So what is going on in Taiwan

Taiwan just held an election in which the more or less pro Independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and their standard bearer Chen Shui Bien who had been elected president in 2000 was defeated by the Kuomintang (KMT) or “Chinese Nationalist Party.” The Chinese Communists hate Chen because of his pro-independence beliefs. The Communists were happy to see the Ma Ying Jeou and CMT take Chen’s place. The CMT were defeated by the Communists back during the Chinese Civil War but they never lost their affinity for relations with China. China has always seen the CMT as more conciliatory and more likely to bring Taiwan “back” to China.

Given the poor state of the Taiwan economy and Chen’s lack of diplomatic success, Ma was heavily favored to win the election. However, even though Ma won a landside, the size of his victory did not match polling predictions. In the immediate run up to the election, China cracked down on Tibet, and many Taiwanese voters saw what was playing out in Tibet as a glimpse into their own future if Taiwan were ruled by China. Many independent voters who might otherwise sided with Ma to send out the DPP changed their minds at the last minute, wary of what China intends for Taiwan.

This is actually a very dangerous time in China. Tibet chose this moment to assert their nationalism since if ever the Red Army would be restrained it is in Tibet, immediately before the Olympics. If other restive provinces decide to press their dissatisfaction with the 300 million unemployed, vast income disparity, heavy handed and incompetent regulation of the economy, China will be faced with a dilemma. Crack down violently to maintain their control or risk being seen to lose the Mandate of Heaven. If China does crack down on these protestors with a substantial loss of life, there is a good chance that many countries will pull out of the Olympics, causing a loss of face that might in itself hasten the end of the dynasty. Then, the cycle will only worsen. Chinese communists will be all the more angry and fearful at what losing face and power would mean to them personally (thing Ceausescu and Mussolini) and all the more likely to take brutal reprisal. No one holds a civil war like the Chinese and the potential loss of life there could be staggering. A minor uprising prior to the Boxer Rebellion in western China killed 800,000. A minor rebellion. Something major like an uprising to depose the Communists would get very ugly. Do not expect them to fade away the Gorby and the boys in the Soviet Union.

Test driving a new slogan for Barack Hussein Obama rallies

Hey, hey, hey Barack
Stab another ally in the back

He is going to go over great with the military.  He will have to fire a dozen Generals before he finds one disloyal enough to the US to enact his policies.  In fact, he is probably going to have to bring back that grasping Gen McPeak to surrender to the Moslems.

Losing is for Losers, Loser!

Lance Lawson Theme Song

La – ance Lawson
La – ance Law – aw – son!
He monitors all police scanner channels
But he only needs four panels
To solve cri – ime, ime, ime – imes.....
That BAFFLE! (Big blast of trumpets here)

This is the theme song that goes through my head on Thursday afternoons. I am more of a librettist than composer as you might be able to tell. I think the melody for the first couple of lines is the opening bars of the Dragnet theme, then it becomes kind of brassy jazz tune.

Lessons from Tet

Bergerud argues that the tactical or operational success of the American military was irrelevant to winning or losing the war in Vietnam. He closes his book with the sweeping statement that the United States lost because the generals “underestimated dealing with enemy forces,” and because civilian leadership underestimated the enemy, and overestimated American’s stomach for the fight. Bergerud’s message is that America lost because there was no way for America to win the Vietnam War: “In short, American leaders, both civilian and military, committed a strategic blunder that has brought many a general to grief: They chose the wrong battlefield.” 1 Bergerud describes the ordinary US soldier and Marine infantryman who carried the fight as proficient, able and deadly. The author’s example was the25th Division. “Yet the evidence indicates that most combat units of the 25th Division retained a high degree of skill and cohesion until the end.” 2 To the extent that there were units that lacked skill and cohesion, the blame lay not with race relations, or drugs or officer and NCO leadership, but with the strategic: politics back home. “The biggest problem facing combat morale dealt not with pathologies but with politics…Every soldier knew that Nixon was withdrawing the troops. Most American combat soldiers assumed that this meant that the United States was selling out South Vietnam.” 3 Bergerud makes the case that defeat was inevitable because of strategic errors but this case is based to faulty assumptions.

Bergerud’s analysis is akin to drawing a straight line back from the ultimate defeat in 1975 to the entry of the United States in the early 60s, and interpreting every victory or good decision and every set-back or bad decision in relation to that downward trajectory towards ultimate defeat. The NLF was ruthlessly violent: this ensured discipline and solidarity in the villages and undermined US resolve. The US and GVN were ruthlessly violent attacking the popular front: however, this policy was alienating and off-putting in the villages, and steeled the hearts of the NLF. Communist instuted land reform was well implemented and convinced the peasants to support the NLF. The government of South Vietnam instituted land reform that failed to convince the peasants to support the Government. Smashing defeats of the VC in Cambodia and during the Tet Offensive were actually not that bad for the North Vietnamese, while the victories won by the US forces and the ARVN where chimerical. This analysis is hard to refute because the author starts with the premise the defeat of America was inevitable and uses the defeat as evidence of the validity of his premise. He explains away the tactical successes of US troops as being in spite of the strategic blunders, poor quality rear-area soldiers and an antagonistic civilian populace. Any strategy, development or action that would refute his premise can be waved aside as “doomed” or “not enough.”

Interestingly, Bergerud may well be correct in his analysis. Perhaps the United States would have lost Vietnam even with inspired intuitive generalship and even if the South Vietnamese government had proven to be a stalwart and respected ally. However, it seems that the author’s assessment that defeat was inevitable rests on two shaky pillars. One shaky pillar is that had the US launched a conventional attack into North Vietnam, this would have provoked the Chinese or the Russians into some kind of response that would have led to a wider war. It is telling that “not even the most ambitious contingency plans advocated an all out invasion of the DRV” but Beregud never answers the question, “why not?” 4 The author sees no reason to answer this question since the answer is an article of faith.

Not every observer saw the Communists this way. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, although in retrospect, thought the Soviets were not interested in directly confronting the US. “I offer what follows somewhat as conjecture, but with a measure of conviction. The Soviet Union never intended to invade Western Europe, or generally speaking, engage in a third World War with the West. The leaders in Moscow were, for a while there at least, Marxist-Leninists. That doctrine decreed that class revolution would come regardless.” 5 In a similar analysis, it seems unlikely that in the mid-Sixties, the Chinese would have be willing to, or much able to reinforce North Vietnam had the US launched a conventional invasion of North Vietnam. China was reeling from the effects of the disastrous “Great Leap Forward” and suffered from internal political maneuvering that threatened a civil war or coup. Further, Mao had a history of provoking the US with bluster for his own internal political reasons, without being willing to act on the bluster. One example to illustrate this point occurred during the shelling of Quemoy and Matsu. Rather than launch an attack across the Taiwan Strait that would have provoked the US, Mao preferred to play games by shelling islands near-by the coast of China that were in the hands of the Chinese nationalists: “the islands are two batons that keep Khrushchev and Eisenhower dancing, scurrying this way and that. Don’t you see how wonderful they are!” 6

Western intelligence analysis of Communist intentions, “Kremlinology,” was little better than guesswork piled on faulty assumptions. The feckless nonsense that passed for insight into Communist intentions that was proffered by Western “Kremlinologists” would have been humorous had not leaders in the West made such important decisions based on this “intelligence.” The West essentially had no clue what the Soviets or the Chinese would do in response to any particular stimulus. This was a “fundamental failure at the intelligence level. For instance, a commentator noted that it ‘beggars incredulity’ that the CIA “had no idea that that the Soviet Union was on the verge of radical change after spending 50 percent of its budget on Soviet analysis.” 7 Based on CIA guesstimates, the civilian leadership in the US assumed that attacking the NVA center of gravity in the North would have lead to a counter-attack by China, and this was not something anyone in the US was willing to consider. Hence, the US focused on the doomed counter-insurgency fight that contemporary observers could tell was not effective. The US strategy of fighting the war in the South even though their real enemy was in the North is reminiscent of the joke about the drunk who insists on looking under the streetlight for the wallet he lost in the alley “because the light is better out here.”

