China’s Influence on Post-Cold War North Korea: The Whale and the Shrimp

Kim Il Sung’s demise and the crushing of the communist coup against Yeltsin in Russia following soon after left North Korea without its founder and without its major benefactor. China stepped up to support Kim Jong Il, ostensibly out of socialist solidarity but probably because neither has many other options. Both countries suffer from poor relations with other countries in the world. China is a feared bully in the region and North Korea is a reckless pariah. “Arguably China and North Korea cling to each other because they have nowhere else to turn―each believes that close cooperation with the other is vital to its own national security.” 1

The official Chinese line is that China and North Korea are as close as brothers, each relying on the other. “China needs peace and stability along its border, in order to ensure its rapid modernization. Likewise, the DPRK needs China’s cooperation, in order to press ahead with its socialist construction. Since both countries need each other for these economic and social purposes, stronger bilateral relations are inevitable. 2 The reality is that China perceives the need for North Korea to serve as a buffer against the forces of the United States and Japan. “With a shared border of 1,400 kilometers, North Korea acts as a guard post for China, keeping at bay the tens of thousands of U.S. troops stationed in South Korea. This allows China to reduce its military deployment in Northeast.” 3 China places great value on this buffer, but North Korea has not always reciprocated this feeling or had much appreciation for being such a buffer.

 Nonetheless, circumstances have thrown China and North Korea together, and now the world looks at them as big brother and little brother. With North Korean leadership’s apparent recklessness and willingness to engage in brinksmanship, diplomats have striven to leverage what influence can be brought to bear on the actions of the DPRK. This paper will examine how China came to be perceived as the one country in the world with influence over North Korea and whether this perception comports with reality.  

 

North Korea’s traditional patron had been the Soviet Union. After World War II, with China exhausted from the long running battle with Japan and a crushing civil war, Stalin saw an opportunity to grab part of the peninsula at relatively little cost. Why this particular conflict mattered to Stalin is unknown, but eventually it paid off richly for him and the Soviet Union. 4 Stalin permitted the establishment of a proxy force led by Kim Il Sung to rule the area and to be beholden to the Soviet Union. Kim Il Sung, by his good fortune and loyal service to the Soviet Union was installed almost by accident as leader of newly liberated North Korea in early 1946. However, the real power remained in the hands of the Soviets. “The Soviet authorities and the apparatus of advisors had a decisive influence on the life of the country and in the first years of the DPRK, Kim was only nominally ruler.” 5

Kim shrewdly assessed his position and eventually seized the opportunity that he was presented to consolidate his rule in Stalinist fashion he had been taught during his time as and officer in the Soviet Army. After the indecisive Korean War, when the frontier had returned to its antebellum approximation, Kim purged his government of potential rivals and began to play the Soviet Union and China off one another, first tilting towards one, then the other. 6 Kim proved quite adept at this type of stratagem and eventually became a willing participant in the Soviet’s Cold War against the West. In return, the Soviet Union provided material goods and energy to the North Korean economy. “The Soviet Union supported North Korea with massive military and technical aid, but after the Cold War, North Korea lost this support, and its economy seriously deteriorated.” 7 With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, North Korea’s most powerful friend and the basis for their economy suddenly went away.  

With the loss of the Soviet Union, Kim was forced to find another patron to prop up his decrepit economy. Lacking any other really options, he solicited China for support. This was a problematic strategy because Kim and many North Koreans believed that with the opening towards the US and the recognition of South Korea, Chinese had committed a serious affront. In the words of a Chinese analyst, the Chinese “betrayed them [North Korea]. We [the Chinese] embraced the U.S. and the enemy in the South.” 8 This betrayal was a particularly bitter one for Kim and North Korea. Kim had sought desperately to prevent China from recognizing South Korea but when his efforts came to naught, “North Korea accepted the blow with official silence.” 9 Kim was forced to bear his betrayal in silence and find some accommodation with the Chinese because he was out of options. The economic situation was dire, with many observers reporting that North Koreans were starving to death. “By the end of 1992, the North Korean government began to impose strict limits on food consumption, limiting individual intake to one-fourth of basic requirements.” 10

