What is counter-insurgency?

Sam Sarkesian, in his book, Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare lamented the confusion and lack of agreement about basic terminology in the study of “revolutionary guerrilla warfare. “Revolutionary war, civil war, internal war, insurgency, resistance movements, guerrilla war, wars of national liberation, stability operations, internal defense, counter-insurgency - these are but a few examples of the proliferating terminology.”1  Sarkesian went on to point out that in studying the topic, scholars must remain conscious of the differences among the terms “definitions, concepts, model building and theories.”2  Given that the topic is large and confusing, it can nonetheless be approached as one might eat an elephant, one bite at a time. Therefore, let us examine the concept of insurgency and counter-insurgency, and examine their relative attributes in order to compare their characteristics.

The root of the English word insurgency is the Latin “insurgo”, a verb meaning “to rise up.” The Elementary Latin Dictionary quotes a line from Ovid: “Caesar paulatim insurgere” or Caesar rose to power.”3  The quotation highlights the neutral connotation in the Latin root of a political action in contrast with the current English usage4 that implies violence. Interestingly, the fourth principle part of the verb is “insurrectus,” from which it is clear that the English word “insurrection” arises. A current United States military doctrinal publication defines insurgency as “an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control.”5  Thomas Marks fit this definition within the framework of the levels of military operations. "Insurgency is violence in support, strategically, of a political goal, operationally, of a political infrastructure, tactically, of local political domination.”6  Wray Johnson made the point that by the 1930’s, theorists in the Marine Corps had noted that insurrectionists seem to have a political goal the pursuit of which must be countered in novel ways. “This is a remarkable statement for an American military organization, with its emphasis on non-military solutions, to what had hitherto been viewed as exclusively a military problem.”7  Thus, we see a clear lineage of the term “insurgency” from its roots as a political term in the Latin to its consensus usage as a primarily political struggle between an authority and a challenger that features violence as one of the tools in the struggle.

Insurgencies contain a trap for leaders attempting to create a counter-insurgency strategy. Since the most visible features of insurgencies, especially the current generation insurgencies in the Middle East, Africa and Thailand, are brutal, nihilistic attacks on soft civilian targets, the natural reaction of authorities to such atrocities is to send troops to find and exact vengeance on the perpetrators. It is tempting for a government to respond with force against force, not only because the government views such a response as an effective counter-measure, but also because internal politics among the government’s supporters demands such a response. Although not exactly analogous, one calls to mind President Bush standing on the rubble of the World Trade Center rallying the workers there to rousing cheers by assuring them that the ones responsible for this would be hearing from America. The trouble with reprisal as the primary response to atrocity is that it is counter-productive. History has shown that unless the government is willing to exterminate everyone associated with an insurgency, including innocents, an insurgency is not diminished, but in fact grows. Insurgents convince their supporters that their shared grievances are political, economic or religious, and that their grievances are being ignored or actively thwarted by the government. Hence, reprisals serve to reinforce the idea implanted by the insurgents in the minds of the people that the government wants to attack rather than help.

To counter an insurgency, policy makers must adopt a multi-pronged response. The perpetrators of violence against civilians must be hunted down and destroyed but to the extent possible, with measured application of force. In general terms, armed insurgents must be countered with the minimum effective force of arms with the key being “effective. Not to respond is to encourage more attacks that will grow in severity in an effort to provoke a disproportionate response that the insurgency can exploit for propaganda purposes. In the words of the Small Wars Manual: “Delay in the use of force, and hesitation to accept responsibility for its employment when the situation clearly demands it, will always be interpreted as a weakness.”8

Additionally, the insurgent’s political claims must be countered with all other means. Counter-insurgency must provide peaceful political opportunities, bountiful economic opportunities, and display respect for indigenous cultures. The Small Wars Manual said it best: “Every means should be employed to convince such people of the altruistic intention of our Government.”9  An observer of the current situation in Iraq echoed the prescription offered in the Small Wars Manual: “Sustaining a commitment to allocating sufficient economic and political resources to get the job done will not be easy. It will require the indefinite presence of American advisers, political pressure, and persistence.”10   LtGen Odierno detailed the concrete economic steps that US forces have taken to show the Iraqis that the US has learned the lessons of the Small Wars Manual and is prepared to sustain the economic commitment: [Effective counterinsurgency] also requires the delivery of essential services, economic development and improved governance. It is what the Iraqi people want and what they deserve. In this regard, we are vigorously pursuing several programs to sustain our momentum, like establishment of a civil service corps, awarding microgrants and developing vocational technical courses.”11  While the ultimate success of the counter-insurgency in Iraq is still in question, it is clear that the counter-insurgency strategists are enacting policies first identified in the 1940’s.

