Once, I wanted to be famous

Now, I would be content to achieve a level of notoriety that would compel the officials at a Busch Series race to invite me as part of a group to yell, "Gentlemen, start your engines!" at the start of a race.

Which Octogenarian do you hate more?

Steinbrenner or Castro? After watching the Yankees add $30 million in payroll and go 8 for 9 in the last week, it is no contest.

Webb is a Reagan Democrat?

Seems laughable, especially given these arguments.

This is what I sent to the author of the post above.

Did you read the comments below the Lowell post to which you linked?

One of the posters makes the point that Webb was standing up for more money for the 600 ship Navy instead of money for "Star Wars." What looks like a better deal today? More ships that would be essentially sitting out the War on Terror like the ones we have now? Or missile defense which may prove crucial in protecting civilization from crazies like Iran and North Korea?

I especially like the charge of "swiftboating" others in the thread make against you. I guess the definition of that word is "telling the truth about someone's past military or government service at an awkward or inconvenient time in that person's election campaign."

Oh, and the charge that you are a "chickenhawk." Can you comment on why liberals are desperate to cede the making of foreign policy to those who served in the military? I am in the military now, and I work with plenty of veterans. I can assure you that if we were allowed to set foreign policy, let's just say that policy would be a lot more muscular than it is now. I suspect Lowell, the NY Times and all the posters at raisingkaine would get the vapors to even contemplate what is openly discussed around here.

Why must sports writers infuse their stuff with liberal claptrap?

I read Uniwatchblog because I am fascinated by sports uniforms, and this guy knows his stuff. Reading his columns on ESPN and in his blog, has been a pleasure. I was jarred out of my reverie by the first few lines of this.

In reply, I wrote this: I know you were just trying to get in a cheap political shot when you wrote: "If Congress really wants to protect the American flag, they should stop promoting bogus Constitutional amendments that circumvent the Bill of Rights and instead turn their attention to Major League Baseball."

However, I would suggest you actually read the proposed amendment before you once again opine:

"The Congress shall have power to prohibit the physical desecration of the flag of the United States."

If you truly want Congress to "turn its attention to Major League Baseball" to address the disrespectful display of the flag, I submit that the necessary prerequisite to the "attention" you seek is for Congress to pass the amendment which would allow them to prohibit the physical desecration of the flag that John Patterson's sideburn delivered. Only upon passage and ratification of the amendment would Congress have the power you want them to have to prevent such things.

But I know you are convinced that the rights in the 1st ten amendments are imperiled by this proposed flag amendment so tell us, which ones, and how? Will passing the flag amendment allow quartering of troops at Phil Knight's house in circumvention of the 3rd amendment? Or allow Anna Benson's guns to be seized in circumvention of the 2nd amendment? Or is passing the amendment, ironically, exactly the attention you want from Congress?

Lest you think this is all negative, I do enjoy your sartorial commentary; keep up the good work!

The superiority of baseball

Runs are the most important event in a baseball game. Teams need runs to be competitive, and they need at least one more run than their opponent in order to get the victory. However, given the crucial importance of runs in a game, it is interesting to me that the focus of fans in the stadium of a baseball game, and even the focus of the players on the field is away from the actual scoring of the runs. Instead, everyone focuses on the play that is happening hundreds of feet away from the actual scoring. For example, there is a tense 3-3 ballgame, top of the ninth inning, runner on third base. The batter works a 2 ball 2 strike count and hits a line drive into the gap. Huge cheers erupt as the fans watch the ball fly towards the wall and gets down for a double that drives in the run. No one actually watches the runner score (except the home plate umpire), but everyone in the stands cheers wildly because they know the runner will score, without actually seeing the score happen.

This is exactly the opposite of every other sport, where the entire focus of the spectators, and everyone playing is on the score itself. The quarterback in a football game slings a ball to the receiver in the end zone for the score, and everyone is watching the receiver. In a basketball game, everyone watches as the ball swishes through the hoop. Hockey fans look at the puck going into the net. Tennis observers watch to see whether the ball will hit the line.

Of course, sometimes, there is a play at the plate, with the determination of whether the runner will score in doubt. However, this is a comparatively rare occurrence, compared to the vast bulk of scoring that is done without anyone noting. Yet another reason why baseball is unique, and therefore, superior to all other pastimes on earth.

Mao’s Mandate of Heaven and the Dynastic Cycle

Chinese history in general and Chinese military history specifically has been characterized by certain trends that continue to this day. Those who would be emperors contested to receive the “Mandate of Heaven.”1 “Now this Mandate is not equivalent to fate or destiny, it is more of an imperative. Humans are free to rule unjustly, they are free to harm the people they rule over; their rule, however, will come to a swift end as Heaven passes on its mandate to another family. It is made evident by the fortunes of war.”2 Once success in battle had confirmed that the victor has received the Mandate, he moved to consolidate and extend his power. Inevitably, those who accepted the mandate of heaven to legitimize their power must have also been willing to accept its transient nature.

Those who have power and use it to establish a dynasty, will eventually lose this power. Sometimes over just a short period of time, and sometimes after centuries have passed, dynasties have found that Heaven gives and Heaven takes away.

“Mandate of Heaven” often turned on various factors that included: bad harvests, natural disasters, fortunate happenstance in combat, poor governance, corruption by the ruling elite or any other number of factors. So often, natural catastrophes mark the downfall of dynasties because those with the “Mandate of Heaven” were expected to look after the well-being of the people. Natural disasters, for which there were inadequate preparations, caused suffering and eroded the legitimacy of the dynasty in power. In fact, it had become something of a self fulfilling prophesy. “When Chinese statesmen thought they discerned the classic symptoms of dynastic decline, they qualified the support they gave to the ruling house and this contributed to its ultimate collapse.” Even though the “Mandate of Heaven” may be explained away as a psychological phenomenon, for many Chinese, the “Mandate of Heaven” is still a reality.

Informed by the idea of the “Mandate of Heaven,” it can be argued that the Chinese Communists have become something of a dynasty with Mao Tse Tung being the father of the dynastic line. Mao himself explicitly endorsed at least the ascendant part of the Mandate: “China will certainly go over to socialism in the future; that is an irresistible law.”3 But Mao had more than just the desire to bring socialism to the people, he also had heroic visions of himself. In 1936, Mao wrote a poem in which he gave the world a preview of his self assessment as the hero of China, above all others in history:

What a beauty this mountain and river,
Enticing countless heroes to vie and toil.
Regrettably, Emperor Qin Shihuang and Emperor Han Wudi were
deficient in literary taste.
Emperor Tang Taizong and Emperor Song Taizu lacked
romanticism.
Pride of an era, Genghis Khan, was only good at shooting
vultures with his bow.
They are all bygones.
Only today is one in the presence of the true hero.4

The Chinese people and the Chinese Communists accepted Mao’s view of history because it was so deeply rooted in their Confucian consciousness. “The eschatology is never seriously questioned, because to the Chinese Communist Party, it is the inevitable result of history.”5 Steven Mosher was even more explicit when he described China’s perception of its destiny: “The leader of the Chinese Communist Party believed that China’s historical greatness, no less than Communism’s universalism, demanded the reconstruction of the Qing empire that had collapsed nearly 40 years before. Lost territories must be recaptured, straying vassals must be recovered, and one-time tributary states must once again be forced to follow Beijing’s lead. Military action-engaging the Japanese invaders, defeating the Nationalists, and capturing the cities—had delivered China into his hands. Now military action would restore the empire.”6

A way to end the cycle of the “Mandate of Heaven” would be to give the people a say in their leadership. Since the “Mandate of Heaven” has been dependent on the emperor ruling in such a way that the welfare of the people is the leader’s primary concern, then the form of government which gives ultimate say to the people would be the culmination of the political theory. The Nationalists learned this lesson while on Taiwan and were able to change rulers without slaughtering the preceding government. Mao had different ideas.

Mao’s certainty was that socialism would be the answer to ensure the permanence of his dynasty, but Mao-style socialism has been repudiated by the current Chinese leadership in pursuit of a different, more successful style of authoritarianism. Clearly, Mao’s vision was not the right answer, and so far, given the internal strife in China, the Hu Jian Tao-style of rule is not the answer either. It is an open question if China itself will learn the lesson that Taiwan’s leaders have learned.

Once Mao assumed power, he implemented actions similar to those that other dynastic emperors attempted in order to retain power. Generally, emperors attempted to extend their control and power through technological advancement, internal improvements, internal repression, and military adventurism. These strategies, singularly, or in some combination, were the broad policy goals of Chinese emperors throughout history. Mao’s successors may have given up on Mao’s peculiar brand of socialism but they continue to pursue his traditional dynastic policies today.
The first instinct of those who founded new dynasties has been to extend and solidify power. Since no dynasty gave up power to its successor willingly, emperors found it imperative to devise the means to defend their rule. Emperors had to raise armies and assert their authority in all regions. There was no political mechanism for redress of grievances, and no way to dislodge an incompetent or unjust ruler. A challenger to the throne who would rule China in the place of the emperor ultimately had only one choice, to drive the ruling emperor from power by force. Dynasties succumbed to challengers who arose from within their own disaffected military force or from outside invaders.

All Chinese dynasties shared the same fate, if not the same path to that fate. At some point, and for some reason, the reign of the dynasty in power ended. One of two conditions prevailed after the fall of the previous dynasty, either chaos, or a new dynasty. If what succeeded the dynasty was chaos, eventually a strong regional power would assume power and attempt to exert his will on the rest of China. If a new dynasty followed quickly on the fall of the previous dynasty, that new emperor likewise sought to assert his rule.

Once he had power, the new emperor sought to entrench his political power by expanding the military into all geographic areas and into all aspects of life. The classic example of this was the Ming Dynasty. The Ming used force to pacify regions in or near China and then install a compliant chieftain who would keep the peace, but remain loyal to the central dynasty. Eventually, if the region remained quiescent, the Ming would send a non-military bureaucrat to administer the area to ensure that taxes flowed. The Ming insisted that bureaucrats used the Manchu language for official business, but were not as concerned that the local inhabitants learn a common language. In fact, the Manchus learned that they could pit one region against another if necessary to keep either or both from becoming a power to rival the central Manchu authority.