The degree to which Kim Il Sung was willing to put aside his historical wariness towards the Middle Kingdom and his bitterness at the recognition of South Korea in order to adopt a conciliatory attitude towards China was an indicator of how perilous the economic and political situation of North Korea actually was. The North Korean people were starving and the world was alarmed at North Korea’s pursuit of a nuclear weapon. North Korea needed friends but there always existed a concern that North Korea would turn on those who tried to help them. China seemed poised to move into the vacuum created by the dissolution of the Soviet Union, but remained somewhat wary. An observer noted that “nobody has a greater knack [than North Korea] for alienating friends and enemies alike.” 11 Even with their dire economic and political situation, North Korea continued to pursue their own policies even when those policies gave headaches to the Chinese leadership. Nonetheless, China continued to shield North Korea. China’s reason for doing so involved internal calculations about their own political requirements.  

Lord Palmerson, British Prime Minister, in a speech to Commons in 1848 noted that “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.” 12 In slightly less elegant prose, China expressed the same sentiment: “The fundamental basis for the formulation of China’s national defense policy is China’s national interests… China takes all measures necessary to safeguard its national interests.” 13 China’s overriding interest has always been security. Even the nickname for China, “the Middle Kingdom” implies that there are areas on the periphery that serve to impede invaders before they can get to the vital, center of the nation. Korea has historically been one of those buffers, serving to keep the Japanese away and more recently, keeping the Americans away. In the estimation of most observers, the status quo on the peninsula which features a stable North Korea balancing South Korea to be the best possible buffer and one that best serves China’s interests. Later, we will examine whether a tranquil Korea is truly in China’s interest in their own estimation.

Another of China’s interests has traditionally been not to become entangled in alliances which might reduce their freedom of maneuver. Ironically, the only formal bi-lateral alliance China has is with North Korea, the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance Between the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea signed in 1961. 14 China generally does not attempt creative or risky diplomatic gambits and is extremely risk adverse when it comes to international relations. China is not above bullying or bluster, but they have little stomach for confrontation with the US. 15 Some of this risk aversion towards confrontation with the US lies in the fact that China lost more than 800,000 troops in the Korean War against American forces. 16 Of late, China has observed the US military fight and win battles year after year while the People’s Liberation Army has done little more than line its own pockets with business ventures. It is likely that the Chinese leadership has assessed that they are as likely to experience a humiliating defeat at the hands of the Americans as they are to win such an encounter.

This does not mean that China is unwilling to contest areas where they feel their national interests are in the balance. Although China is risk adverse, they are nonetheless still willing to commit overwhelming force when they feel that their core interests are threatened by some outside aggressor. The most obvious example of this was the willingness to commit millions of troops and to take frightful numbers of casualties, to prevent the US from entering China during the Korean War. China sees its buffering areas, Korea, Manchuria, Western China and Tibet, as tripwires, encroachments on which are signals to act. The reason that China was willing to suffer almost a million casualties was the specter of the well trained and equipped US army pushing into traditional Chinese lands over the Yalu River. Chinese commitment of troops showed dramatically “the sensitivity of the Chinese to any encroachment on their borderlands, their buffers, which represent the foundation of their national security.” 17

 Similarly, Chinese diplomats will expend political capital and will make daring diplomatic gambits when the Chinese leadership estimates that there is a significant threat to Chinese sovereignty. The last such bold diplomatic initiative occurred in 2003. China assessed that President Bush was unpredictable and likely to attack North Korea as he had Iraq. “The Chinese leader reportedly was alarmed that U.S. military action against North Korea might be imminent in the aftermath of Iraq and believed Beijing had to act promptly to avert war on the Korean Peninsula.” 18

The combination of North Korea’s desperation and China’s alarm at the intentions of the United States on the Korean peninsula might suggest that the two neighbors along the Yalu River would be find their diplomatic interests to be aligned. Conventional wisdom has long accepted that China has some influence over North Korean foreign policy. There are literally hundreds of web pages listed when one types “China’s influence over North Korea” into an internet search engine. However, savvy observers have learned to be cautious about observing “2+2” with regards to China and North Korea and assuming “4.” There remains much about North Korean and Chinese decision-making and internal political calculation that is unknown, especially in the aftermath of the death of Kim Il Sung and the dissolution of the Soviet Union.  