That being said, a successful counter-insurgency does not necessarily need the “correct strategy” at the highest levels. Therein lies Bergerud’s second shaky pillar. The Philippine Army conducted a successful counter-insurgency roughly as the same time as the Vietnam War, even though the Philippine’s civilian leadership and the Army was every bit as corrupt and incompetent as their South Vietnamese counterparts. Thomas Marks notes “as the efficiency and legitimacy of the Marcos regime declined, there was a commensurate increase in the extent to which armed force, as represented by the 70-odd, individual military battalions, became the crucial foundation upon which the government survival depended. This proved significant, because in the absence of any other viable government presence, it was the battalions which became, like so many warlords, the rulers of their domains.” 8 Bergerud makes the case that the military remained effective in Vietnam at the Battalion level and below, so it can then be asserted that a hands-off policy with regards to Battalion operations in Vietnam may well have succeeded to the same extent that such a policy worked in Vietnam. No two historical analogies are perfect, and there are many differences between the Vietnam War and the Philippine Counter-insurgency. Most notable of the differences relates to what may be the immutable law of the counter-insurgency fight. A successful counter-insurgency need time to fight onto victory once they discover what works. In the Philippines, the government forces had the luxury of time, since they had no place else to go. In Vietnam, the clock had been ticking since the first combat deaths and by the Tet Offensive, the time had run out. No victory, no matter how definitive or apparent at the time would have mattered unless it was clear to the American public that troops were literally on the march to total victory. In Vietnam, the American public certainly did not have this perception.

So, perhaps the defeat in Vietnam was not as inevitable as Bergerud describes it. However, American Intelligence did not have ability to discern Communist intentions, the American Military did strike at the real center of gravity in a conventional sense, nor did they hit upon the right counter-insurgency strategy with enough time left on the clock of American public opinion: therein lie the dynamics of defeat.

Sources:

1. Bergerud, Eric M. The Dynamics of Defeat (Boulder: Westview Press) 1991. Pg 335.
2. Ibid., pg 290.
3. Ibid., pg 291.
4. Ibid., pg 331.
5. Moynihan, Daniel Patrick. Congressional Record, Senate - 1 May 1997. Page: S3891.
6. Zubok, Vladislav Martinovich and Konstantin Pleshakov. Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press) 1996. Pg 226.
7. Perry, Mark. Last Days of the CIA (New York: William Morrow) 1992, pg 308 quoted in Ofira Seliktar; Politics, Paradigms, And Intelligence Failures: Why So Few Predicted the Collapse of the Soviet Union (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharp) pg 4.
8. Marks, Thomas. Maoist Insurgency Since Vietnam (London: Frank Cass) 2003, pg 125.

Protecting the oldest tree in the world -OR- Buddhists v. Monkeys

The oldest documented tree, and the most sacred tree in Buddhism is under guard in Anuradhapura, Sri Lanka. The tree is thought to be 2300 years old, and grew up from a shoot taken from the Bohdi tree that sheltered the Buddha as he attained enlightenment. The shoot was replanted in the spot where it now grows by a Sri Lankan princess. (Fraser) Twenty-three years ago, in 1985, Islamic LTTE guerrillas attacked the monastery where the tree is located, and killed three monks, 25 worshippers and 117 pilgrims. The goal of the attack was to destroy the tree seen as a symbol of both the Sri Lanka government and of Buddhism itself. Now, the threat to the tree is not from terrorists, but from monkeys that are raiding the tree for fruit and leaves. (AFP)

The raids by the monkeys put the monks at the temple into a quandary. The monks, because of their vows, are forbidden to hurt the monkeys who are destroying the tree, but non-injurious attempts to drive away the monkeys have been completely unsuccessful. However, if the monks continue to be unsuccessful, the tree will die. The monks have tried clanging bells, bursting firecrackers and flashing lights at the monkeys, but are not looking for some kind of technological solution to non-violently drive away the monkeys and protect their sacred tree.

The tree itself has been featured in English literature for more that 120 years. Even HG Wells published an account of the tree in 1922. His description is remarkably close to the condition of the tree in the present day. “It has been carefully tended and watered; its great branches are supported by pillars and the earth has been terraced up about it so that it has been able to put out fresh roots continually.” (Wells, pg 434) Another earlier observer, James Ricalton in 1891, also described the tree in terms that are very familiar today. “The several divisions of this tree are feeble, gnarled, and bent; the leaves lack the fresh verdancy of a vigorous growth, and plainly show the yellowish pallor of decrepitude.” (Ricalton, quoted in Fraser) Nowadays, the tree is surrounded by gold plated fencing, and is guarded around the clock by an army of well wishers, monks and Sri Lankan soldiers. “The tree already arguably has the tightest security in Sri Lanka.” (AFP) People continue to scramble for leaves, just as they have done for thousands of years. The monks want to keep the tradition alive, whether in the face of terrorists or monkeys.

This tree is significant because it highlights the Buddhist commitment to non-violence, but it is similar to the Afghanistan buddhas in that the Muslim terrorists would be happy to destroy the tree, absent the extraordinary security precautions.

Sources

AFP. “Monks battle monkeys to save Buddhism's holiest tree” 26 February 2008 at http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5j12FKz3DWqsfmADUQ7DH7NwkiO9w accessed 27 February 2008.

Fraser, Anna. “Buddha and the Bodhi tree” The Tree.org.uk (no date) at http://www.the-tree.org.uk/Sacred%20Grove/Buddhism/bodhi4.htm accessed 27 February 2008.

Well, H.G. The Outline of History: Being a Plain History of Life and Mankind (New York: Review of Reviews Company) 1922.

Similarities among insurgencies

What is remarkable about various insurgencies is how similar they all sound. A weak central government loses the ability to effectively assert its authority in rural areas. Long pent up grievances held by farmers are exploited by insurgents who have moved into the power vacuum left by the receding power of the central government. In Vietnam, the South Vietnamese government never addressed perceived and real agrarian inequalities, and the North effectively exploited those grievances. Other countries that have faced a discontent by rural peasants found that real land reform effectively forestalled insurgency. Taiwan, Bolivia and parts of India have instituted land reform that has done much to undermine insurgencies. However, successful land reform is difficult since landowners who must give up their land also provide the capital and taxes that any government needs to stay in power. Consequently, governments facing a crisis that has sprung from agrarian inequalities must negotiate carefully. There is a real tension between the need to distribute land equitably to aggrieved peasants and the interests of entrenched landowners loathe to surrender their title to lands. Skilled, successful and relatively uncorrupt governments can do it, Diem was none of these things. Not surprisingly, he failed.

Mao and his disciples have sought to exploit rural discontent. Communist ideology appeals to landless, disenfranchised peasants because it seems to offer a chance to retain their claim to the land. Skilled Maoist propagandists exploit these desires to gain a foothold among villagers. These insurgents can swim among the “fishes” of the local people, always present, enforcing discipline, but relatively invisible to government forces. Then, these Maoist true believers use ruthless tactics to maintain discipline, and to thwart attempts by the government to counter their influence.

The North shrewdly recognized the dynamics of the government of the South that replaced the French colonialists. The political and economic environment had not changed, so it was likely that the tactics that prevailed against the French would work against the Diem government. This assessment was correct.

Devotion to Buddhist Enlightenment?