Mao Tse Tung emulated the Manchu. What Mao was perhaps most astute in learning was the necessity to rule China ruthlessly in order to stay in power. Mao, in an address in Hankou set out his famous formulation about the genesis of political influence: “From now on, we should pay the greatest attention to military affairs. We must know that political power is obtained out of the barrel of a gun.”7 Mao’s epigram about political power being dependent on military prowess recognized a central pillar of all Chinese dynasties. “Military organization and mobilization, conceptualizations of who was friend and ally, which sections of the population were assigned military tasks, and the position of the military in the larger bureaucratic framework helped define the Chinese world. Warding off foreign predators, mounting military expeditions and suppressing domestic challengers were regular activities of all dynasties.”8

The impulse to extend the army to all facets of life indicated the dynastic emperors’ belief that the only way to serve the people, to justify the “Mandate of Heaven,” was to control and dominate the actions of the people. Mao believed this and his successors shared this belief. Li Ximing, of the Beijing Party Committee exhorted the troops preparing to enforce the will of the Communist leadership by massacring unarmed students in Tiananmen Square by saying: “You came to the capital to enforce martial law. You have contributed greatly to security and order in the capital and to stabilization of the entire country. You are undertaking a sacred mission, and history will record your achievements.”9

Mao also learned that in order for his dynasty to retain power and continue into the future, he personally had to put into place all the mechanisms of power that successful emperors since the Sui Dynasty had adopted. Mao’s problems and those of his successors were not so different from “...those of the traditional emperors. He has to make sure that the second in command will not amass too much power, that his bureaucrats are compliant and do not abuse their powers outrageously, and that local officials will not become too independent.”10 Mao constructed a system, like those of the emperors who preceded him, that allowed him to retain ultimate power. “In the PRC political system, all powers are concentrated in the hands of the paramount leader. Every secondary leader is in charge of a limited range of affairs, and ultimately responsible directly to the paramount leader alone.”11

Mao exercised similar control over his military, in order to prevent any regional commander from gaining power and threatening the dynasty. One measure he adopted was to order rotation, in 1973, among eight of his eleven regional commanders to prevent any from establishing a personal power base.12 Even 24 years into his rule, Mao still demonstrated the need to undermine subordinates who might build a base of power from which to challenge him.

Some dynasties attempted to better the lot of their people through technological advancement. According to the ancient texts, technological advancement was a requirement for good government. The Da Yu Mo which dates from sometime around 100BC, stated that: “The morality and ability of a king are shown through the excellent governance of the country. The excellent governance must improve the living of the people. Improvement of the living of people must develop the technology of handicrafts related to water, metal, wood, soil, and crop. (These are a summary of important handicrafts.)”13 Da Yu, the first emperor, came to power because of his devotion to technological advancement. “A famous example is Da Yu, who was a specialist of water conservancy and was successful in controlling very big floods in his time. He had a crucial influence on the country. Then he won popular support and became the first king of the first dynasty of China.”14 The Sui Dynasty was notable among these dynasties interested in extending technology as they were the first to construct a canal of sufficient length and depth to transport goods and personnel between regions.

The development of technology in China went along in concert with the development of agriculture and military prowess. According to Confucian tenets, there was no other reason to develop technology than to make fields more fertile and improve the military to take better care of the people. Thus, there is consonance between the “Mandate of Heaven,” and the Confucian belief system that permeated China. “So, dynasty after dynasty, emperors after emperors paid great heed to the farms of Chinese countryside, giving incentives to agriculture productions and calculating the estimates of each year’s agricultural taxes, building great canals for farmland, building dams to prevent flood, and building Great Wall to protect the interior farmlands. Yet because nothing but food, military, and confidence of the people were on the menu of the government, as quoted by the Master Confucius, everything else was considered as corruptly decadent.”15 Dynasties pursued technological advancement out of a number of desires including the desire to feed and protect the people, to preserve the Mandate of Heaven, and to fulfill the Confucian mandate.

The primary example of a dynasty pursuing improvements in military technology was the Yongle dynasty. After assuming power by defeating Jianwen, Zhu Di ordered a major expansion in shipbuilding and overseas engagement. The proximate reason for the expansion was to construct a fleet of vessels large enough and powerful enough to chase down the contestant to the throne who was thought to have fled overseas. Zhu Di himself had hit upon the idea of sending a fleet to find and destroy Jianwen. However, Zhu Di was astute enough to discern the connection between the advancement of naval technology, trade, and the relative prosperity of the coastal cities. Zhu Di envisioned that his magnificent fleet would by its presence and grandness convince other regional potentates of his legitimacy and power. “Certainly the magnificence of the so-called treasure fleet seemed to have been designed to convince any foreign ruler who might be harboring the deposed emperor just who the rightful occupant of the dragon throne was. And it probably wasn’t far the emperor’s mind that the imperial treasury, depleted by a long civil war, was in need of replenishment by foreign trade.”16 The advancement of technology, in this case, naval technology, had three goals: the first was to enrich the treasury; the second, to extending political power in the region; and the third was to better the lot of the people. Meeting these goals confirmed the dynasty’s “Mandate of Heaven,” which was something particularly important to an emperor newly ascended to the throne.

Just as Zhu Yi sought to improve his technology and benefit his rule and his people, so too did Mao. While Zhu Yi ordered the building of a navy which produced the concomitant effects of technological advancement and economic benefit, Mao pursued two separate tracks. Mao sought agricultural reform while at the same time attempting to acquire the technology for nuclear weapons. Domestically, Mao attempted to better the lives of his people by providing them adequate food and an economy that would provide for their necessities. He called his personal plan to ensure the betterment of the Chinese people the “Great Leap Forward.” Mao decreed that his plan be implemented and pushed upon the people against the tepid protests of his top advisors. By ignoring 600 years of history, during which time the farmers of China had by and large been able to feed the people of China, Mao, without anyone to contradict him, set about to improve China’s agriculture and economics based on his own vision of agriculture and technology.

Mao personally rallied the people of China to enact the tenets of the plan. Those who did not accept the plan willingly were forced to accept the Great Leap Forward regardless of their reservations, on pain of death. “During 1957 and 1958 Mao Zedong was seized by a vision that economic development in China could proceed rapidly in leaps and bounds by relying on improvisation and mass spontaneity, rather than moderately by the planned and gradual way pursued during the First Five Year Plan (1FYP, 1953-7). Mao singlehandedly initiated the Great Leap Forward (GLP), pushing his views relentlessly, and his changing ideas and preferences shaped the momentous events of 1958 to 1960.”17

Given the decision making process, or lack of it, that went into the implementation of the Great Leap Forward, Mao acted as the emperor of his own dynasty. He had solidified his power, made all subordinates report directly to him, and began to enact his own ideas. He personally conceived and implemented the Great Leap Forward. Mao’s Great Leap Forward herded China’s peasants onto collective farms founded on land seized from land-owners. All members of the farm collectively held the materials of production as well as the farm and draft animals. To facilitate steel production, Mao directed that every backyard have a steel-making furnace.
Stalin’s experience with a similar policy that had proved so disastrous might have given Mao pause, had he seriously considered the example. However, Mao had a vision and had the “Mandate of Heaven” to make the right decisions for the people. The collective farms Mao implemented resulted in a decrease in economic production as people slaughtered plow animals rather than allow them to be collectivized without recompense. The backyard furnaces produced metal of little economic value, yet used up precious and dwindling supplies of fuel required to fire the furnaces. Unfortunately, for many in China, the decisions made by Mao were ruinous. Chan’s reference to the momentous events referred to the millions who died to fulfill Mao’s dynastic vision.

Many new emperors, once they had seized the “Mandate of Heaven,” immediately sought to extend or strengthen their hold on power by launching attacks against rivals internal or external to China. Khublai Khan, when he finally seized and held power in the north of China, turned his attention to his rivals, the Song, in the south of China. After defeating the Song, Khublai Khan decided to extend his influence outside of China by invading Japan. Khublai Khan incorporated Song naval technology into his fleet that he used twice in unsuccessful attempts to invade and conquer Japan.

Mao’s foreign policy was similar to that of Khublai Khan. Mao moved rapidly to consolidate his internal power by mopping up and destroying remnants of the Nationalist Army and repressing internal non-Chinese populations, notably the Tibetans, who resisted his rule. He threw his forces into combat against the Americans on the Korean peninsula to keep the US Army from marching into Manchuria. Once Mao was secure internally, and relatively free of external threats, Mao began to menace his neighbors. He fought border engagements against the Soviet Union and India and learned something vital about his conventional forces and his ability to project power. Mao discovered that overwhelming conventional force was effective in regional confrontations, but would not be worth much in projecting power. While Mao was initially ambivalent about nuclear weapons, he changed his assessment once it occurred to him that he could not have hegemony in Asia unless he pursued the powerful new weapons technology represented by nuclear weapons.

With conventional forces, Mao enjoyed initial success when he made the decision in 1950 to send his armies across the Yalu River into North Korea to confront the Americans. American forces had flanked the North Koreans at Inchon which relieved the pressure Kim was exerting on the combined forces inside the Pusan perimeter. The rapidity with which the Americans had erased the North Korean’s advantage and had rolled up the North Korean forces shocked and alarmed Mao. Rather than allow another conquering imperial power to march through Manchuria, he committed hundreds of thousands of troops to counter the Americans. Although successful in driving the US back to the status quo ante, the cost in troops and materiel was high. Nonetheless, Mao saw his confrontation with the US as a victory in that he was able to defeat or at least fight the technologically superior Americans to a stalemate.

Mao and the Chinese brought this confidence born of military success into the confrontation with the Indians along their shared border in the Himalayas. When negotiations to demarcate the border and regarding Indian support for the Dalai Lama broke down, China decided to attack India. “This operation was ostensibly designed to teach India a lesson for her perceived support to the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan resistance. The border dispute was a pretext conveniently exploited by the Chinese to launch a swift and sudden invasion (that caught the Indians totally by surprise), inflict a humiliating local defeat and then stage a magnanimous unilateral withdrawal that was designed to underline the impotence of the victim nation.”18 Mao wanted the Indians, and by extension, the rest of China’s neighbors, to recognize China as the primary power in Asia.