Circumstances would seem to indicate that China should have influence on North Korean policies perhaps in moderating some of North Korea’s brinkmanship. However, North Korea has been stubbornly resistant to this supposed Chinese influence. There are competing hypotheses about what is actually going on in this relationship. One is that North Korea is stubbornly contrarian, doing the opposite of what China has urged in order to exemplify North Korean commitment to “juche” or “self-reliance.” Alternately, it is possible that China is not actually trying to influence North Korean behavior in any tangible way because of fear on the part of the Chinese that they worry that they actually do not have any influence over Kim so they are not willing to risk doing anything. The last and perhaps most worrisome explanation of the circumstances is that North Korea is actually doing EXACTLY what China wants. North Korea keeps the US, South Korea and Japan off balance by appearing reckless and unreasonable and this allows China to appear statesmanlike and reasonable. Further, North Korea’s alarming behavior encourages the other participants in the Six Nation Talks to more readily accede to North Korean (and, as the theory goes, Chinese) demands.  

Let us examine the evidence for each hypothesis in turn. One explanation for North Korea’s stubborn resistance to China’s influence is that for die-hard communists, political concerns are more important than economic leverage, even for an impoverished economic basket-case like North Korea. In other words, ideology trumps all other considerations. Professor Yan Xuetong of Qinghua University in Beijing argued that even though economic ties have increased between the countries, political ties have remained strained. "This is a common phenomenon after the Cold War. Economic relations don't necessarily mean that the political relations of the two countries will be good or one has more political influence on the other." 19 
For some, the evidence of this lack of influence is apparent. The chief negotiator for the US in the Six Party Talks expressed surprise at the lack of respect and ingratitude that North Korea showed to the Chinese: 

I don't know about the Chinese people, but I would have been a little surprised to have seen a senior Chinese delegation go to Pyongyang with a rather fair request and to see the DPRK not receive the delegation at an appropriate level. 
And what was interesting was, of course, at about the same time there was a DPRK delegation in Beijing that was received at an appropriate level. Your President who's a very busy man, who has -- your President has worldwide responsibilities, and without stretching the imagination too much, I suspect he has more responsibilities than Kim Jong-Il does. And yet he found time to meet with the DPRK delegation and Kim Jong-Il did not find time to meet with the Chinese delegation. 20

Whether this lack of respect for Chinese views is childish ingratitude, reliance on juche or just hardball international socialist politics is probably unknowable, but for many observers, there is a clear lack of influence on the part of China over North Korea.

 Others are not so sure that China is actually doing anything to influence North Korea. This theory is that given Chinese geopolitical situation and ingrained North Korean intransigence, there does not appear to be any room for Chin to exert influence. North Korea’s own unique approach to diplomacy makes it problematic for anyone, including their ostensibly close ally, China, from having any influence on the Hermit Kingdom. Since China is closest to the situation it recognizes its own limitations. There is a risk that by over-pressuring North Korea, China would cause a backlash of resentment and perhaps create an unpredictable and dangerous enemy on their doorstep. 21 Conversely, if China were to attempt to pressure North Korea and be simply ignored this would make China seem ineffective and week. Christopher Hill’s emphasis in the quote above about Kim’s snub of the Chinese delegation was playing on this perception. Rather than be seen as ineffective, the Chinese leadership prefers to do as little as possible while appearing engaged and concerned. Observers call this the “mini-maxi principle,” with China trying to maximize the credit they receive for the appearance of effort, while actually doing the minimum possible. 22 Doing nothing because they have no real influence is thus turned into a net plus for the Chinese.  