One day, while the Buddha was meditating, a monk, Malunkyaputta, came to the Buddha to ask what might be called “eternal questions.” Among the questions the monk asked were: Is the cosmos eternal or not? What is the nature of the soul? What is the nature of the Buddha? The Buddha dismissed these questions as questions upon which he had not commented. Buddha then gave his reasons for his silence: "And why are they [the answers to your questions] undisclosed by me? Because they are not connected with the goal, are not fundamental to the holy life. They do not lead to disenchantment, dispassion, cessation, calming, direct knowledge, self-awakening, Unbinding. That's why they are undisclosed by me.” 1 Buddha also related a parable about a man who was struck by a poison arrow, and spent his last moments asking for information about who had shot him. What was the man’s profession? What clan did he come from? What were his physical characteristics? What was the arrow made of? What were the feathers on the arrow made of? Even as the man was asking his questions, he died without ever getting the answers he sought. 2

I will examine why Buddha remained silent to Malunkyaputta’s questions, and the Buddha’s belief in the foolishness inherent in irrelevant spiritual pursuits. Then, the paper will examine some similarities in the Buddha’s focus on the Way that can be found in other religious traditions. Later, I will examine Buddha’s goal for his followers, then a look at how the current human condition, given the similarities in religious traditions, can benefit from Buddha’s goal.

Why no answers?

Why the Buddha would have not have answered Malunkyaputta’s questions, the total number of which is given as ten 3 or fourteen 4 depending on the translation and whether longer questions are actually broken into more shorter questions, is a popular question among students of Buddhism. These questioners look for a deeper reason than the one that the Buddha himself gave. There are four general theories to explain the silence of the Buddha in the face of these universally pondered inquiries from Malunkyaputta. One theory is that the Buddha was silent because he was only interested in practical matters, and had no time to ponder imponderables. Another theory is that Buddha simply did not know the answers. Malunkyaputta, the monk of the parable, seemed to think this was the reason for the Buddha’s silence. 5 Malunkyaputta, exasperated, said to the Buddha: “But if he doesn't know or see whether the cosmos is eternal or not eternal, then, in one who is unknowing & unseeing, the straightforward thing is to admit, 'I don't know. I don't see.'” 6 The monk then repeated this accusation. He seemed clearly perturbed that the Buddha would not answer, although, in fairness, Malunkyaputta eventually went away satisfied. The final words of the parable are: “That is what the Blessed One said. Gratified, Ven. Malunkyaputta delighted in the Blessed One's words.” 7

Still another theory for the Buddha’s silence is that the Buddha did know the answers to the questions asked, but his listeners did not possess the vocabulary and comprehension to understand the explanation should he give one. Therefore, the Buddha never bothered to speak the things that he knew. A final theory is that the Buddha would not answer the question because the monk’s act of asking such a question was evidence that the questioner was still striving and grasping, and the Buddha would not be a party to such actions. 8

Ultimately, the most compelling justification for the Buddha’s silence is the one given by the Buddha himself. The Buddha would only speak if he had something of import to pass to his listeners. There was nothing hidden in the silence, because there was nothing in the silence worth knowing. The Buddha only said exactly what he meant, and he meant everything that he said. Nothing else was of any importance. “And why are they disclosed by me? Because they are connected with the goal, are fundamental to the holy life. They lead to disenchantment, dispassion, cessation, calming, direct knowledge, self-awakening, Unbinding. That's why they are disclosed by me.” 9

Foolishness of irrelevant spiritual pursuits

The questions asked by the poisoned man in the parable were entirely irrelevant to finding a cure for his poison, or finding a cessation of the suffering the man was feeling, but he persisted in the questions, nonetheless. Asking these questions was the embodiment of foolishness. Squandering one’s last moments in the quest for answers to unanswerable and in fact pointless questions is the opposite of wisdom. Speculating about the “eternal questions” is a fool’s errand because there are no definitive answers offered to mortals although there is plenty of conjecture. As one commentator remarked, “in the final analysis, such speculation remains a matter of belief or opinion, for in this life these questions cannot be settled with any certainty. Furthermore, seeking answers to unanswerable questions diverts precious time and energy away from the real of heart of spirituality: the quest of wisdom and compassion. To be wise and compassionate does not require that we settle the many metaphysical questions we might pose.” 10

Similarities of the Buddha’s Way found in other religious traditions

Other religious traditions share the Buddha’s disdain for seeking answers to these large questions. Paul Tillich, a Christian theologian made the point that spirituality requires that a man must put aside that which he considers wisdom, and seek holiness as does a child. Tillich’s idea is that man will be unsuccessful in trying to discern the answers to large questions but must ask those questions in order to be prepared to recognize that the path to fulfillment is paradoxically in not finding the answers. The path is one in which the mind accepts that reason will not provide the answers that the brain can craft. Tillich called this paradox the “divine foolishness.” “This certainly is ecstatic and paradoxical, and it should not be brought down to the level of a divine-human chemistry. But it should be understood and experienced as an expression of the divine foolishness that is the source of wisdom and the power of maturity. “ 11 Tillich here was recapitulating an idea first offered by Paul in his First Letter to the Corinthians: " Let no man deceive himself. If any man among you seemeth to be wise in this world, let him become a fool, that he may be wise.” 12

Another religious tradition expresses sentiments similar to those of the Buddha. Taoism, based on the Tao Te Ching by Lao Tzu includes many verses that make it seem like the writer was not interested in delving into the nature of that which cannot be observed or commenting too explicitly on these matters. Instead, the Tao, which literally means, “the Way,” was designed to provide guidance to those who would live the right way in this world. At the earliest period of Taoism, the practitioners were primarily interested in living the right way to the exclusion of other considerations. “If the essential defining characteristic in the diachronic analysis of an early Taoist tradition is that its members all practiced the ‘techniques of the Way’ – a term that encompasses apophatic inner cultivation aimed at a mystical realization of the Way and its integration into everyday life.” 13

The Tao offers practical advice to help keep those who seek the way on the right path. The Tao contains guidance that those who know the answers need not speak them. In chapter 34 it says: There is something mysterious and whole which existed before heaven and earth, silent, formless, complete, and never changing. Living eternally everywhere in perfection, it is the mother of all things. I do not know its name; I call it the Way. If forced to define it, I shall call it supreme.” 14 Later, in chapter 56, Lao Tzu offers the observation that “Those who know, do not speak. Those who speak, do not know. Close the mouth; shut the doors. Smooth the sharpness; untie the tangles. Dim the glare; calm the turmoil. This is mystical unity.” 15 The Tao advises silence when one knows, much as Buddha remained silent regarding the questions that were asked. Just as Buddha remained silent to focus on the more important work of finding the right path to enlightenment, so to do the believers in the Tao focus mainly on the path rather than a higher philosophy. The final stanza of the Tao sounds very familiar to the ear of students of Buddhism: “The Way of heaven sharpens but does no harm. The Way of the wise accomplishes without striving.” 16

The Buddha’s goal

Rather than answering the questions that did not have answers, the Buddha was more interested in the practical. He was interested, as was Lao Tzu, in leading those who would listen along the Way to enlightenment. The Buddha knew that the way to the cessation of suffering is difficult. Another giver of Truth, Jesus, described the quest along the way with these words: “For the gate is narrow and the way is hard that leads to life, and those who find it are few.” 17 However, since the way was hard, and the showing others the path to the cessation of suffering, the Buddha knew that his followers had to husband their reservoirs of power. There was literally nothing that the Buddha could do for his followers except give them a roadmap along the “hard way,” whether those followers would make it to Nirvana was up to those who would follow the Way. “The Buddha has clearly stated that no one can do any thing for another for salvation except show the way. Therefore we must not depend on god and not even depend on the Buddha. We must know what are the qualities, duties, and responsibilities of being a human being. He said that if we have committed certain bad karma, we should nor waste precious energy by being frustrated or disappointed in our effort to put it right. 18