Mao wanted to demonstrate in Asia that China’s concerns and interests must be accommodated lest China’s neighbors be forced to face a humiliating invasion at the hands of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

During the period when the PLA was teaching India a lesson with conventional forces, China was also attempting to acquire nuclear weapons. Mao made many dismissive and bizarre statements about nuclear weapons during the 50’s, ostensibly to make it seem as though China was not interested in atomic weapons. Mao expressed the view that even if nuclear bombs were used on China, it would “hardly mean anything to the universe as a whole, although it might be major event for the solar system.” On another occasion, he dismissed nuclear weapons as nothing but a “paper tiger.”19 However, it turned out that these statements by Mao were intended to deceive and misdirect the enemy, just as Sun Tzu, generations previously, had advised commanders to do.

Ultimately, China acquired the needed nuclear weapons. “Chinese leaders have long been acutely aware of the geopolitical importance of nuclear weapons and China’s vulnerability to nuclear threats. As a result, China launched a nuclear weapons program in January 1955. The initial Chinese program relied heavily on Soviet technical assistance, the Soviet Union ultimately reneged on a secret agreement to provide China with design information and a sample atomic bomb. As a result, China was forced to rely on its own scientific capabilities and technological infrastructure. These efforts ultimately produced a successful test of a highly enriched uranium fission bomb in October 1964 and a hydrogen bomb in June 1967.”20

In the years after the test of China’s first nuclear weapon, Deng Xiao Ping, one of Mao’s remain cohort from the victory over the Nationalists, started a war against another of China’s neighbors. In 1979, the People’s Liberation Army massed troops on the border of Vietnam, in response to Vietnam’s leadership’s threatened invasion of the Chinese client, Cambodia. Unable to offer logistical assistance or troops to Cambodia, Deng ordered the PLA to invade Vietnam to relieve the pressure on the Cambodia border. Bakshi argued that China’s invasion of Vietnam was another instance of China’s limited war/teach a lesson doctrine promulgated by Mao during the Sino-Indian Crisis of 1962.21 While Bakshi is correct in this assessment, the difference in the Vietnam conflict from the Indian invasion was that China did not actually win as convincing a victory as they had earlier. It was not even clear that China won any victory at all. The PLA did manage to advance into the Vietnamese border region but in the course of the invasion, the PLA suffered high losses and then withdrew, without appreciably altering the strategic balance in Southeast Asia. Vietnam did not learn the lesson that China wanted to teach about regional hegemony, but there are other lessons to learn from China’s adventure.

The first of the lessons that can be gleaned from the Sino-Vietnam conflict of 1979 is the fallacy of the “teach a lesson” doctrine. “Teach a lesson” only works when the country “learning” the lesson agrees to the education. In 1962, India agreed that they had been taught a lesson; in 1979, Vietnam did not. A more recent, non-Chinese example, emphasized this point. In 2001, al Qaeda terrorists attacked the United States, killing more than 3000 civilians, knocking down the World Trade Towers, and seriously disrupting the US economy. This was a classic “teach a lesson” operation, since there was no attempt to hold territory or capture anything other than the initiative. This mission ultimately proved to be a failure, in that the US in response launched a disproportionate attack on terrorist strongholds around the world that disrupted operations and killed many in the senior leadership. Whatever lesson the aggressor wanted to teach was lost in the response by the victim.

The second lesson is that this invasion of Vietnam, in 1979, was the last time Chinese troops conducted a “live” operation against anyone except unarmed students. Additionally, the Sino-Vietnam War was 17 years after the PLA’s last major engagement. The Sino-Vietnam conflict exposed serious gaps in PLA readiness, logistics and coordination, especially when compared to the experienced Vietnam Army. The time between the Vietnam conflict, and whatever the Chinese Communist leadership has planned is thirty-seven years and counting. Essentially, the PLA has had one engagement lasting approximately one month in the last 44 years. That is a long time for an expeditionary army to go without action and still expect to victorious. The various types of missions that the PLA might be called on to perform in the near future such as: a limited cross-border conflict, a large scale amphibious raid, or a division or larger sized para-drop synchronized with a missile strike, all require officers with a great deal of skill. This skill has not been evident of late. “American sailors are constantly exposed to examples of the poor training and leadership in the Chinese navy, whenever they encounter Chinese warships at sea. Foreigners living in China, and speaking Chinese, can pick up lots of anecdotes about the ineptitude and corruption found in the military. It's all rather taken for granted. But in wartime, this sort of thing would mean enormous problems for the troops, when they attempted to fight.”22 Given the inherent difficulties in such operations listed above and the lack of experience in their officer corps and the lack of veteran troops, it is not surprising that, of late, the PLA has been more adept at rattling its sabers than using them.

Given the long gap in time between operations, there is one final lesson to be gleaned from the China’s last war. The dynasty of the Chinese Communists established by Mao, is laboring under the same constraints that have afflicted Communist regimes since the Bolsheviks defeated the Czar in 1917. Communist dictatorships found it necessary to decentralize war-making ability while centralizing power. Therefore, only the founder of the Communist dictatorship, or one of his original cohorts, can single-handedly initiate a cross border war. Subsequent generations of Communists have been thwarted in their ambitions to expand their power externally for two reasons. First, they lack the unquestioned authority that stemmed from the dynamic personality of the main revolutionary. Without the authority of a single emperor, the highest levels of leadership must make decisions as a group.

The communal decision-making structure that inevitably arose to fill the void left upon the demise of the founder of the revolution prevents precipitous action. Succeeding generations of Communists found it necessary to work collectively since no one individual in the ruling politburo has been able to exert as much authority as could the founder of the Communist dynasty. Anyone who has been on a committee of any sort knows how hard it is to collectively decide to take decisive action. The high stakes involved for the Communist Chinese ruling politburo in committing the PLA to a war it might lose, make taking decisive action even more problematic. The dynamics of collective decision-making and the high stakes have made it impossible for second and third generation Communist dynasties to take the decision to prosecute cross-border war. It is unlikely that China, given the lack of experience of its armed forces and its decision making structure, will be the first to break this trend.

Chinese dynasties, of which Mao’s China is the most recent, acquire the “Mandate of Heaven” to legitimate its rule. Along with the Mandate comes the responsibility to protect the people from natural and man-made threats. When the dynasty fails in this responsibility, the “Mandate of Heaven” will be withdrawn, and the regime will fall. This has been the pattern throughout Chinese history, and given the way in which Mao acquired power and the way he and his successors have ruled, the dynastic cycle will continue to turn.

NOTES
1 Richard Hooker, “T’ien Ming: The Mandate of Heaven.” (accessed 11 May 2006); available from http://wsu.edu/~dee/GLOSSARY/TIENMING.HTM; Internet.
2 David Graff, Military History of China. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002), 41.
3 Mao Tse Tung, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung. (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967), 243.
4 Fu Zhengyuan, Autocratic Tradition and Chinese Politics. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 187.
5 Alan R Kluver, Legitimating the Chinese Economic Reforms: A Rhetoric of Myth and Orthodoxy. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 31.
6 Steven W. Mosher, “Does the PRC Have a Grand Strategy of Hegemony?” [testimony presented to the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations] (Washington: US House of Representatives, 14 Feb 2006, accessed 12 May 2006); available from http://wwwa.house.gov/international_relations/109/mos021406.pdf; Internet.
7 Phillip Short, Mao: A Life. (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1999), 203.
8 Hans Van De Hen, Warfare in Chinese History. (London: Brill, 2000), 11.
9 Andrew J. Nathan and Perry Link, Tiananmen Papers: The Chinese Leadership’s Decision to Use Force Against Their Own People – In Their Own Words. (New York: Public Affairs Books, 2002), 302.
10 Fu, Autocratic Tradition and Chinese Politics, 217.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid., 250.
13 Alan K.L. Chan, Perspectives on East Asia Science, Technology, and Medicine. (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2003), 53.
14 Ibid., 55.
15 Chen Gu, In Search of the New Way. (College Station, TX: Virtualbookworm.com Publishing, 2003), 36.
16 Louise Levathes, When China Ruled the Seas. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 74.
17 Alfred L Chan, Mao’s Crusade: Politics and Policy Implementation in China’s Great Leap Forward. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 3.
18 G. D. Bakshi, “The Sino-Vietnam War-1979: Case Study in Limited Wars,” Indian Defence Review, Vol 14 (July-September 2000, accessed 13 May 06); available from http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE3-3/bakshi.html; Internet.
19 Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 190.
20 Alexander Millar, Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Emergent Threats in an Evolving Security Environment. (Dulles, VA: Brassey’s, 2003), 117.
21 Bakshi, “The Sino-Vietnam War-1979: Case Study in Limited Wars,” Internet.
22 Jim Dunnigan, “Illusion of Military Power.” Strategy Page, November 8, 2005; available from http://www.strategypage.com/qnd/china/articles/20051108.aspx; Internet; accessed 14 May 2006.

Laura and me

Listening to your visceral reaction to Ann Coulter, and your stumbling, "I think they are good people, even though they are liberal; can't we all get along" response to her reinforces an opinion about you that has been nagging at me for years.

I think that you are playing us.

You pretend to have these conservative views, but then you pal around with all these liberals, and tell them not to get too upset by the things you say, since you are just bilking the rubes on a lark. Yet, when confronted by the views of a real conservative, you blanch and stumble around, refuse to engage her arguments, and appeal to feelings. Just like the liberal I suspect you are.

I like you Laura, but I am tired of being played.

Her staff’s response to me:
1. Laura put her neck on the line as an 18 yr old college student at Dartmouth when she edited The Dartmouth Review, got sued by liberal professors for millions of dollars (eventually won).
2. Speechwriter in the Reagan White House.
3. Clerked for Clarence Thomas.
4. Launched the first conservative cable show EVER on MSNBC
5. Launched the first and biggest female hosted conservative radio talk show in the country.
6. Wrote The Hillary Trap, exposing Hillary's ABSURD political views.
7. Wrote the NYT bestseller Shut Up & Sing--telling the idiot elite left to shut up or put up (evidence that their ideas work).
8. Has called out Kristin Breitweiser ON HER POLITICAL INANITY for three years--without calling her a "harpie" or saying she would "be upset if her
husband came back."
9. Travelled to Iraq to support our troops and tell their stories six months after chemo, and right after Bob Woodruff was blown up there, with his same unit.
10. Yeah, she's a total sell-out.
11. Ann Coulter has a role. Laura has a role -- and demonstrates it every single day for 3 hrs a day to millions of listeners. There is room in the world for both.