 For others observers, China is pursuing a realpolitik advantage against their rivals in North East Asia. Regarding the geo-political situation, China is best served by North Korea keeping the other four member of the Group of Six off balance. Perhaps not coincidentally, the Chinese leadership sees these other countries as China’s main competitors in the world. To the extent that the US, Russia, Japan and South Korea must scramble to react to the latest North Korean provocation, China reaps the benefits. It is possible that instead of China attempting to moderate the excesses of the North Korean, China is actually encouraging and exacerbating North Korean unpredictability because of the consternation and distraction it represents to China’s rivals. In the zero sum game of balance of power politics, a disadvantage to China’s rivals represents an advantage to China, an advantage that China readily seizes. Although conventional wisdom may see that China would benefit from a peace and tranquility on the Korean peninsula, China’s perception may be very different. 

 The lack of real information out of either Beijing or Pyongyang makes it possible that any or all of the dynamics outlined above are at work at any given time. There also exists the possibility that none of these scenarios represents reality since all assume a high level of shrewdness and coordination between powerful leaders on both sides that probably has not existed since the passing of Kim Il Sung and Stalin. The two countries’ close proximity and similar socialist governments had made it easy to assume there is close coordination between the two. However, North Korea, known as a “shrimp among whales,” 23 has become adept at keeping all sides off balance. It is quite difficult to ascertain how much influence is wielded by anyone and on whom.  

Notes:
1. Scobell, Andrew. China and North Korea: From Comrades-in-Arms to Allies at Arms’ Length (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute) 2004, p 28.
2. Xiao Zan, “Beijing and Pyongyang Get Closer,” Beijing Review, September 27, 2001, pp 9-10.
3. Shen Dingli, “North Korea’s Strategic Significance to China,” China Security, Autumn 2006, p 20.
4. Friedman, George. “The Geopolitics of China: A Great Power Enclosed” Stratfor Reports, 12 June 2008.
5. Lankov, Andreĭ Nikolaevich. From Stalin to Kim Il Sung: The Formation of North Korea (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press) 2002, p 59.
6. Oberdorfer, Don. The Two Koreas (Basic Books) 2001, p 10.
7. Center for Non-proliferation Studies, “North Korea,” WMD 411, no date, at http://www.nti.org/f_WMD411/f2d1.html accessed 20 July 08.
8. Hutzler, Charles and Gordon Fairclough, “The Koreas: China Breaks With Its Wartime Past,” Far Eastern Economic Review, August 7, 2003, p. 27.
9. Oberdorfer, ibid, p. 248.
10. Ahn, Ilsup. “North Korea Human Rights Crisis and Christian Response: A Korean American Perspective” unpublished paper presented to the Samford University Christianity and Human Rights National Research Conference, 11-14 Nov 2006 at http://www.samford.edu/lillyhumanrights/papers/Ahn_North.pdf accessed 20 July 2008, pg 8.
11. Eberstat, Nicholas. “Reckless Driving” Time Magazine, M ay 5, 2003 at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,449513,00.html accessed 20 July 2008.
12. Hansard, Thomas Curson. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates (London: G Woodfall and Son) 1848, Pg 122.
13. Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China. “China's National Defense in 2002,” Xinhua Net at http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2003-02/27/content_748657.htm accessed 20 July 08.
14. Peking Review, Vol. 4, No. 28, 1961, p. 5.
15. Scobell, ibid, p. 31.
16. Zhang Aiping, Chief Compiler, Zhongguo Renmin Jiefang Jun [China’s People’s Liberation Army] Vol. 1, Contemporary China Series, Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo Chubanshe, 1994, p. 137.
17. Friedman, ibid.
18. Scobell, ibid, p. 21.
19. Newhouse, Barry. “China's Influence Over North Korea in Question” Voice of America website 27 July 2006 at http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/china/2006/china-060727-voa01.htm accessed 20 July 2008.
20. Hill, Christopher. “Foreign Press Center Briefing” State Department East Asia Update July 21, 2006 at http://fpc.state.gov/fpc/69311.htm accessed 21 July 2008.
21. Scobell, ibid.
22. Kim, Samuel S. The Two Koreas and the Great Powers. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 2006, p 61.
23. Snyder, Scott. Negotiating on the Edge (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press) 1999, p20.

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