Mark Muess argues that Buddhism’s emphasis on finding relief from suffering, indifference to eternal questions and practical advice for living in a world full of strife and discord make Buddhism particularly relevant for modern society. It also allows one to find a way to put into practice beliefs one might hold from other religious traditions. Buddhism also allows one to find accommodation with whom one does not share political beliefs. “Buddhist spirituality is imminently practical. It provides discipline for the mind and the body, for treating others and oneself. It does not merely say, "Love others"; it shows us how to love others. It does not merely say, "Be wise"; it shows us how we may become wise. Because it is practical rather than theoretical, it may be compatible with other religious perspectives. It does not seek the repudiation of other spiritual and philosophical viewpoints.” 19

Relevance to current human condition

Conserving one’s energy to continue the quest for Enlightenment remains extremely relevant in the current time. The earth’s population is higher than it has ever been, while the proportion of those living in poverty and hunger seems to have stabilized. Nonetheless, in absolute terms, there are more miserable people now living than there have ever been. 20 There are more people with AIDS, there are more people without clean drinking water and there are more people displaced by war than ever previously. In absolute terms, there has never been are more urgent need for guidance in finding a way to relieve the suffering in the world.

Buddhism has particular relevance in this regard. Buddhism offers an escape from suffering, whatever the cause, and whatever beliefs the seeker has prior to following the Eightfold Path. Even though the Buddha revealed what he revealed thousands of years ago, what he revealed still has value for us today. “From the Buddhist perspective I think the analysis that the Buddha offered in his Four Noble Truths still remains perfectly valid. Not only does it need not the least revision or reinterpretation, but the course of twenty-five centuries of world history and the present-day human situation only underscores its astuteness and relevance.” 21

Clearly, Buddhism retains its relevance because human suffering has not changed even as the Four Noble Truths have not changed. Those not paying attention might conclude that with a world full of conveniences and technology, that human suffering should be on its way out. However, there is little practical evidence that human suffering is in retreat. That is because the nature of human suffering remains the same as when the Buddha first diagnosed the cause. The origin of suffering is attachment. Thomas Knierim neatly summarizes in modern English what suffering is. “The reasons for suffering are desire, passion, ardour, pursuit of wealth and prestige, striving for fame and popularity, or in short: craving and clinging.” 22 Knierim’s summary applies to people throughout history, but given the magnitude of wealth that is available in the world, and the magnitude of people in the world who do not have any real access to wealth but have only that brutal longing, there has probably never been an epoch more in need of a way to end suffering. This realization in itself makes Buddhism relevant.

Given that there is so much suffering in the world, and there is such a clear need for Buddhist principles, is it likely that Buddhism will be the answer to the suffering in the world? Is there a possibility that populations that have not been willing to or who have not had the opportunity to embrace Buddhism actually do so? Religious traditions in other cultures around the world have similar goals to that of the Buddha. Other religious traditions even use similar language in pursuing the way. There seem to be so many similarities in the approach to alleviate suffering in the world and in the desired end-state to make the time seem ripe for Buddhism to have a world-wide influence. One observer of Buddhism thinks that it is possible for Buddhism to have such an influence if it makes some minor changes and does more to proselytize. “I think

Buddhism will have to change itself somewhat, and there is no doubt about it. Still the main reason why Buddhism does not have many converts is because Buddhism has never emphasized too much on conversion. There are many who follow their own religion and follow Buddhist precepts. Even Dalai Lama maintains, one should not change his religion. Therefore it is not like pouring water on sand, rather Buddhism is not interested in sowing individual trees at all.” 23
The Ven. Bhikkhu Bodhi agrees that Buddhism has much to teach both East and West, and both sides have a responsibility to reach out to one another to ensure the benefits are transferred from one to another. In fact, neither side, East nor West, has an excuse to remain isolated, because technology and communications have become ubiquitous. “In the present age access to these teachings and practices will cease to remain the exclusive preserve of the monastic order, but will spread to the lay community as well, as has already been occurring throughout the Buddhist world both in the East and in the West. The spirit of democracy and the triumph of the experimental method demand that the means of mind-development be available to anyone who is willing to make the effort.” 24 Bodhi goes on to make the case that all the suffering in the world points to one particular solution. He quotes the Buddha’s short discourse in the Satipatthana Samyutta to the effect that:

"Protecting oneself, one protects others,
Protecting others, one protects oneself"

Doing these things, not squandering energy on foolish speculation but instead, taking actions that advance everyone on the way to enlightenment is the best way to remain relevant in this current situation. 25

Notes:

1 Cula-Malunkyovada Sutta. The Shorter Instructions to Malunkya in Buddhism Today.com at http://www.buddhismtoday.com/english/texts/majjhima/mn63.html accessed 25 February 2008.
2. Ibid.
3. Nila-kantha-chandra. “The Poisoned Arrow” in the Cuckoo’s Call Blog Wednesday, September 13, 2006 at http://cuckooscall.blogspot.com/2006/09/poisoned-arrow.html accessed 26 February 2008.
4. Berzin, Alexander. “The Fourteen Questions to Which Buddha Remained Silent” in The Berzin Archives February 2007 at http://www.berzinarchives.com/web/en/archives/sutra/level4_deepening_understanding_path/interferences/fourteen_questions_which_buddha_rem.html accessed 26 February 2008.
5. The Wanderling. “AVYAAKATA: The Buddha's Ten Indeterminate Questions” in Awakening 101 (Date unknown) at http://www.angelfire.com/electronic/awakening101/avyaakata.html accessed 26 February 2008.
6. Cula-Malunkyovada Sutta. Ibid
7. Ibid.
8. The Wanderling. Ibid.
9. Cula-Malunkyovada Sutta. Ibid.
10. Muess, Mark. “What Does It Mean to Lead a Spiritual Life? A Buddhist Perspective” Explore Faith.org 2002 at http://www.explorefaith.org/steppingstones_SpiritualLife_Buddhist.htm accessed 25 February 2008.
11. Tillich, Paul. Eternal Now (New York: Charles Scribners and Sons) 1963. Chapter 14.
12. Paul. “Letter to the Corinthians” King James Version Study Bible (Grand Rapids: Zondervan) 1 Corinthians 3:18.
13. Roth, Harold David. Original Tao: Inward Training (Nei-Yeh) and the Foundations of Taoist Mysticism (New York: Columbia University Press) 1999. Pg 185.
14. Lao Tzu, “Tao Teh Ching - Line-by-Line Comparisons: Beck Translation” at http://wayist.org/ttc%20compared/beck.htm accessed 25 February 2008.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Matthew 7:14, Revised New Standard Edition, Layman’s Parallel Bible Grand (Grand Rapids: Zondervan) 1991.
18. Thera, Dr K. Sri Dhammananda Nayaka Maha. “Buddhism As A Religion” at http://home.pacific.net.sg/~bvs/religion1.htm accessed 26 February 2008.
19. Muess, Ibid.
20. United Nations. “People and Poverty 2000: Globalization has yet to benefit the poor” in UN.org 17 October 2000 at http://www.un.org/events/poverty2000/backpp.htm accessed 26 February 2008.
21. Bodhi, Bhikkhu. “A Buddhist Response to Contemporary Dilemmas of Human Existence” in Access to Insight: Readings in Theravada Buddhism December 1993 at http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/bodhi/response.html accessed 26 February 2008.
22. Knierim, Thomas. “The Four Noble Truths” in The Big View.com (no date) at http://www.thebigview.com/buddhism/fourtruths.html#truth2 accessed 26 February 2008.
23. Verma, Chapla. Comments to TO, 17 February 2008.
24. Bohdi. Ibid.
25. Bodhi. Ibid.