My response:
A resume isn't an argument, and where you see bona fides, others see shrewd positioning. When 99% of your fellow journalists and DJs are liberal knuckleheads, the smart "conservative" will stand out and get the gigs. Ask John Stossel about that.

Here is one you can ask her to comment on; where does she stand on gay marriage? I suspect that is one issue a genuine conservative would be happy to opine about but which about which she would have a hard time concealing her real feelings.

Since I did not say "sell out," yet you put it in quotes in response #10 tells me you are hearing this point of view from many others. Whether she is conservative or not is ultimately not that important, rather, it matters how she is perceived by those who listen, and whether we will buy the things she endorses. I for one, don't and won't.

Have a nice weekend

Bonds, Grimsley, the Clueless Press and the Feds

Jason Grimsley, a pitcher for a number of teams for 16 years in the major leagues, got caught up in a Federal investigation that reaches into money laundering, wire fraud, abuse of the mails, and drug trafficking all related to baseball players using steroids and human growth hormone (HGH). I have a couple of observations:

How lame is the media that sends numerous reporters to every game that is played in major league baseball, who live with and travel with the players they cover, and yet did not have an inkling that illicit drug use was so pervasive in clubhouses that there were coffee makers labeled “Leaded” for the ones that contained amphetamines? Or were these reporters so complicit with illegality in the clubhouse that they deliberately did not report what they knew, for whatever reason?

Barry Bonds should be very afraid. According to the affidavit that the lead investigator on this case (who, not incidentally, is an IRS Agent) Grimsley attracted the attention of investigators when they developed information that he was going to receive HGH in the mail from a supplier. The investigator received a warrant to search Grimsley’s home on the theory that he possesses illegal drugs, has distributed illegal drugs to other players for profit, and then laundered the money. The Feds attempted to get Grimsley to collect evidence against Barry Bonds in exchange for leniency, and when he would not cooperate in that effort, they publicly exposed him. The reason Bonds should be afraid is that this entire task force of DEA, FBI, IRS, Customs, Postal Inspectors and US Attorneys are looking to make a case against Bonds and are strong arming associates of his to do it. I would say he is in deep kimchi. To Bonds illustrious titles of “wife beater” and “bad sport,” we can add “tax cheat,” “drug user” and “fraud.”

And yet, even with all these Federal law enforcement agencies, all over the US, looking into one person, who is also watched every day by scores of credentialed media, we read not a word of suspicion or analysis in any newspaper or on any sports show about what might be forthcoming. It is as if the paying news consumer would not be interested to know that virtually everyone playing baseball, including the “best player in this generation” is juiced up. Unless someone hands a press release to one of these high paid, clueless windbags in the media describing the location of his own ass with an included map, he would not be able to find it even with both hands.

Sports journalism is a disgrace. Barry Bonds is a disgrace. Baseball needs to clean house, and soon.

Party Control of the Chinese Military

The Chinese Communists recognized that they had, and still have, the same problem that bedeviled dynastic leaders throughout Chinese history. That problem is how to maintain sufficiently strong forces in all regions of the country yet maintain centralized control to prevent any one army from becoming so strong as to challenge central rule.

The solution has been to inculcate the entire army with the notion that the army does not serve the state, but rather, serves the interests of the Communist Party. Mao himself wrote that “Our principle is that the party controls the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to control the party." Guided by this principle, the officers of the Army were selected by the Communist Party more for their commitment to the party than for their military acumen. Additionally, Mao and the Communist Party assembled a parallel organization of military commissars who reported directly to the party and who ensured that the officers and men maintained their allegiance to the party. This system produced the results Mao wanted, but not because of the wisdom of the structure. Rather, Mao and his leadership cohort had a high level of mutual trust and commitment that recognized the supremacy of the Communist party. As this senior level of leadership began dying off, the men who replaced them did not share the experiences and outlook that would allow Mao’s system to perpetuate.

In recent years, the military has become more assertive in pursuit of its own prerogatives. As the military has become less fettered by the dictates of the party and has become more professional, the military has developed domestic and foreign policies independent of those desired by the CCP. Additionally, the regional groupings of the PLA have developed their own policies, with some regions developing in ways that make them more amenable to central control, and others, less so.

In 1989, the locally garrisoned troops of the 38th Army Group commander was relieved because his troops lacked the stomach to fire on their fellow Beijing ren. The Chinese Communist Party called up the 27th Army Group, a more reliable army, with roots that went back the 8th Route Army, filled out with provincial troops who spoke a dialect of Mandarin almost unintelligible by the Beijing residents in Tiananmen Square. In simple terms, the 38th was loyal to the nation, the 27th was loyal to the party.


There was a much touted initiative promulgated by Jiang
Zemin in 1998 that the PLA was to divest itself of all businesses and return to the barracks. There is doubt whether the Army has actually taken this step. The fact that the Army was so heavily involved in business ventures, and may still be, albeit in a camouflaged fashion, has implications for the party’s control. The party’s inability to force the Army to divest its business holdings is further evidence that the Army does not necessarily take orders from the party, and retains its advantage of firepower. It seems that the Mao’s principle of party control of the military may be in the process of inverting.

Marriage Amendment

An argument against the Marriage Amendment at the Volokh Conspiracy and my response:

There are four main arguments against the FMA. First, a constitutional amendment is unnecessary because federal and state laws, combined with the present state of the relevant constitutional doctrines, already make court-ordered nationwide same-sex marriage unlikely for the foreseeable future. An amendment banning same-sex marriage is a solution in search of a problem.

Is it possible to couch this “argument” in any more weasel words? Present state of relevant Constitutional doctrines make same sex marriage unlikely for foreseeable future. Forgive me if I don’t think these hollow assurances/blatherings from some law professor will keep a future supreme court from finding the penumumbras of emanations in the constitution mandating all states accept “gay marriage.”

Second, a constitutional amendment defining marriage would be a radical intrusion on the nation's founding commitment to federalism in an area traditionally reserved for state regulation, family law. There has been no showing that federalism has been unworkable in the area of family law.

Except that it isn’t, as Steve T pointed out with regard Utah’s statehood.

Third, a constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage would be an unprecedented form of amendment, cutting short an ongoing national debate over what privileges and benefits, if any, ought to be conferred on same-sex couples and preventing democratic processes from recognizing more individual rights.

Going through the process of amending the constitution to preserve the unique status and importance of marriage to our nation and society is undemocratic? This “argument” is nonsensical.

Fourth, the amendment as proposed is constitutional overkill that reaches well beyond the stated concerns of its proponents, foreclosing not just courts but also state legislatures from recognizing same-sex marriages and perhaps other forms of legal support for same-sex relationships. Whatever one thinks of same-sex marriage as a matter of policy, no person who cares about our Constitution and public policy should support this unnecessary, radical, unprecedented, and overly broad departure from the nation's traditions and history.

This argument is the same as the first one, in that it assumes that future courts won’t do with gay marriage what Berger et al did with abortion. The only thing that will prevent gay marriage in the US is to write a prohibition to it in the constitution in unambiguous language. Arguing otherwise shows cluelessness or disingenuousness about jurisprudence in America in 2006.

Make no mistake, given current legal scholarship and supreme court interpretations, supporters of marriage have lost this debate. There is no legal justification not to call a contract between two men a marriage. You can be sure, in our lifetimes, this will come to pass. Unless we enact a constitutional amendment to remove marriage from interpretation by the courts, gays will be allowed to “get married” and enjoy the benefits that society has heretofore conferred on married couples. Absent this amendment, in twenty years, when we have a culture replete with gay marriage, polygamy, group marriages, and men marrying their grandsons to control inheritance, we will wonder how we got to this point. Or, more tragically, we won’t ask any questions at all, accepting those contracts as normal, and instead, wonder why society has gone to hell.

Are the Japanese racist? Did the Japanese commit genocide in China prior to WWII?

Before answering the questions, it is necessary to define and analyze the terms of the question. "Genocide" was coined by Rafael Lemkin to describe the actions he observed committed by the Nazis against the Jews in Europe. In Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation - Analysis of Government - Proposals for Redress published by the Carnegie Foundation in 1944, Lemkin wrote: “Generally speaking, genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation, except when accomplished by mass killings of all members of a nation. It is intended rather to signify a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves.” His word very closed described what the Nazis attempted to accomplish vis a vis the Jews and other minorities in Europe. Subsequently, observers sought to expand the term "genocide" to describe other situations in the world that were not so clearly reminiscent of Nazi atrocities. Eventually, the UN formally defined “genocide” in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide as “any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.” A close reading of this definition makes it arguable that virtually any large scale action in a conflict can be called "genocide," an interpretation that makes claims of "genocide" not particularly useful as a descriptive term.

The actions of the Japanese in on the Chinese mainland prior to and during World War II, while clearly murderous, do not seem to fit into the Lemkin's original definition of genocide. His definition hinges on the mindset and intentions of the dominant party toward the party they are attempting to eradicate. The Nazis were clearly trying eliminate Jews and other minorities from Europe, and the Nazi’s actions were clearly motivated by their ideology and beliefs. There is much less documentation to suggest that the Japanese were motivated to eliminate the Chinese from China in a "genocidal" campaign.

There is no doubt that the Japanese engaged in mass killings in China. Many Chinese were killed as a result of combat operations, but many more were killed after combat operations had ceased. The Japanese troops, who in other campaigns contemporary to Manchuria, behaved with discipline, nonetheless committed atrocities during the campaign in the interior of China. The Japanese Army operated with great restraint in Taiwan, even in the face of provocations and challenges from the local aboriginal population, and never committed the scale of the atrocities that marked the Japanese operations on the Mainland. It seems that something other than raw racism was at work.

The Japanese did have racist sentiments towards Chinese, but that does not seem to be the only motivation for the killing. As Benjamin A Valentino observed in Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the Twentieth Century: “Racism was rampant in the Japanese Army, but even in this case, strategic motives also seem to have been at work.” The strategic motives include desire to defeat and cow a restive population, and the need to ensure easy, dependable access to the resources of the Mainland. Where the Japanese had few problems pacifying the population, such as in Taiwan, there were few atrocities. Had the Japanese truly sought to exterminate the Chinese, Taiwan would have been a good place to start, with its relatively small population and the islands relative vulnerability. The fact that the Japanese did not take this easy opportunity for brutality is telling.

