those not paying attention might conclude that with a world full of conveniences and technology, that human suffering should be on its way out. However, there is little practical evidence that human suffering is in retreat. That is because the nature of human suffering remains the same as when the Buddha first diagnosed the cause. The origin of suffering is attachment. Thomas Knierim neatly summarizes in modern English what suffering is. “The reasons for suffering are desire, passion, ardour, pursuit of wealth and prestige, striving for fame and popularity, or in short: craving and clinging.” 22 Knierim’s summary applies to people throughout history, but given the magnitude of wealth that is available in the world, and the magnitude of people in the world who do not have any real access to wealth but have only that brutal longing, there has probably never been an epoch more in need of a way to end suffering. This realization in itself makes Buddhism relevant.

Given that there is so much suffering in the world, and there is such a clear need for Buddhist principles, is it likely that Buddhism will be the answer to the suffering in the world? Is there a possibility that populations that have not been willing to or who have not had the opportunity to embrace Buddhism actually do so? Religious traditions in other cultures around the world have similar goals to that of the Buddha. Other religious traditions even use similar language in pursuing the way. There seem to be so many similarities in the approach to alleviate suffering in the world and in the desired end-state to make the time seem ripe for Buddhism to have a world-wide influence. One observer of Buddhism thinks that it is possible for Buddhism to have such an influence if it makes some minor changes and does more to proselytize. “I think

Buddhism will have to change itself somewhat, and there is no doubt about it. Still the main reason why Buddhism does not have many converts is because Buddhism has never emphasized too much on conversion. There are many who follow their own religion and follow Buddhist precepts. Even Dalai Lama maintains, one should not change his religion. Therefore it is not like pouring water on sand, rather Buddhism is not interested in sowing individual trees at all.” 23
The Ven. Bhikkhu Bodhi agrees that Buddhism has much to teach both East and West, and both sides have a responsibility to reach out to one another to ensure the benefits are transferred from one to another. In fact, neither side, East nor West, has an excuse to remain isolated, because technology and communications have become ubiquitous. “In the present age access to these teachings and practices will cease to remain the exclusive preserve of the monastic order, but will spread to the lay community as well, as has already been occurring throughout the Buddhist world both in the East and in the West. The spirit of democracy and the triumph of the experimental method demand that the means of mind-development be available to anyone who is willing to make the effort.” 24 Bodhi goes on to make the case that all the suffering in the world points to one particular solution. He quotes the Buddha’s short discourse in the Satipatthana Samyutta to the effect that:

"Protecting oneself, one protects others,
Protecting others, one protects oneself"

Doing these things, not squandering energy on foolish speculation but instead, taking actions that advance everyone on the way to enlightenment is the best way to remain relevant in this current situation. 25

Notes:

1 Cula-Malunkyovada Sutta. The Shorter Instructions to Malunkya in Buddhism Today.com at http://www.buddhismtoday.com/english/texts/majjhima/mn63.html accessed 25 February 2008.
2. Ibid.
3. Nila-kantha-chandra. “The Poisoned Arrow” in the Cuckoo’s Call Blog Wednesday, September 13, 2006 at http://cuckooscall.blogspot.com/2006/09/poisoned-arrow.html accessed 26 February 2008.
4. Berzin, Alexander. “The Fourteen Questions to Which Buddha Remained Silent” in The Berzin Archives February 2007 at http://www.berzinarchives.com/web/en/archives/sutra/level4_deepening_understanding_path/interferences/fourteen_questions_which_buddha_rem.html accessed 26 February 2008.
5. The Wanderling. “AVYAAKATA: The Buddha's Ten Indeterminate Questions” in Awakening 101 (Date unknown) at http://www.angelfire.com/electronic/awakening101/avyaakata.html accessed 26 February 2008.
6. Cula-Malunkyovada Sutta. Ibid
7. Ibid.
8. The Wanderling. Ibid.
9. Cula-Malunkyovada Sutta. Ibid.
10. Muess, Mark. “What Does It Mean to Lead a Spiritual Life? A Buddhist Perspective” Explore Faith.org 2002 at http://www.explorefaith.org/steppingstones_SpiritualLife_Buddhist.htm accessed 25 February 2008.
11. Tillich, Paul. Eternal Now (New York: Charles Scribners and Sons) 1963. Chapter 14.
12. Paul. “Letter to the Corinthians” King James Version Study Bible (Grand Rapids: Zondervan) 1 Corinthians 3:18.
13. Roth, Harold David. Original Tao: Inward Training (Nei-Yeh) and the Foundations of Taoist Mysticism (New York: Columbia University Press) 1999. Pg 185.
14. Lao Tzu, “Tao Teh Ching - Line-by-Line Comparisons: Beck Translation” at http://wayist.org/ttc%20compared/beck.htm accessed 25 February 2008.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Matthew 7:14, Revised New Standard Edition, Layman’s Parallel Bible Grand (Grand Rapids: Zondervan) 1991.
18. Thera, Dr K. Sri Dhammananda Nayaka Maha. “Buddhism As A Religion” at http://home.pacific.net.sg/~bvs/religion1.htm accessed 26 February 2008.
19. Muess, Ibid.
20. United Nations. “People and Poverty 2000: Globalization has yet to benefit the poor” in UN.org 17 October 2000 at http://www.un.org/events/poverty2000/backpp.htm accessed 26 February 2008.
21. Bodhi, Bhikkhu. “A Buddhist Response to Contemporary Dilemmas of Human Existence” in Access to Insight: Readings in Theravada Buddhism December 1993 at http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/bodhi/response.html accessed 26 February 2008.
22. Knierim, Thomas. “The Four Noble Truths” in The Big View.com (no date) at http://www.thebigview.com/buddhism/fourtruths.html#truth2 accessed 26 February 2008.
23. Verma, Chapla. Comments to TO, 17 February 2008.
24. Bohdi. Ibid.
25. Bodhi. Ibid.