I was watching Obama, with that regal bearing of his

And I knew that I had seen it before.

How well prepared was the US military prior to Vietnam?

Colonel Summers’ anecdote about his exchange with Colonel Tu of the NVA is telling.  Summers reportedly said to the North Vietnamese: “You know you never defeated us on the battlefield.” Tu responded: “This may be so, but it is also irrelevant.” Even in the aftermath of the war, analysts from the two sides were looking at two different battlefields. The Americans did not seem to recognize what they were looking at when they entered the war, and they were not sure what they saw on the way out.

In broad terms, it seems that both France and the US got distracted and bogged down combating the “insurgency” as if that was the center of gravity in the war. Harry Summers has made the point in many places that the counter-insurgency fight was a distraction from the conventional war that was utterly winnable in 1965 but utterly lost in 1975. Nixon seems to have intuitively recognized that the conventional nature of the enemy, and unleashed a bombing campaign against the North’s infrastructure that looked like a light version of Curtis Lemay’s campaign against the Japanese. What made Linebacker and Linebacker II light versions of total war is that there was not contemporary effort by the infantry to fight its way towards Hanoi. Instead, there were gestures towards conducting a conventional war, but that was only after the US public and government had lost faith in prosecuting the counter-insurgency that some have called “slow motion defeat” for the Americans.

The longer an insurgency or guerrilla force can stay in the field against a conventional force, the more likely it is that public opinion on the side of the conventional force will prove decisive. Eight years of war in the Colonies was enough for the British public to demand an end to the Revolutionary War in 1783. So that pattern has continued. On the other hand, if a conventional force can be seen rolling up an enemy and continuing the offensive, public opinion will allow the battles to continue. The key is taking the fight to the enemy’s true center of gravity and destroying his ability to fight effectively.

This gets back to the question of whether the American forces were well prepared for Vietnam. Assume for a moment that American leaders had perceived that North Vietnam was conducting a conventional invasion of the South with the VC guerrillas forming a skirmishers line to harass and pin down the more capable American force. Suppose for a moment that the Americans had rushed North in a bid to capture Hanoi and end the war. I recognize that the US leadership was wary of provoking the Soviets or the Chinese into a costly war the US might lose. However, not recognizing and fighting the conventional war that Vietnam actually was actually coaxed America into fighting a war that it DID lose.

We are all in agreement that the doctrine and training of the US armed forces was adequate prior to Vietnam. The US military won the conventional battles it fought, and when it applied tried and true counter-insurgency doctrine, that worked as well. The problem is that the senior leadership did not adopt the right strategy until too late. As soon as US forces began taking casualties, the clock of public opinion in the United States began ticking. US forces only get so long to achieve victory before they will be forced to withdraw.

We saw a repeat of that dynamic following the quick conventional victory against Iraq in 2003. US public opinion began to sour on the American presence in Iraq as soon as it appeared that there was a guerrilla force that was killing Americans and the US forces did not appear to be willing to take the fight to the enemy. When President Bush ordered the escalation of forces and a re-commitment to counter-insurgency principles, an when that strategy began to work, the American public was satisfied. Gen Petraeus did not invent the strategy now being employed, but he recognized the fight he was in, and responded appropriately. Just as in the Vietnam War, American forces were prepared and trained to fight and win the type of war ordered by senior leadership. The difference between victory or defeat then as now was whether the senior leadership had enough tempo in their OODA loops to prevent US public opinion from declaring defeat and forcing a withdraw from the field.

Mahayana Buddhism

The most fascinating aspect of Mahayana Buddhism is the idea offered by Paul Williams in Buddhist Thought that “Buddhism is thus an orthopraxy rather than orthodoxy.”(pg 99) Williams’ point here is that a Buddhist is free to believe anything that he wants, provided that he stays on the Eightfold Path. A Buddhist can believe that Buddha was a mortal who found the Path, taught others the way, then died. A Buddhist may also believe that Buddha was actually a deity, who still lives and may be experienced by the faithful Buddhist. For some, it is easier to follow the way of a mortal. For others, they find it easier to follow the way of a deity. Regardless of the individual Buddhist’s conception of the Buddha, both follow the way.

In the Christian tradition, there is much concern about the corrosive effects of orthopraxy divorced from orthodoxy. Many Christians worry that following the Ten Commandments, (which, as previously mentioned in another context, bear some resemblance to the Eightfold Path) or following the example of Christ without actually believing, will result in hypocrisy. In other words, people whose outward acts do not match their inner convictions will eventually stop acting in the correct way because they cannot see a point to continuing. At that moment, such a person will have neither orthodoxy nor orthopraxy, and will instead be cast adrift, likely to pursue ever more damaging behaviors. Since Christian salvation occurs after death, there is nothing concrete on this side of death that can be used as incentive.

Many Christians will argue that even the most disciplined follower of “correct actions” will eventually falter because the cravings of the flesh, or as it is expressed in the Christian tradition: “sin” will win out. There are many instances in the Epistles of Paul where he cautions followers that they must have faith even as they follow the laws. Paul, and many subsequent Christian commentators had a pessimistic view of the ability of men and women to continue living a wholesome life, doing wholesome things, without the under-girding of faith. Rules and punishment are no substitute for faith because there is nothing of value to be gained in this life so there is no reason, absent faith, to do good works.

Buddhists have a different conception. Although the Buddha taught in the Four Noble Truths that “Life is suffering,” he also taught that the cessation of suffering is possible. Followers of Buddha argue that it is possible to stay on the Path indefinitely through self-control and the application of rules that punish and correct deviance from the path. Further, in this life, Buddhism offers a culmination to staying the right path. That culmination point is nirvana. Christianity does not offer anything comparable in this life. Faith in Christ and doing good works allows a Christian to develop a temporary sense of well being, but since sin prowls this world like a hungry lion at all times, Christians are never free.

That being said, Buddhism does at least offer to me the solid example that orthopraxy is a viable alternative. Since Mahayana Buddhists can continue on the same path as those who believe something different within their own tradition, then perhaps a Christian can use the example of a Buddhist to maintain his own self control. The value of such an approach is clear. Self-control is a good thing to have, regardless of belief. Since self control is good, it is appropriate to find guidance in the maintenance of self control wherever one can. I know that I intend to try.

Scenes from my last performance evaluation

I didn't write this, but I wish that I had

Clemens: You want answers?

Congressman: I think I'm entitled to them.

Clemens: You want answers?

Congressman: I want the truth!

Clemens: You can't handle the truth! Son, we live in a world that has
baseballs. And those balls have to be hit by men with bats. Who's
gonna do it? You? You,Congressman? I have a greater responsibility
than you can possibly fathom. You weep for steroids and you curse
HGH. You have that luxury. You have the luxury of not knowing what I
know: that HGH, while illegal, probably sells tickets. And my
existence, while grotesque and incomprehensible to you, sells
tickets...You don't want the truth. Because deep down, in places you
don't talk about at parties, you want me on that mound. You need me
on that mound. We use words like fastball, slider, splitfinger...we
use these words as the backbone to a life spent playing a sport. You
use 'em as a punchline. I have neither the time nor the inclination
to explain myself to a man who rises and falls asleep to the
Sportscenter clips I provide,! then questions the manner in which I
provide it! I'd rather you just said thank you and went on your way.
Otherwise, I suggest you pick up a bat and dig in. Either way, I
don't give a damn what you think you're entitled to!

Congressman: Did you order the HGH?

Clemens: (quietly) I did the job you sent me to do.

Congressman: Did you order the HGH?

Clemens: You're goddamn right I did!!