What the Japanese perpetrated in China does not seem to meet the definition of genocide but instead seems more like “mass killing.” While highlighting the differences between the terms "mass killing" and "genocide" make strike some as needless hair-splitting, differentiating the two allows an observer to examine the underlying motives of the actions. Mikiso Hane offered many reasons why the Japanese Army was able to actually perform the grueling, grisly work of mass killing that furthered Japan’s strategic requirements. Hane argued that the actions of the Japanese in Manchuria could be explained by the brutality involved in the training of Japanese soldiers, feelings of racial superiority engendered by military success and brainwashing and mob psychology. There is no indication that the formal policy of the Japanese government or of the Army's high command was to systemically eliminate all Chinese from China. However, to attribute what occurred in Manchuria to “genocide” makes the action easier to dismiss as some uniquely pre-McArthur Japanese aberration. On the other hand, to attribute the Japanese actions to poor soldierly discipline, to contempt for the enemy or to mob psychology bring the circumstances of the actions of the Japanese uncomfortably close to familiar contemporary circumstances. There are numerous reports of modern, relatively well trained forces committing atrocities around the world even today. Often these atrocities can be blamed on soldiers essentially being “turned loose,” unconstrained by laws of war and soldierly discipline, in order to effect the larger policies of their governments. We should be thankful that the atrocities are relatively small because these modern day deployments are dwarfed by the size of the Japanese army in China.

"Mass killing" on the scale the Japanese perpetrated in China requires a mindset inured to killing other human beings in large numbers and in close quarters. The Nazis committed their genocide in camps, automating their killing so that a relatively small, hard core did the bulk of the killing. The Soviets starved the large majority of their victims, a method of homicide that made their mass killing distant and impersonal. The Japanese Army, once unfettered from discipline, engaged in killing their victims in a retail fashion. The Japanese martial culture trained their warriors from their youth to close with the enemy, and engage in mortal combat at arm’s length. Grossman notes in “On Killing” that humans have to be conditioned to kill, especially in close combat, when fear of injury and death is at the peak and threatens to overwhelm a soldier’s training, orders and desire. The Japanese martial culture provided the conditioning that the leadership was able to harness in pursuit of national aims.

The racism that Hine observed in the Japanese Army came from the fact that Japan was an unusually isolated society. Japan is an island with few natural harbors, all of which are defensible whose major regional rival, China, essentially gave up on sea borne exploration and conquest except for a brief period in the 15th Century. The Japanese had little contact with other societies, a condition that allowed the Japanese to concentrate and refine their elaborate rituals of manners. Their isolation and safety from invasion was seen as validation for their theology of superiority and unique favor with the Gods. When the Japanese were finally forced to deal with other societies that were clearly more advanced in technology with the coming of the American Fleet, the Japanese were able to study and adopt the most useful components of foreign technology without being subjugated by a foreign power. Hence, the Japanese were able to persist in their belief in their inherent superiority, a belief that they took with them into the interior of China. The rapidity of their victories was seen as yet more affirmation of their favor with the gods and superiority over other races.

The Japanese combined their feelings of racial superiority with a society built on the culture of politeness and affront. All Japanese from their youth were trained formally and informally in deference to their "superiors" and in contempt for their "inferiors." Elaborate rituals of politeness were demanded and affronts to the rituals were punished immediately and brutally often times with death. The Japanese were accustomed to kill as punishment. More important to the willingness to use brutality to enforce cultural mores was the willingness of those oppressed to accept stoically the brutality meted out by the ruling samurai class. People in such cultures accept irrational brutality if they themselves know that by enduring, they will eventually have the chance to visit brutality on others subordinate to them. The Chinese were the ready targets for this expression of brutality by the Japanese. A western analogy to this Japanese construct can be found among the Spartans of ancient Greece. The Spartans were ruled by a warrior class, and were contemptuous of other civilizations not as organized or as ruthless as they.

The Japanese saw other cultures that did not accept their peculiar vision of society as uncouth, barbarian, and unworthy of consideration. The Japanese used, and in fact still use, dehumanizing language to identify outsiders. The Japanese had the peculiar situation where they were strong enough to maintain separation from their neighbors, but had just enough contact to develop negative perceptions of those same neighbors. As Soderberg pointed out in Japanese Influences and Presences in Asia, “Racism tends normally to be directed against people who are in a minority, in close proximity and in sufficient numbers.” For the Japanese, the Chinese were this minority.

But even given all the factors that conspired to cause the atrocities in China, was there something unique about the Japanese wanting to kill as many of their enemy as possible? The answer to that is no. Americans in every war, from the Revolution to World War II have written memoirs attesting to their desire to "kill as many of the enemy as possible." Allied forces grimly but deliberately bombed civilian targets in pursuit of total war in World War II. There was nothing unique about Japanese desire to kill large numbers of their enemy. What distinguished the Japanese was their willingness though a confluence of circumstances, to kill large numbers of the enemy, even enemy civilians, in close personal contact.

Warlord-ism

The most dramatic change in the Chinese military was the establishment of the Whampoa Military Academy. Sun and Jiang both recognized the need for scientific and systematic approach to training officers. Sun may have been more interested in insuring that the most advanced military science and tactics were taught, while Jiang was perhaps more interested in insuring that officers had correct political thoughts. They established the academy to accomplish both their goals, and largely succeeded, at least initially. Mr Lawrence pointed out the role the Soviets had in establishing Whampoa, and Whampoa’s importance in fielding new weaponry for the prolonged period of warfare from 1911 to 1946. However, I would argue that Whampoa’s larger importance was in the shared experience and zeal it fostered in the officer corps. This esprit de corps among the young officers served the Nationalists well as they grew up to assume more senior leadership positions in the military of the Republic of China, and helped the ROC to hang on, even after retreat to Taiwan.

One thing that did not change was the basic organization of the Chinese military. Warlords raised armies, and controlled territory until they were defeated or bought off by other warlords. It was interesting to read the analysis of the warlords by Edward McCord on page 176 of the Graff text. McCord makes an elaborate argument that the warlords after the turn of the century did not have any direct linkage to the warlords to whom the Qing dynasty turned for defense from the Taipings. Then, one paragraph later, McCord points out that dynasties had made a calculated decision not to have a unified army to defend against any one commander becoming strong enough to challenge for the throne. McCord calls this policy “military fragmentation.” To my mind, McCord is shaving the point too thin by denying direct linkages between the warlords of the different eras. It seems significant however that 70 years apart, we have virtually identical military organizations arising from the Chinese body politic.

It seems McCord is also missing the larger picture as well. Throughout Chinese history, strongmen have arisen from somewhere in the provinces, and if they were able, challenged to be declared emperor in a bid to unify China. These men did not have royal lineage to give legitimacy to their claims; to paraphrase Mao, their political power and legitimacy came from the point of a spear, or the barrel of a gun. The chaos of the competing warlords was an expression of the egalitarianism at work in the Chinese dynastic succession. Any strongman, regardless of his background, with the wherewithal and good fortune could seize power. For lack of a better term, warlord-ism is the Chinese way.

Another change in the Chinese military was having Sun Yatsen as the philosophical voice and Jiang Jieshi as the front man for their attempts at reform. Sun had a western education, and could make his case for the superiority of his claim to power in English to the press and diplomats of the world. He had the ability to craft a simple yet still vague philosophy such that both the Chinese communists and the Republic of China claim him as a founding father. Sun also had the keen insight to turn to the western world for military training assistance and for arms. Sun also had an able subordinate in Jiang, who though may not have been the most tactically sound General, was on occasion, politically astute and was an excellent commandant of the Whampoa Academy mentioned earlier. Jiang also had a polished, Christian wife who sold the world on the idea that Jiang and the Nationalists were more than just regional army vying for power. Together, Sun and Jiang modernized their army, forced their opponents to do the same and were able to entrench their military vision so that it outlasted their own lives. These men brought major change in the Chinese military. However, if one strips away the philosophical pretense, one finds that Sun and Jiang WERE just warlords, albeit ones who had some western education, good American PR and, paradoxically, the good fortune to have truly despicable characters like the Chinese Communists as their enemy.

Of note, the Chinese way stands in contrast to the Japanese who were able through discipline and luck to restrict power at the highest levels to just a few families.

Elleman's Military History of China

Elleman treats all the rebellions of the 19th century as an ethno-centric reaction to the Manchu rule. Elleman characterizes the Taiping Rebellion as an _expression of “anti-Manchu Han nationalism.” (pg 57) Regarding the other rebellions that Elleman covers: Nian, Tungan, and Muslim Rebellions; the author calls these “radical reflection of increased regionalism.” He then explains that the only reason that regionalism had a chance to rise up is because the Qing dynasty was so distracted by the larger Taiping rebellion, that they could not concentrate on the situations out in the provinces.

Elleman’s treatment reminds me of Sir John Harington quote from the 17th century: “Treason doth never prosper: what's the reason? For if it prosper, none dare call it treason.” The term “rebellion” is similar to “treason” in the epigram; rebellions that succeed become “revolutions” that usher in new dynasties. The Manchus/Qings themselves came to power after a period of rebellion that culminated with the sacking of Beijing. Had the Mings been able to resist the Qing onslaught, history would have recorded the rise and fall of the Manchus a failed regional rebellion. As we have seen, a rebellion’s success allows those leaders to dictate the terms by which they are remembered.

This author also asserts the inevitability of success for rebellion against the Qing. According to Elleman, as the rebellions grew stronger, the Qing were forced to adopt western weapons and tactics, both of which were soon matched by the rebels. Elleman cites the diffusion of Western thought and hardware into the China as the reason the Qing were ultimately defeated. The problem with this thesis is that the Qing had the same access to Western thought and hardware as the rebels, but those things could not preserve the dynasty. Further, when innovative military minds did rise up among the Qing, the dynasty was able to defend itself.

The rebellions occurred during a period in which the Qing Dynasty lost the competence and the will to assert its authority throughout China. Such periods in China’s past, during which the provinces perceived that that the central government had lost control, signaled the beginning of the end of the dynasty in power. In an earlier posting, we discussed whether the perception that the dynasty had lost control inexorably led to the Dynasty actually losing control or whether the perception flowed from the actual loss of control. Regardless of which was the cause and which was the effect, opportunistic pretenders to the throne pressed their claims during this 60 year period. It is easy to comprehend how fatigued the Qing dynasty became after two generations of challenges to its rule. This fatigue prevented the Qing from mustering the force necessary to put down the final challenge to their rule in 1912.