Analysts of the type of conflicts known as “small wars” or “revolutionary guerrilla warfare” or “insurgencies” concur that the conflicts share a defining and common characteristic. This common characteristic is the political contest that underpins the conflict. Effective counter insurgency engages the insurgency where the insurgents are, in the economic and political realm, only replying to violence in a measured way. Ineffective counterinsurgency focuses on the secondary battlefield where the kinetic fight is and ignores or downplays the political and economic dimension. Therefore, the question must be answered, in terms of insurgency and counter-insurgency, is one the flip side of the other? In the strict definitions of the terms, the answer is yes. Anything the government does to resist the insurgency is a “counter-insurgency” until all areas are “white,” in Malay Emergency terms, or until the insurgency triumphs. The more pertinent question is, given the primacy of the political and economic components of an insurgency, what constitutes an effective counter-insurgency? The real contest is one of ideas about governance and about whom can best provide opportunities for the people. Effective counterinsurgency offers better ideas and opportunities under difficult and dangerous conditions.

Notes:
1. Sarkesian, Sam Charles. Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare (Chicago: Precedent Publishing) 1975. Pg 4.
2. Ibid. Pg 19.
3. Lewis, Thomas Charlton and Hugh McMaster Kingery. An Elementary Latin Dictionary (New York: American Book Company) 1918. Pg 429.
4. Webster’s Online Dictionary. “Insurgency” at http://www.websters-dictionary-online.net/definition/insurgency accessed 16 January 2008.
5. Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency (Washington: United States Marine Corps) 15 December 2006. Paragraph 1-2.
6. Marks, Thomas. Maoist Insurgency Since Vietnam (London: Frank Cass) 2003. Pg 4.
7. Johnson, Wray. Vietnam and the American Doctrine for Small Wars (Bangkok: White Lotus Press) 2001. Pg 21.
8. United States Marine Corps Publications Small Wars Manual (Washington: United States Government) 1940. Pg 27.
9. Ibid. Pg 23.
10. Siperco, Ian. “Subversive Markets: The Economic Roots of the Iraq Insurgency” Royal United Services Institute Defence and Security Studies Website at http://rusi.org/research/studies/transatlantic/commentary/ref:C46AF3A8D53542/ accessed 18 January 2008. Pg 8.
11. Odierno, LtGen Raymond T. “DoD News Briefing with Lt. Gen. Odierno from Iraq” US Department of Defense News Transcript at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4122 accessed 17 January 2008.

Bibliography:
Johnson, Wray. Vietnam and the American Doctrine for Small Wars (Bangkok: White Lotus
Press) 2001
Lewis, Thomas Charlton and Hugh McMaster Kingery. An Elementary Latin Dictionary (New
York: American Book Company) 1918
Marine Corps Publication.Small Wars Manual (Washington: United States Government) 1940.
Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency (Washington: United States
Marine Corps) 15 December 2006
Marks, Thomas. Maoist Insurgency Since Vietnam (London: Frank Cass) 2003
Odierno, LtGen Raymond T. “DoD News Briefing with Lt. Gen. Odierno from Iraq” US
Department of Defense News Transcript at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4122
Sarkesian, Sam Charles. Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare (Chicago: Precedent Publishing) 1975.
Siperco, Ian. “Subversive Markets: The Economic Roots of the Iraq Insurgency” Royal United
Services Institute Defence and Security Studies Website, 2007 at
http://rusi.org/research/studies/transatlantic/commentary/ref:C46AF3A8D53542/ accessed 18 January 2008
Webster’s Online Dictionary. “Insurgency” at http://www.websters-dictionary-
online.net/definition/insurgency accessed 16 January 2008.