Why the Philippines is the example of counter-insurgency done right

Both the Philippine counter-insurgencies proved to be successful. Given the results attained, it would appear that the counter-insurgency efforts were more similar than dissimilar. It is illuminating to examine how the counter-insurgencies were different. The counterinsurgencies were different in ways that proved to be largely irrelevant to the success of the effort. The counter-insurgency at the turn of the century was lead by United States forces who recruited locals to the effort, mostly to serve in civil positions and the local constabulary. The later counter-insurgency was an effort manned exclusively by Filipinos with minor US logistical and intelligence support, fighting an indigenous communist front made up of other Filipinos. The insurgency following the Spanish American War was a collection of loosely linked nodes operating independently, without coordination and with only nominal allegiance to the titular head, Aguinaldo. The Communists in the later insurgency were hyper-organized and controlled although there is the possibility this organization was more apparent on paper at NPA headquarters than on the ground.

Given the differences in who was leading the counter-insurgency, the US in one case, the Philippine Army in the other and the gap in time between the conflicts, it is striking how similar the efforts actually were. Both counter-insurgencies saw the greatest success when it came to rely on dispersed, independently operated units. Both counter-insurgency efforts made a priority of establishing local political control that had a chance to flourish under the protection of arms. Both sought to destroy those elements of the insurgency that were not willing to come under control of the government. The similarities in the two strategies separated by more than seventy years would make it seem that that commanders were operating out the same OPLAN or at least from the same doctrine. However, the counter-insurgency leaders did not adhere to any OPLAN and they had no access to doctrine. The counter-insurgencies in both cases made a virtue of necessity, and by doing so, independently arrived at the most effective strategy at fighting insurgents.

Regarding the issue of doctrine, the Philippine Army commanders engaged in the fight expressly denied that they were conducting the fight in adherence to US Army doctrine. Victor Corpus, a Philippine Army officer who defected to the Communists then returned to fight the insurgency, denied that he had learned anything from US Army doctrine. Instead, he adapted to the situation and what they learned from fighting the war. In the words of Corpus: "we drew mostly upon my experience. We didn't refer to any books. We had read the US manuals on low intensity conflicts, but we blamed those manuals for introducing COIN doctrines that only aggravated the situation. They apply conventional efforts to an unconventional situation. In particular, traditional civic action is a mere palliative. It does not go to the root causes of the problem, to the lack of democracy.”1

To Corpus, the crucial difference in successful vice un-successful counter-insurgency strategy was the sincerity and permanence of efforts to institutionalize democracy and address the legitimate concerns of the "grievance guerrillas."2  The strategy that Corpus advocated resulted in a "feeling among the populace that nonviolent avenues were available for interest articulation and realization." With Corpus and others in the Philippine Army pushing for sincere democratic reforms, people in the countryside were convinced to give up the insurgency. "They had given up precisely because the hardline approach.3

Was the fact that the Philippine Army counter-insurgency strategy so closely mirrored that of US Army counter-insurgency efforts prior to the Vietnam War-vintage COIN doctrine dismissed by Corpus, merely a coincidence? Did the winning strategy transcend the Philippine theater, or is there something unique in Filipino psychology or terrain that channeled strategy in one particular way? These appear to be unexamined questions. There does not seem to be any literature that would support or deny the theory that there is something in Filipino psychology that would result in one particular type of effective counter-insurgency strategy. Rather, it appears that the fact that the same strategy arose some eighty years apart, albeit in the same geographic location, is evidence that the counter-insurgency doctrine hit upon independently decades apart, is the appropriate way to counter “grievance guerrillas.”

The strategies of the successful counterinsurgency that arose independently find support in the US Marine Corps Small Wars Manual. The Marines who wrote that document noticed the imperative to contest insurgents with all available means with an emphasis on the moral and psychological. “The motive in small wars is not material destruction. It. is usually a project dealing with the social, economic, and political development of the people. It is of primary importance that the fullest benefit be derived from the psychological aspects of the situation. That implies a serious study of the people, their racial, political, religious, and mental development.”4  Serious study of foreign people takes time for a foreign counter-insurgency force, such as the United States Army in the Philippines. As for the Philippine Army, they had a head-start since they were of the same culture and psychology of the insurgents they were battling. Since the Philippine Army battalions were also living in the same environment as the insurgency they fought, those soldiers became all the more attuned to the culture and therefore, all the more effective.

Other successful counter-insurgencies share many of the characteristics of the Philippine campaigns. The Malay Emergency and the current US campaign in Iraq both resemble, in broad terms, the traits apparent in the Philippine counter-insurgency. Richard Clutterbuck, in his book The Long, Long War, identified the keys to the successful counter-insurgency in Malaysia: "Protection of the people and the government structure is essential. An extensive police force at the village level is also required."5   Clutterbuck’s description of the successful counter-insurgency are similar to those in the Philippines and those currently in effect by the US Army in Iraq.

There is little doubt that the Philippine Army, however fortuitously, went about their counter-insurgency in the right way. The key, which went un-remarked by Marks is that the Philippine Army had time to make sure their counter-insurgency worked. In the words of General in the current counter-insurgency fight in Iraq, “Counterinsurgency is a long-term proposition. The ability to fight counterinsurgency requires time and building-block approach for learning…”6  The reason the Philippine Army had the time to make their strategy worked is self evident; the government and the insurgents had no where else to go. Both sides would fight until the war ended one way or the other. Time is a luxury that foreign counter-insurgency forces do not always have, whereas indigenous counter-insurgencies can fight until resolution. However, so long as the counter-insurgency has the time to prosecute the strategy, the doctrine will be validated. If for some reason, the counter-insurgency must leave the field, the strategy will fail.

Ultimately, the Philippine Army had the time to grind down the Philippine Insurgency with a home-grown strategy that focused on the psychology of the insurgency and addressed the concerns of “grievance guerrillas.” Indigenous forces addressed the psychological needs of the grievance guerrillas and had the time to grind down and destroy recalcitrant revolutionaries. This is the essence of a counter-insurgency done right.

Notes:
1.  Marks, Thomas. Maoist Insurgency Since Vietnam (London: Frank Cass) 2003. Pg 136.

2.  Ibid. Pg 133.

3.  Ibid.

4.  United States Marine Corps Publications Small Wars Manual (Washington: United States Government) 1940. Pg 18.

5.  Clutterbuck, Richard. From The Long Long War, Quoted in "Insurgency and Counter-insurgency: Lessons from Malaya" in Ohio University E history at http://ehistory.osu.edu/vietnam/essays/insurgency/0006.cfm accessed 7 February 2008.

6.  Gaskin, Maj.Gen. Walter. “ DoD News Briefing with Maj. Gen. Gaskin from Iraq July 20, 2007” US Department of Defense News Transcript at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4012 accessed 7 February 2008.

I check out this site every Sunday night

postsecret.blogspot.com

You should too.

Who is the real TO?

I took a personality test and here are the results: "You are relatively open to new experiences. You are well-organized, and are reliable. You are relatively social and enjoy the company of others. You are good-natured, courteous, and supportive. You probably remain calm, even in tense situations."

According to the food test, I am Mexican Food: Spicy yet dependable. I pull punches, but people still love me

My animal personality? The crow. (What the heck?) "You love to talk and am very persuasive. You are curious, but careful not to poke your beak where it doesn’t belong. You love to travel, and people have a hard time keeping track of you."

According to face recognition software, I resemble Tom Cruise (67% similar), Matt Dillon (66%) or Rachel Bilson (64%). Augusto Pinochet (60%) made the list as well, but I don’t talk about that.

Is counter-insurgency the flip-side of insurgency?