It is perhaps the nature of China and the Chinese that gives rise to bloody rebellion. China is a huge area with many different cultures competing for political power. When there is a strong central power that can plausibly claim to have the “Mandate of Heaven” for its rule, China holds together in peace. However, if the rulers lose the interest or will to ruthlessly assert their power all the way to the frontiers of China, rebellions arise either to assert local control or, depending on the ambitions of the rebellion’s rulers, push all the way to the capital in a bid to overthrow the Emperor.

Decline of the Qing Dynasty

The beginnings of the decline of the Qing dynasty ironically can be found in the Qing emperors’ desire to prevent the armed forces from becoming a threat to the dynasty. The Qing emperors were descended from the Manchus, a people ethnically distinct from the majority Han. The Manchus were aware that even hundreds of years into their rule, they were perceived as outsiders in the midst of the majority Han. With this self-awareness, Qing emperors worked to decentralize power. They had read history and knew that challengers to the throne often arose from those who had large armies to use as a power base. The Manchus believed the hostility to them as outsiders made them even more vulnerable.

In an effort to prevent any army from arising to challenge the dynasty, the Qing decentralized Army authority, organized their forces into two large groupings and the Dynasty retained the responsibility to actually pay the salaries of the troops. In one sense, the Qing’s strategy was successful. They ruled for almost 300 years, and prevented the army from rising up to challenge them. However, the Qings had violated some of the basic teachings of Sun Zi notably, Sun Zi’s call for proper marshalling of the army, and having the general retain control of salaries: As Sun Zi wrote in Chapter 1, paragraph 9: “By method and discipline are to be understood the marshaling of the army in its proper subdivisions, the graduations of rank among the officers, the maintenance of roads by which supplies may reach the army, and the control of military expenditure. The Qing, with their complicated structure of Banners and the Green Army, and with the state retaining control of salaries prevented the Army itself from presenting a threat, but made it difficult for the Army to counter external threats.”

By ignoring basic tenets of ancient Chinese thought, the Qings may have weakened the Army in such a way as to prevent a coup, but at the same time, the Dynasty was left open to other internal threats. Ironically, the most serious of these internal threats came from others who explicitly rejected ancient Chinese thought. In the 1850’s, large groups of poor Chinese rejected the strictures of Confucianism and embraced ersatz Christianity. Many of these poor Chinese believed the world that was ordered according to the dictates of Confucianism kept them poor and without prospects. These impoverished peasants eagerly received Hong Xiu Quan’s interpretation of himself as heavenly king, God’s son, Jesus’ brother sent to earth to establish a new order that would start by eradicating the hated Confucians. It is hard to comprehend how charismatic Hong was and how fertile the ground was for the type of ideology he sewed. Large portions of the formerly docile Han population took up arms to challenge, so many in fact that the civil war ended up killing 25 million Chinese.

Hong and his followers scored many initial successes against the Qings’ poorly organized and led armed forces. To their credit, the dynasty realized unless there was serious reform in the Army, Hong might well be successful. The Qing court appointed Zeng Gou Fan as the military governor of Jiangsu and Jianxi Provinces. Zeng had success leading a militia against the Taipings, having organized and lead the militia using the traditional Chinese military teachings. Zeng built a well organized army, and with the aid of opportunistic Western powers, was able to crush and destroy the Tiaping.

Immediately after the Taiping Rebellion, the Qings had to contend with another rebellion that expressly rejected Chinese thought. The Panthay Rebellion in Yunnan Province featured Moslems dissatisfied with their treatment at the hands of the Chinese majority. This rebellion took almost 20 years to quell at the cost of 80,000 lives, and was yet another serious threat to Qing authority.

Appealing to Zeng for defense of China was another step in the decline of the Qings. The Qing Emperors had deliberately tried to prevent the armed forces from becoming a rival power base, but had to forgo that policy. The Qings were forced to appeal to the local militias, like those of Zeng, to fight off the Taipings in the south and east, and the Moslems in the west. It was apparent to the local governors that the Qing were unwilling or unable to exert their centralized authority. Traditionally in China, once the provinces lost their respect and fear for central authority and power, the dynasty was in decline.

Three responses

1. Roe vs Wade is terrible constitutional law. It is built on a fictitious “right” not actually found in the constitution, bolstered by phony history and now defended from criticism because it is supposedly “settled” law. We may all desperately want something to be in the constitution, but if it is not there, it is not. Ask the prohibitionists about that.

Take abortion out of the courts, kick it to the state legislatures, and let them do the will of the people. New York and Maryland craves abortion, they will have it. South Dakota and Alabama see it as murder, they will prohibit it. Every other state will exercise their freedom of choice to select some policy in the middle.

2. Abortion is grisly and wrong. Peter Singer, ghoul that he is, nonetheless makes the inarguable point that birth is just another tick of the clock. If we are willing to shove scissors into the head of a baby still in the birth canal and suck out her brains at 40 weeks, why can’t we do the same to a 3 month old who was born 3 months premature? It would probably be a better idea even. Give that troubled girl you mentioned 3 months to really try out being a mother, sort of as a test run. If she says, “I can’t get any sleep, and my grades are suffering, and I really wanted to go to college,” planned parenthood can have drop offs in the back where the baby can be euthanized. Or she could just do it herself.

Watch a baby being aborted on 3D ultrasound. It’s hard to complain about the nihilistic beheading Islamists when we allow that same kind of thing in our own midst.

3. What is the difference between 1) creating an embryo to harvest its parts, 2) creating a clone for its parts to be harvested, 3) conceiving a baby for the express purpose of harvesting its parts in utero prior to abortion, 4) birthing the unwanted baby to whom you have given a lobotomy so that she has the same mental abilities of Terri Shiavo to allow it to grow for a period in order to harvest her now larger parts, so that you can starve her to death later? I’ll tell you. 1) is now, 4) is later. If you don’t think that loosening the rules a little leads to the unthinkable later, you have not watched prime-time TV lately or noticed that since gays started getting married, polygamists are agitating for their “rights.”

Party of Death

Ramesh Ponnuru, in his book Party of Death, opens with a description of a dream he had about Hillary Clinton. It was not that kind of dream; instead, it was about her upcoming run for president. In Ponnuru’s dream, Hillary opines that abortion is a terrible thing, and the goal of all people should be to reduce the numbers of abortions, and provide assistance for poor mothers and their children. She then proposes to throw abortion policy back to the States, and allow legislatures to restrict or allow abortion as suits their constituents. Ponnuru awoke, thinking such a speech would make Clinton the next president.

Is that dream likely to come true? Maybe; Ponnuru makes a compelling case that abortion, when framed as the killing of innocents, is a political loser. He also shows that incremental restrictions on abortion are political winners. So, would the senator from New York make such a speech? Who knows? She is likely to say anything, and might stumble onto the winning Ponnuru combination on abortion.

Reading Ponnuru’s clear prose is a joy. He effortlessly demolishes the framework of arguments that the “Party of Death,” has constructed to bolster the conjured “right” to an abortion. Ponnuru is particularly devastating to the more than 400 historians who drafted a voluminous amicus brief purporting to show that anti-abortion laws are “an aberration from an American tradition” that the decision in Roe vs Wade restored. The brief bolstered Blackmun’s otherwise flimsy rationale for finding the right to abortion in the constitution. The brief was cited by Ronald Dworkin, Laurence Tribe and George Will as authoritative history.

Ramesh Ponnuru’s conclusion about this brief is a little different. “It was fraudulent. [It] is a case study in the academic betrayal of truth.” And his opinion of the authors is equally contemptuous: “They put their scholarly authority behind lies.” In a thirteen-page chapter with 53 footnotes, many of which come from other works written by the briefs’ authors, Ponnuru completely discredits this alleged historical brief. 400-1 and Ponnuru dominates. He barely breaks a sweat.

Reading Ponnuru’s outstanding book reminded me of a recent dream of my own. I am a big fan of Michael Medved’s radio show. I especially enjoy his willingness to bring on any liberal commentator, espousing any argument, in order to expose the illogic, fallacies and frauds that characterize their arguments. In my dream, Medved was debating with something that looked like a Ted Kennedy-shaped helium-filled piñata that the radio host hit with a broomstick every time Medved made an unanswerable argument. It did not take long before the gas bag was beaten to the ground. Nonetheless, beaten and deflated, it kept yammering on. With Party of Death, Ponnuru has administered the Medved treatment to those who would argue in support of abortion, euthanasia and embryonic stem cell research. Will those deflated opponents learn from their defeat and make the Clinton speech of Ponnuru’s dream? Or will they continue yammering their tired, discredited arguments as does the Ted Kennedy piñata in mine?

Ancient Chinese Naval Secrets

The three most impressive Chinese naval feats were each produced by representatives of different influences on Chinese history. Two of the great naval accomplishments, the massive Mongolian amphibious raids on Japan in the 13th Century, and the Treasure Fleet of the 15th Century were accomplished by those who might accurately be called “outsiders.” The Grand Canal, that longest of man-made waterways, indispensable to the rise of Chinese power, was conceived and built by Chinese, albeit by leaders who made up one of the shortest dynasties in Chinese history.

The Grand Canal’s genesis dated from when Yang Di of the Sui Dynasty (580-618 AD) decided to move the capital of China from to Luoyang. Yang Di saw the strategic implications of moving the capital to Luoyang because it was well defended by mountainous passes and gave him access to the major rivers of China, provided he could link them with a canal system. Yang Di was so impressed with his choice of a capital that he was moved to poetic language to justify his choice: “With excellent land and water transportation, it provides a whole gamut of taxes and tributes. Thus, Gao Zu of Han said: I have traveled far and wide under heaven, and have only seen Luoyang.” (Xiong, pg 77) He built on the work his father started, with an ambitious canal program. “In fact, under Yang Di, Luoyang evolved into the hub of an unprecedented nationwide water transportation system which came to be known as the Grand Canal. Arguably his greatest legacy, it was also his most criticized and costly public works project.” (Xiong, pg 86) While it was a great engineering triumph, the Canal’s cost in human lives and treasure help to bring about the early end of the Sui Dynasty.

The demise of the Sui Dynasty did not mark the end of the canal, but the waterway did fall into periods of ill repair. During the wars between the Song Dynasty and the Mongols, the canal suffered from lack of upkeep and from battle damage. Upon coming to power, Yang Di moved the capital to Bejing to better govern the North, and to more quickly respond to overland threats from the Mongols to the North. But making the move north required that there be high-speed lines of communication throughout the country. The necessity for “The decision of the third emperor of the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) to relocate the Ming capital from Nanjing on the Yangtze River to Beijing in the north, amplified the importance of the Grand Canal to the maintenance of state power.” (Dodgen, pg 2) Commerce moved over the inland canal safe from marauding pirates on the coast. Troops were able to move to where they were needed to protect the country or for the dynasty to assert its control over China. The government could move tax levies from the wealthy south toward the capital to pay for the lavishness at court which typified the Ming Dynasty and for the defense of China on the frontier. The safe movement of commerce and troops upon which the dynasties depended meant the canal defended over-water transport from foreign sea-going pirates. This fact certainly qualifies the canal as a great naval achievement.

The other major Chinese naval feats had less of a completely “Chinese” character than did the building of the canal. The first of these feats was the formidable amphibious armada put together by the Kublai Khan, the grandson of Ghengis Khan. Kublai Khan realized the importance of naval transport to securing the coast and lines of communication in China. He built a fleet of 7000 ships and 120,000 men which served to crush the final remnants of the Song Dynasty. Rather than let this huge force stand idle or disintegrate, Kublai launched naval campaigns against Vietnam and Japan. He chose Japan because he had heard it would be an easy invasion. “Kublai Khan's interest in Japan was aroused in 1265 when Cho Yi, a Koryo courtesan, informed him that Japan could be subdued easily. In the following year, Kublai sent two emissaries He De and Yin Hong to Koryo and asked King Kojong to facilitate their entry to Japan.” (Rang)

The Japanese rebuffed these initial entreaties, which frustrated Khublai Khan. Over the next few years, he insisted with more and more urgency that Japan recognize and pay respects to his rule. Eventually, in early 1268, he sent a more urgent letter. The letter Khan sent was not exactly diplomatic: He demanded that the shogun in Japan recognize his authority and that there be no delay, lest there be a war. (Hishida, pg 64). The Japanese refused even to respond to this letter, which served to enrage Kublai. He rushed to assemble a fleet to invade and conquer.He ordered hundreds of sea going ocean junks build on the Song design which featured the revolutionary innovation of water-proof compartments. (Turnbull, Fighting Ships; pg 13)

Kublai’s naval feat was actually an amphibious operation. The huge fleet, full of battle hardened veterans, landed on the western-most main island of Japan, in Hakata Bay, which is now surrounded by Fukuoka City. The soldiers made landfall, and were met by the city’s garrison of samurai, who were arrayed in traditional garb, prepared to do battle in classical samurai style. The samurai’s style on one-on-one combat with edged weapons was terribly inadequate to the squad and platoon tactics the Mongols had perfected over years of conquest. The Mongols quickly overwhelmed the overmatched garrison, the remnants of whom retreated into the city’s defendable rampart. (Varney, pg 107) The Mongols, however, were unable to consolidate the victory. For reasons that are murky, the Mongols retreated after burning a temple and much of the city. Some argue that approaching weather caused the Mongols to withdraw. (Jackson, pg 159) Other sources argue that the Mongols ran of arrows, and withdrew and the tale of a divine wind was just after-the-fact Japanese mythologizing. (Turnbull, Ghengis Khan; pg 66) Another theory involves superstitious Korea troops threatening mutiny if the were not immediately withdrawn from the battle. The on-scene commanders sensed the possibility of losing control, and ordered a withdrawal. (Sansom, pg 440) Regardless of the reason, while back on the ships, a storm blew up, capsized some ships, dispersed others, and the remaining ships made for Korea, ending the threat. This storm, celebrated as the kamikaze (divine wind) in Japanese literature, and the dispersion of the Mongol fleet would be repeated in seven years. At that time, Khan would again attempt an invasion of Japan. (Smits)

The second invasion, in 1274, would feature an even larger invasion force, but a concomitantly larger, and better prepared defensive force. Khan intended his forces to conquer and settle Japan. The Japanese suspected that Khan would again press an invasion in the same place, Hakata Bay. So, in defense, the Japanese built a seven foot wall, facing the sea, around Hakata Bay. Khan envisioned two huge fleets coming together near an island off the coast of Japan, and massing for the final assault on Hakata Bay. The daunting logistical challenges inherent in this plan caused the invasion to commence out of sequence and to wither in the face of the strong Japanese defense. The Mongols were forced to a couple of small islands in the bay and the sides continued to skirmish for a couple of months. While the fleet was in the bay, another kamikaze typhoon arose and destroyed the fleet, ending the attempted invasion. (Turnbull, Ghengis Khan; pg 68) Though ultimately unsuccessful in conquering Japan, Kublai’s ability to mobilize these massive fleets even to attempt an invasion of Japan from sea, was a remarkable naval endeavor, unmatched by another Chinese fleet, until those raised by Zheng He in the early 15th century.

Zheng He was probably the only person in China who could have put together the huge fleets which went on the numerous voyages in pursuit of glory for emperor Zhu Di. However, there was little indication from his early upbringing that the future Ming admiral would become so skilled a mariner. Zheng He was from Yunnan province, a landlocked area in the southwest of China. When the Ming conquered Yunnan in 1381, Zheng He, then a 10 year old boy named Ma San Bao, was captured by the Ming and castrated to be made a servant of the Ming court. He quickly rose through the ranks because of his intelligence, political skills, organizational abilities, military prowess and trustworthiness. Because Zheng He was a eunuch, a Muslim and an outsider, he was not tainted as so many of the advisors of Zhu Di’s predecessor had been. Zheng He survived the purge attendant to the Yongle emperor’s accession to the throne and the future admiral did much to prove his loyalty to the new emperor. The Yongle emperor tapped him to organize a fleet of treasure ships ostensibly to extend the influence of China, but also rumored to be mission to find the disposed emperor who was said to have fled overseas. For such a mission, only the most trusted aide could be sent, and Zheng He was obviously such a man.
The fleet Zheng He was impressive, perhaps the largest wooden fleet to ever set sail. The seven voyages he is known to have completed are very impressive, stretching all the way to the east coast of Africa and as far north as points along the Red Sea and possibly to the northern reaches of Australia. He acquired much treasure and great fame for China, and spread legends of huge Chinese junks all over the Indian Ocean basin. (Levathes, pg 69-74)

The three major naval accomplishments of China; the major hydraulic engineering feat of the Great Canal, the massive Mongol amphibious raids on China, and the huge treasure fleets of the Ming Dynasty, represented very different fields of endeavor. Each required huge amounts of ingenuity, a large amount of man power, and great will on the part of the leadership. And while each accomplishment is “Chinese,” it is interesting that these things were, in turn, accomplished by one of the shortest lived Dynasties, a Mongol invader, and a Muslim Eunuch. What this observation says about the accomplishments is unclear, but it does illustrate the point that China is not a homogenous entity. Rather, China is a collection of quite disparate elements, each of which needs to be examined independently as well as in context, to glean the clearest picture of this huge nation.

WORKS CITED

Dodgen, Randall A. Controlling the Dragon: Confucian Engineers
and the Yellow River in Late Imperial China. (University of Hawaii Press: Honolulu) 2001.

Hishida, Seiji George. Japan as a Great Power. (Columbia
University Press: New York) 1905.

Jackson, Steve. Lucky Lady: The World War II Heroics of the USS
Santa Fe and Franklin. (Carrol and Graf Publishers: New York) 2003.

Levathes, Louise. When China Ruled the Seas. (Oxford University
Press: Oxford) 1994.

Rang, Lee Wha. “The Koryo-Mongol allied invasion of Japan: The
myth of kamikaze.” Association for Asia Research, (http://www.asianresearch.org/articles/2123.html) 6/9/2004.

Sansom, George. A History of Japan to 1334. (Stanford University
Press: Palo Alto, CA) 1958.

Smits, Gregory. Topics in Japanese Cultural History: Chapter
Five: The Rise of the Warriors and the "Age of Anxiety". (Web based book; Penn State) http://s118842024.onlinehome.us/textbooks/172/ch5.htm. Spring, 2006

Turnbull, Stephen. Fighting Ships of the Far East (1): China and
Southeast Asia 202 BC - AD 1419. (Osprey Publishing: Osceola, MN) 2002.

Turnbull, Stephen. Genghis Khan & the Mongol Conquests 1190 –
1400. (Osprey Publishing: Osceola, MN) 2002.

Varley, H Paul. Japanese Culture. (University of Hawaii Press:
Honolulu) 2000.

Xiong, Victor Cunrui. Emperor Yang of the Sui Dynasty: His Life,
Times, and Legacy. (State University of New York Press:
Albany) 2006.

Newly Bold, but still as stupid

Did you read the essay in Time by former Marine LtGen Newbold in which he claimed to be newly bold in standing up to demand Secretary Rumsfeld’s resignation? I have a couple of thoughts:

1. LtGen Newbold’s new boldness directly corresponds with polls that show the President’s low approval ratings. In this atmosphere, there is a lot more demand from the Bush and Rumsfeld-hating media for sour-grapes grousing from passed-over generals. Which leads me to point #2.

2. Who recommended Gen Pace over LtGen Newbold, Clinton appointee, for Vice Chief of Staff and later for Chairman of the Joint Chiefs? Answer: Rumsfeld. The reason for getting passed over for the fourth star and promotion probably has something to do with his mediocre and muddled thinking as exemplified by his lame “recommendations” contained in LtGen Newbold’s Time piece.

3. What is LtGen Newbold’s analysis for why we need a change in leadership at the Pentagon? In talking points that could have been ripped from the headlines of the Daily Kos, he says:

“the distortion of intelligence in the buildup to the war, McNamara-like micromanagement that kept our forces from having enough resources to do the job, the failure to retain and reconstitute the Iraqi military in time to help quell civil disorder, the initial denial that an insurgency was the heart of the opposition to occupation, alienation of allies who could have helped in a more robust way to rebuild Iraq, and the continuing failure of the other agencies of our government to commit assets to the same degree as the Defense Department. My sincere view is that the commitment of our forces to this fight was done with a casualness and swagger that are the special province of those who have never had to execute these missions--or bury the results.”