Sam Sarkesian, in his book, Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare lamented the confusion and lack of agreement about basic terminology in the study of “revolutionary guerrilla warfare. “Revolutionary war, civil war, internal war, insurgency, resistance movements, guerrilla war, wars of national liberation, stability operations, internal defense, counter-insurgency - these are but a few examples of the proliferating terminology.”1  Sarkesian went on to point out that in studying the topic, scholars must remain conscious of the differences among the terms “definitions, concepts, model building and theories.”2  Given that the topic is large and confusing, it can nonetheless be approached as one might eat an elephant, one bite at a time. Therefore, let us examine the concept of insurgency and counter-insurgency, and examine their relative attributes in order to compare their characteristics.

The root of the English word insurgency is the Latin “insurgo”, a verb meaning “to rise up.” The Elementary Latin Dictionary quotes a line from Ovid: “Caesar paulatim insurgere” or Caesar rose to power.”3  The quotation highlights the neutral connotation in the Latin root of a political action in contrast with the current English usage that implies violence.4  Interestingly, the fourth principle part of the verb is “insurrectus,” from which it is clear that the English word “insurrection” arises.

A current United States military doctrinal publication defines insurgency as “an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control.”5  Thomas Marks fit this definition within the framework of the levels of military operations. "Insurgency is violence in support, strategically, of a political goal, operationally, of a political infrastructure, tactically, of local political domination.”6  Wray Johnson made the point that by the 1930’s, theorists in the Marine Corps had noted that insurrectionists seem to have a political goal the pursuit of which must be countered in novel ways. “This is a remarkable statement for an American military organization, with its emphasis on non-military solutions, to what had hitherto been viewed as exclusively a military problem.”7  Thus, we see a clear lineage of the term “insurgency” from its roots as a political term in the Latin to its consensus usage as a primarily political struggle between an authority and a challenger that features violence as one of the tools in the struggle.

Insurgencies contain a trap for leaders attempting to create a counter-insurgency strategy. Since the most visible features of insurgencies, especially the current generation insurgencies in the Middle East, Africa and Thailand, are brutal, nihilistic attacks on soft civilian targets, the natural reaction of authorities to such atrocities is to send troops to find and exact vengeance on the perpetrators. It is tempting for a government to respond with force against force, not only because the government views such a response as an effective counter-measure, but also because internal politics among the government’s supporters demands such a response. Although not exactly analogous, one calls to mind President Bush standing on the rubble of the World Trade Center rallying the workers there to rousing cheers by assuring them that the ones responsible for this would be hearing from America. The trouble with reprisal as the primary response to atrocity is that it is counter-productive. History has shown that unless the government is willing to exterminate everyone associated with an insurgency, including innocents, an insurgency is not diminished, but in fact grows. Insurgents convince their supporters that their shared grievances are political, economic or religious, and that their grievances are being ignored or actively thwarted by the government. Hence, reprisals serve to reinforce the idea implanted by the insurgents in the minds of the people that the government wants to attack rather than help.

To counter an insurgency, policy makers must adopt a multi-pronged response. The perpetrators of violence against civilians must be hunted down and destroyed but to the extent possible, with measured application of force. In general terms, armed insurgents must be countered with the minimum effective force of arms with the key being “effective. Not to respond is to encourage more attacks that will grow in severity in an effort to provoke a disproportionate response that the insurgency can exploit for propaganda purposes. In the words of the Small Wars Manual: “Delay in the use of force, and hesitation to accept responsibility for its employment when the situation clearly demands it, will always be interpreted as a weakness.”8

Additionally, the insurgent’s political claims must be countered with all other means. Counter-insurgency must provide peaceful political opportunities, bountiful economic opportunities, and display respect for indigenous cultures. The Small Wars Manual said it best: “Every means should be employed to convince such people of the altruistic intention of our Government.”9  An observer of the current situation in Iraq echoed the prescription offered in the Small Wars Manual: “Sustaining a commitment to allocating sufficient economic and political resources to get the job done will not be easy. It will require the indefinite presence of American advisers, political pressure, and persistence.”10  LtGen Odierno detailed the concrete economic steps that US forces have taken to show the Iraqis that the US has learned the lessons of the Small Wars Manual and is prepared to sustain the economic commitment: [Effective counterinsurgency] also requires the delivery of essential services, economic development and improved governance. It is what the Iraqi people want and what they deserve. In this regard, we are vigorously pursuing several programs to sustain our momentum, like establishment of a civil service corps, awarding microgrants and developing vocational technical courses.”11  While the ultimate success of the counter-insurgency in Iraq is still in question, it is clear that the counter-insurgency strategists are enacting policies first identified in the 1940’s.

Analysts of the type of conflicts known as “small wars” or “revolutionary guerrilla warfare” or “insurgencies” concur that the conflicts share a defining and common characteristic. This common characteristic is the political contest that underpins the conflict. Effective counter insurgency engages the insurgency where the insurgents are, in the economic and political realm, only replying to violence in a measured way. Ineffective counterinsurgency focuses on the secondary battlefield where the kinetic fight is and ignores or downplays the political and economic dimension. Therefore, the question must be answered, in terms of insurgency and counter-insurgency, is one the flip side of the other? In the strict definitions of the terms, the answer is yes. Anything the government does to resist the insurgency is a “counter-insurgency” until all areas are “white,” in Malay Emergency terms, or until the insurgency triumphs. The more pertinent question is, given the primacy of the political and economic components of an insurgency, what constitutes an effective counter-insurgency? The real contest is one of ideas about governance and about whom can best provide opportunities for the people. Effective counterinsurgency offers better ideas and opportunities under difficult and dangerous conditions.

Notes

1.  Sarkesian, Sam Charles. Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare (Chicago: Precedent Publishing) 1975. Pg 4.
2.  Ibid. Pg 19.
3.  Lewis, Thomas Charlton and Hugh McMaster Kingery. An Elementary Latin Dictionary (New York: American Book Company) 1918. Pg 429.
4.  Webster’s Online Dictionary. “Insurgency” at http://www.websters-dictionary-online.net/definition/insurgency accessed 16 January 2008.
5.  Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency (Washington: United States Marine Corps) 15 December 2006. Paragraph 1-2.
6.  Marks, Thomas. Maoist Insurgency Since Vietnam (London: Frank Cass) 2003. Pg 4.
7.  Johnson, Wray. Vietnam and the American Doctrine for Small Wars (Bangkok: White Lotus Press) 2001. Pg 21.
8.  United States Marine Corps Publications Small Wars Manual (Washington: United States Government) 1940. Pg 27.
9.  Ibid. Pg 23.
10.  Siperco, Ian. “Subversive Markets: The Economic Roots of the Iraq Insurgency” Royal United Services Institute Defence and Security Studies Website at http://rusi.org/research/studies/transatlantic/commentary/ref:C46AF3A8D53542/ accessed 18 January 2008. Pg 8.
11.  Odierno, LtGen Raymond T. “DoD News Briefing with Lt. Gen. Odierno from Iraq” US Department of Defense News Transcript at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4122 accessed 17 January 2008.

Bibliography

Johnson, Wray. Vietnam and the American Doctrine for Small Wars (Bangkok: White Lotus
Press) 2001

Lewis, Thomas Charlton and Hugh McMaster Kingery. An Elementary Latin Dictionary (New
York: American Book Company) 1918

Marine Corps Publication.Small Wars Manual (Washington: United States Government) 1940.

Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency (Washington: United States
Marine Corps) 15 December 2006

Marks, Thomas. Maoist Insurgency Since Vietnam (London: Frank Cass) 2003

Odierno, LtGen Raymond T. “DoD News Briefing with Lt. Gen. Odierno from Iraq” US
Department of Defense News Transcript at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4122

Sarkesian, Sam Charles. Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare (Chicago: Precedent Publishing) 1975.

Siperco, Ian. “Subversive Markets: The Economic Roots of the Iraq Insurgency” Royal United
Services Institute Defence and Security Studies Website, 2007 at
http://rusi.org/research/studies/transatlantic/commentary/ref:C46AF3A8D53542/ accessed 18 January 2008

Webster’s Online Dictionary. “Insurgency” at http://www.websters-dictionary-
online.net/definition/insurgency accessed 16 January 2008.

How appropriate is Buddhism in the West

The Buddhist monastic and lay community life is based on the directions contained in the vinaya. The vinaya contains the framework for the “Sangha” or monastic community. The vinaya contains the rules for the monastics, their interrelationships and for their relationships with their lay supporters.(jtb) Since the monastic community is necessary for the existence of Buddhism in the society, the monastery must be run in such a way as to serve the spiritual requirements of the society. Thus, the monks must follow the vinaya for the mutual benefit of the monastery and the society in which it resides. The vinaya ensures that while the monks renounce living in society, they are nonetheless dependent on that society in a reciprocal arrangement that Rupert Gethin calls “genius.” (Gethin, pg93) Buddha created the vinaya in the context of his society that was used to supporting aesthetics and monks who were on spiritual quests. Buddha adapted this existing relationship to make it more than just one of householders supporting and monks being supported. Instead, he created a system that represented a much closer relationship. “Buddhism is sometimes presented in the West as if the religion of the laity on one hand and of the clergy on the other are discontinuous, completely separate. That is wrong.” (Heine, pg48)


The Buddha was not inflexible in the rules he provided in the vinaya, and even during his life, amended the rules. Buddha distinguished between the truths that could not change and the concessions to living in society that monks had to make. “It is only the convention established and accepted for the smooth and orderly conduct of a particular community. As such, it is bound to be changed and modified in different places at different times according to need. Thus, the Buddha himself amended and modified some of the vinaya rules several times.” (Rahula, pg48)
Since the Buddha had set the precedent during his own life that the rules of the vinaya were not among the inviolate truths he established, monks who spread into communities outside India began to vary from traditionally accepted vinaya. The first monasteries outside India were located in Sri Lanka, a culture somewhat similar to the one at the roots of Buddhism. Changes in the vinaya for Sri Lankan monasteries were relatively minor. However, as Buddhism spread further afield from India, more dramatic changes were needed in the vinaya. Since the West possesses a culture very different from that in Asia, drastic changes would be needed for Buddhism to thrive in the West.


The lack of a monastic infrastructure in the West has stunted the growth of Buddhism in the West. One commentator has likened the attempt to spread Buddhism in the West as sowing seeds on rocks. Western culture is fundamentally different from that in Indian and Asia. He went on to note the primary difference in the cultures: “Here in the West we live in a profoundly non-monastic and non-contemplative society. And so to adopt these profound and esoteric contemplative practices and the monastic way of life without sufficient context is highly problematic.” (Hodel, pg 2) To respond to those changes, many Buddhist teachers have attempted to accelerate the training to connect with the shortened attention spans of their Western student, in order to get the seeds of the truth to germinate, even if there is little long-term hope that the lessons will persist in the students. Acceleration has proven largely ineffective. The commentator observed that Buddhism in the West is analogous to pouring water into sand, an effort that produces no effect. He concluded by saying that “recent trends in Tibetan Buddhism in the West suggest that it’s rapidly degenerating. One such trend is the commercialization of Buddhism, and another is the loss of much of its extraordinary intellectual and contemplative.” (Hodel, pg 9)

Even though the Buddhist vinaya is flexible, and worked well to facilitate the spread of Buddhism into regions in Asia that bore some similarities to India, it has not proved flexible enough to gain acceptance in the West. Westerners are too individualistic and too impatient to subordinate themselves to the culture and take the time necessary to achieve nirvana. Interestingly, the affluence of the Western culture appears capable of corrupting of Buddhist teachers, who come to teach, but find themselves drawn to the material goods that students can offer in exchange for teaching. Given the vast differences in Western culture and the requirements of the Buddhist life, it would appear that Buddhism is not appropriate in the Western context

Sources
Gethin, Rupert. The Foundations of Buddhism (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 1998.

Heine, Steven, Charles S. Prebish, Buddhism in the Modern World (Oxford: Oxford University
Press) 2003.

Hodel, Bryan. “Tibetan Buddhism in the West: Is it working here? An Interview with Alan
Wallace” Tricycle: The Buddhist Review, Summer 2001

Jtb. “Vinaya Pitaka: The Basket of the Discipline” Access to Insight Website at
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/vin/index.html accessed 31 January 2008.

Rahula, Walpola. “The Problem of the Sangha in the West” quoted in Heine, Buddhism in the
Modern World

Gushing like a school-girl

Mark Levin sounds like a school-girl gushing over Zac Efron when he talks about Reagan. Reagan was a good president for the first 5 years or so, but, his last few years in office were an embarrassment. His press conferences were painful and he sounded more like an addled geriatric rather than an inspiring leader. It is bad when someone like George Bush I generated a sense of relief that there was finally someone who seemed competent in the office. From my vantage point, Reagan got rolled by the likes of Tip O’Neill, Jim Wright the Iranians, Hezbollah, and Sam Donaldson, and ended up making compromises on Supreme Court Justices, immigration and taxes that hurt this country.

But Levin assures us that Reagan was making compromises from the right. And that bad old Democrats flummoxed him on taxes and enforcing the border and what not. Hmmm, so that explains it. I have to tell you, these examples of Reagan’s bona fides as a great leader are not particularly compelling. And does it really matter where you are coming from if you end up wallowing in the pig pen with the Dems?

I put George W Bush up against Reagan, and W comes off looking pretty good. W has guts, never backs down when the Democrats challenge him, only compromises when other Republicans object to his policies, cut taxes and is smashing jihadis around the world. He always displays good humor, command of the issues and is a humble inspiration. He always wins. His administration has been an ethical breath of fresh air. I am an officer in the Marine Corps, and I see in George W Bush the same kind of guts that you see in the Marines walking point like the one Michael Ledeen highlighted in a post earlier today. The closest I have come to supporting Romney was when he mentioned that President Bush should be commended for his leadership. None of the rest have W’s strength of character in the political arena, and I would include McCain in that list. It has been a major disappointment to me that this crop of mediocrities running for president has run away from the current President, especially since Bush will eventually be lauded as the best since Lincoln.

Hillary for Prez!

Sorry about  the formating on the previous post, and I couldn't make it work so I left it.  Contrary to reports, I was not in my cups.

I am down on Giuliani for exactly the reason I wrote.  What a president believes about abortion is not that important to me. Giuliani said he would pick judges like Roberts and a court full of judges like Roberts will send abortion back to the states. Depending on how important access to abortion is to someone, that person could live where it is readily available and paid for by the state, like in Maine, or completely unavailable like South Dakota or Mississippi. Let the people have a choice.

If Hillary were smart, she would recognize that Obama is a force of nature among liberals, and not tangle with him. Instead, she should tack all the way to the right, farther right than McCain (not that that would be that hard) and become a ruthless hunter of Islamics and champion of Gunatanamo. She could pledge to appoint Patraeus as Sec Def. She should ask Lieberman to be her VP. She voted for the war, so it would not be hard to make the case that she is actually a conservative but she thought she had to hide it to get the Democrat vote. She could cast the race as a three way between her, a JFK-style "strong America" Democrat, Obama and McCain and give conservatives someone to vote for.

She is going to lose anyway if she doesn't do something drastic, this way she would have the chance to pick up despairing Republicans and maybe do a juijitsu on Obama. It would rock him like nothing he ever saw on the mean streets of Honolulu growing up.