Do we still have to argue these tired points? Distorted intelligence, not enough resources, disbanding the Iraq army, French not onboard because of bad diplomacy, and the fact that State has not been as eager to rebuild as the Defense Department is. Even if any of these were anything more than lame distortions, where is Rumsfeld’s culpability in any of them? CIA and DIA provided their judgments regarding Iraq’s weapons which EVERYONE including some newly bold cashiered generals agreed with. We have fought two wars for 5 years and lost 500 troops a year, which is little higher than the military accidental death rate; where is the evidence of a lack of materiel readiness? Secretary Bremer disbanded the Iraq Army, and how can Rumsfeld be blamed that other parts of the government are not committing assets at the same level as the Defense Department? (And doesn’t this argument mean the Rumsfeld is doing comparatively better than the rest of government which gives the lie to LtGen Newbold’s earlier bleating about a lack of resources? “Shhhhh, don’t wake the General, he is strategizing.”) Oh, don’t forget the shot about chicken hawks who “never had to execute these missions--or bury the results.”

So does that mean the Generals would do better? Well, no. The highest levels of the military lack courage to speak their minds about a “flawed” plan, are “intimidated,” display “quiescence” and “acted timidly” in the face of Rumsfeld’s “casualness and swagger.” Heck, with this bunch of nellies as Generals, as Newbold describes himself and his cronies, Rumsfeld probably felt like he HAD to strut around and make bold decisions lest Newbold and the boys with the Stars curl up under their desks in the E-ring, trying not to wet themselves.

4. But, let’s cut LtGen Newbold a break, after all, Clinton’s generals are not analysts, they let the big brains like Kos and Nancy Pelosi do the thinking. No, Newbold is a man of action! So what does he propose to do in Iraq, once we get those bumbling losers out of the Pentagon and can make bold, correct decisions? As his name would imply, he has a plan: “We need fresh ideas and fresh faces. That means, as a first step, replacing Rumsfeld and many others unwilling to fundamentally change their approach.” Tell us, General, what should we change, what should we do? Well, sadly, LtGen Newbold displays the same timidity that characterized his service in the Pentagon: “a precipitous withdrawal would be a mistake.”

I join clear thinkers everywhere when I say: “huh?” Newbold asserts that the US needs to change leadership in the middle of the war but as justification for such an assertion can only cite Rumsfeld’s boldness in the face of timidity, strength in the face of General weakness, competence in the face of incompetence. And he wants to make this precipitous change in order to maintain the status quo.

All in all, not very compelling piece of generalship, although as an audition for lead military advisor to Olbermann or Maher, it will probably get his foot in the door.

What to do about Chechnya?

The Chechen Conflict offers a glimpse on a small scale, what the Global War on Terror is likely to resemble in a few years time, if the US insists on countering its terrorism problem as Russia has. Russia has adopted a no-negotiation policy with regards to the Chechen separatists. Russia regards the Chechens they are fighting as terrorist who need to be eradicated. However, Russia’s policy has been largely unsuccessful, even given that the Russian army has killed virtually all the indigenous Chechen leaders identified at the start of the conflict. More leaders have sprung up, and foreign Islamists have thrown in with the local Chechen resistance. The Russians have not shown the ability to destroy the Chechen forces, and the Chechens have shown no ability to do anything but strike back with terrorism against civilians, and small scale harassment attacks against the Russian forces on the ground. There is no sense of impending resolution on the battlefield, or any where else in this conflict.

The Mediator in the Chechen simulation succinctly distilled the conflict down to its essence; 1) the Russians have a veto in the UN, which forestalls that organization from serving as mediator. 2) The Russians and the Chechen cannot agree even on the type of conflict they are having, with the Russians seeing the war as a battle to prevent secession, and the Chechens fighting to prevent genocide. 3) Neither side can muster the power to defeat the other. And finally 4) neither side has a reason to end the conflict. The Mediator suggests that all this perhaps adds up to an impasse that the sides must address.

The Chechen conflict certainly looks like an impasse. Since 1994 Russia has attempted to quell the uprising in Chechnya but the justification for that action has changed. “If Yeltsin's war was purportedly about preserving the union, Putin's has now become about defending it -- against bandits, terrorists, and radical Islam.” (King) The conflict has mutated over the years but neither side has been able to establish control. The status quo is one of kidnappings on both sides, press censorship and reprisal killings. The conflict is now between a pro-Russia ruling clique against an Islamist resistance made up mostly of foreign fighters. After consulting the most recent stories about Chechnya of the pro-Russian Itar-TASS.com and the pro Chechen kavkazcenter.com, there are stories of military victories by their respective sides, but very little about gaining control. The Mediator’s assessment that Chechnya is at impasse seems prescient.

Mayer has a benign view of impasses, arguing that there are often good reasons for the parties to be in impasse, often because an impasse can serve the objective of one or both parties. Mayer calls these impasses which serve the needs of one or the other in a conflict “tactical impasses” and characterizes them in this way: “when disputants refuse to proceed with a resolution effort in an attempt to increase their negotiating power, to put pressure on others to make concessions, or to enhance their negotiating position in some way.” Mayer goes on to note that “tactical impasses usually result from a short-term calculation of costs and benefits and usually do not last very long.” (Mayer, pg 169) Given that the Chechen conflict is entering its 12th year, this impasse seems to have moved past the tactical into what Mayer calls the “genuine.”

“Genuine impasse occurs when people feel unable to move forward with a resolution process without sacrificing something important to them…Usually, disputants experience this kind of impasse as beyond their control, and feel they have no acceptable choice but to try to remain there.” (Mayer, pg 171) This quotation accurately describes what is happening in Chechnya. Charles King, in the September 24, 2004 issue of foreignaffairs.org calls the conflict “Russia's unwinnable war against Chechen secessionism.” The war may well be unwinnable, but it is also one that the Russian government, for reasons related to the oil trade, but largely for psychological reasons, cannot avoid. Boris Yeltsin, on a fishing trip to Norway, gave some insight into the Russian point of view: “Russia must not allow Chechnya to break away, nor can Russian authorities ‘negotiate with bandits.’” (Washington Times) Yeltsin asserts that Russia cannot allow secession of Chechnya, as if that is a self-evident proposition. Now, after 12 years of fighting, and a quarter of the Chechen population dead or having fled, Russia has too much invested, in terms of lives lost, and the Chechens have perpetrated too many atrocities to allow any negotiations, much less concessions. But on a deeper level than this strictly pragmatic consideration, Russian people are predisposed to resist the breakup or loss of any part of their territory they consider as part of Mother Russia. Chechnya is such a part. The Russian government cannot relinquish their hold on Chechnya.

The situation in Chechnya is a genuine impasse, and not a benign one. Sensing the intractability of this conflict, the participants in the recent simulation offered various means of breaking the stalemate, the majority of which revolved around calling in some external international body to mediate, intercede, or create some kind of buffer between the forces which would allow a cooling off period. After some time had passed, most participants advocated convening some kind of Truth and Reconciliation Commission to allow the airing of grievances with the hope that exposing the truth about atrocities on both sides would prevent reprisal violence.

This recommendation of truce, followed by peacekeeping, mediation and a TRC is much more likely to be successful in an environment without an active low intensity conflict (like South Africa) or where the dominant power in the conflict is willing to acquiesce to the process (like East Timor). Russia has shown zero willingness to “negotiate with bandits” as Yeltsin put it, or open the conflict to international news media, much less mediation groups. Further, Russia has the diplomatic power to prevent any international organization from imposing a settle, and Russia has the military means to resist any power from crossing its borders to force a truce.

The other disputant, Chechnya, has been infiltrated and radicalized by the presence of Islamic fundamentalists who are ideologically motivated to fight. These fundamentalists see the battle in Chechnya as one to defend their faith. They have no desire to negotiate because there is nothing that Russia can offer them that tops the heavenly rewards their faith offers them should they die in the battle. So, one disputant cannot concede land because to do so is a psychological impossibility while the other cannot concede because to do so would be a blasphemy.
One additional solution not mentioned in the simulation but suggested by the intractability on both sides is that one side or the other will give up through exhaustion. Both sides are apparently trying this solution. The Chechens have brought the war into Russian urban centers in the hope that the population of Russia will tire of the losses and demand Russian forces withdrawal from Chechnya. Russia has apparently embarked on a “scorched earth” policy of their own in Chechnya, outside the watch of the media. These tactics worked in the US Civil War and World War II, the theory goes, they may work in Chechnya. However, this hope for victory though exhaustion is illusory. The Chechens have access to unlimited capital through petrodollars controlled by sympathetic Islamic regimes, and virtually unlimited fanatical recruits who will flock to their banner. Russia has massive material advantage, and enough authoritarianism extant in their government to ignore popular discontent over the pursuit of the war. Exhaustion no longer has a place. “Wars are limited with exacting refinement to achieve very specific political objectives. In such a world, the strategy of exhaustion—a strategy that helped bring decisive victory in some of the most horrific conflicts mankind has ever seen—no longer has a place. Its provocative nature, the greater perceived benefits of peace, and the scaled-down nature of modern conflicts have all combined to bring about its obsolescence.” (Smith)

The critical factors in this conflict are the attitudes of those in the conflict. Negotiation, military defeat, and attrition are not effective weapons against ideologies. The only effective weapon against intractable ideologies is utter, unconditional surrender like in the US Civil War and World War II, or by having the more irrational elements of the ideology collapse in the face of moral suasion over time as happened to the anarchists at the turn of the century. As Smith pointed out, the era where one combatant can force an opponent into unconditional surrender has probably past. So, we are left with the idea that one or the other side in the Chechen conflict will experience an evolution in their ideology so that they are less confrontational, and more willing to reach past the impasse to craft a solution. Unfortunately, as the Islamists move toward the acquisition of nuclear weapons, combined with their enthusiasm for suicide missions, time is not something in abundance. The world may be compelled by necessity to return to a concept though to be passé: forcing surrender conditions onto an abjectly defeated enemy.
Sources cited

King, Charles. “Crisis in the Caucasus: A New Look at Russia's
Chechen Impasse.” Foreign Affairs Magazine; March/April 2003.

Mayer, Bernard. Dynamics of Conflict Resolution. Jossey Bass
(San Francisco); 2000.

Smith, Lawrence M. “Rise and Fall of the Strategy of
Exhaustion”. Army Logistician Magazine; November/December
2004.

Washington Times. “UPI Hears…” 19 August 2004.